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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 MARXISTS INTO MUSLIMS: 
 
THE IRANIAN IRONY 
 
by 
 
Abdolrahim Javadzadeh 
Florida International University, 2007 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Barry B. Levine, Major Professor 
 This dissertation examines the influence of Islamic ideology on Iranian Marxists 
during the 1979 revolution. The purpose of this study is to extricate the influence of 
Islamic culture, ideology, and terminology on Marxist organizations and on individuals 
who identified themselves as Marxists in Iran. This is especially of interest since in many 
ways Marxism and Islam are ideologically in conflict. Were Marxists aware of the 
influences of Islam in their behavior and ideology? To investigate the irony publications 
put forth by several Marxist organizations before and after the 1979 revolution were 
examined. A history of such influence both ideologically and contextually is depicted to 
demonstrate their political and cultural significance.  
            Through the study of Marxist political organs, theoretical publication and political 
flyers distributed during and after the revolution, the phenomenon of Marxists converting 
to an Islamic ideology became clearer. Many Marxist organizations were demonstrably 
utilizing Islamic political ideology to organize and mobilize masses of Iranians. This 
study shows a historical precedence of Marxists’ usage of Islam in the political history of 
Iran dating back to early twentieth-century. 
 vii
 Primary and secondary Marxist literature showed that Islam was an inescapable 
social and political reality for Iranian Marxists. Not only was there a common upbringing 
but a common enemy fostered provisional collusion between the two. The internalizing 
the idea of martyrdom—of Shi’a Islam—was a shared belied that united Marxists with 
Muslins in their attempt to effect sociopolitical change in Iran. Studying Marxist 
publications shows evidence that many Iranian Marxists were not conscious of using 
Islamic ethics and terminology since Islamic beliefs are part of the taken-for-granted 
world of Iranian culture. This contextual belief system, pervasive within the culture and a 
change of political ideology is what created the conditions for the possibility of Marxists 
becoming Muslims.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
THE 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
 
 The path for a political culture and Islamic discourse was made prior to the 1979 
revolution…the resistant Islam of Khomeini, the fundamentalist Islam of Shariati, and 
liberal Islam of Bazargan, and the Liberation Movement were among the nationalist 
constitutional culture. 
    John Foran 
 
 
 In 1979, the Iranian people gathered enough force to finally oust one of the more 
authoritarian rulers in the Middle East, Mohammad Reza Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty. 
The Shah’s regime was uprooted in a matter of months despite its vast military power and 
Gestapo-like secret police, the SAVAK. His regime, dubbed an ‘island of stability’ by 
American President Jimmy Carter, was not able to withstand the force behind the 
discontent of the Iranian masses. The Pahlavi dynasty, which had ruled Iran for more than 
fifty years (1925 to 1979 between the Shah and his father, Reza Shah) was toppled in 
early February 1979. Even internationally, those who had previously come to assist the 
Shah no longer perceived his regime as salvageable. In the Guadeloupe Conference, the 
heads of four ally nations of Iran (U.S., Britain, France, and Germany), suggested that it 
was time for the Shah to leave.1 Consequently, he fled the country on January 16, 1979, 
which marked a new era for the Iranian people. They were now ready to create a 
government of their own choosing, at the very least one that guaranteed basic human 
rights. The result was establishment of an Islamic republic. The new government, 
however, did not fully carry out the political and economic demands of the Iranians.  
                                                 
1 Gholamreza Nejati. 2000. tarikh-e- siasi-e bist va panj saley-e Iran (Twenty-five Years of Iranian 
 Political History). (Tehran: Rasa Cultural Institute). 
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 The Iranian revolution as a mass social revolution involved almost all classes and sectors 
of Iranian society against a dictator. Blue- and white-collar workers, peasants, small 
business owners, traditional merchants, students, intellectuals, women, and Iranian 
students abroad were involved in overthrowing the Shah. Marxist, Muslim, and 
nationalist organizations and individuals played major roles in organizing the masses. It 
took several months for the actors to become sufficiently organized to create a 
revolutionary force – a force so powerful that not even Shah’s mighty military was able 
to contain it.  
  On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after 14 years of exile. 
The enthusiasm with which millions of Iranians greeted Khomeini may have marked the 
first signs of the type of state that would be established in Iran. Islamic ideology, values, 
and ethics had played a significant role in Iranian culture for hundreds of years. After the 
Shah’s departure, an interim government was set up first under the name of the 
Provisional Islamic Republic of Iran. It took the new government almost two years to 
suppress the established forces in the opposition, both Muslim and Marxist. Once most of 
the opposition was eliminated, the Islamic Republic of Iran was established. 
 Through the laws of Islam and under the auspices of a new Islamic revolution, more 
political pressure was exerted on the people. Invariably, groups in the opposition were 
dubbed anti-revolution and banned by the new Islamic Republic government. This held 
true for all groups of the opposition, both Marxist and Muslim.  The new government not 
only restricted all sorts of political freedoms, but also dubbed as anti-Islamic many older 
traditions and cultural values, e.g., the Norooz (New Year) celebration; these were then 
banned.   
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  The problem to be examined in this work involves the influence of Islamic culture 
and ideology on Iranian Marxist organizations. This is of special interest because the two 
belief systems, Marxism and Islam, are in direct opposition. Such an examination of 
Marxism in Iran begins with two primary questions: What culture-specific factors 
contributed to Marxists’ conversion to Islam? Were they aware of the influences of Islam 
and Islamic culture? The notion of Marxists using Islam or becoming Muslims is seldom 
stated or implied in research on Iranian Marxists or the Islamic revolution. The subject of 
who converted to whose ideology is usually examined to demonstrate Muslims’ use of 
Marxism and not widely understood as Marxists’ conversion to Islam.   
  The primary purpose of this dissertation is to study some of the literature and print 
materials published by Marxist organizations in Iran to extract the traditionally 
overlooked Islamic terminology and ideas that pepper their literature. A secondary 
purpose is to examine and unveil both contextual and ideological inclinations of political 
Marxist organizations in Iran.2  
  The “contextual Islam”, according to Mesbahi, was/is part of a “tripartite Islamic 
complex” array of “manifestations of Islam” in both pre and post revolutionary Iran:  
 “Each one of these tripartite complex was acting in a separate but reinforcing function, 
collectively- consciously or sub-consciously- conditioning the emotive/symbolic ethos, the 
ideational choices, and political strategies and predicaments of all secular opposition 
groups and more specifically the Marxists.”3
 
                                                 
2 I am indebted to Dr. Mohiadin Mesbahi for explaining to me the meaning of “contextual Islam” for the 
purposes of my dissertation. Through extensive conversations he made clear the idea behind this concept 
and how it works in the Iranian political culture.  
 
3 Interview with Dr. Mesbahi, October 13, 2006. 
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  Finally, this work creates a source for those who are interested in the Iranian 
revolution and its outcome. It also shows how ideologies, as rigid as they may seem, are 
transformed and can look completely different after changes take place.  
  There are four facets to this research. The first studies the Islamic ideology and 
belief system as a political force against the Shah (Pahlavi Dynasty) and the impressions 
it made on Iranian Marxists. The second part delves into the ideas of Marx on religion 
and false consciousness vis-à-vis Iranian Marxism. The third part examines a history of 
Iranian Marxism as it pertains to Islam and the Islamic movement before and after the 
1979 revolution. Finally, the fourth part is an examination of the significance of hybrid4 
(Marxist-Muslim) organizations and the individuals within the Iranian opposition. The 
overall objective is to create a new understanding of Iranian Marxism using the sociology 
of knowledge to study Marxists and their relationship to Islam in Iran. 
  The Shah referred to the armed opposition as “Islamic Marxists.”5 However, the 
revolution became possible because of a more complex set of ideas than the Shah 
imagined and the cooperation among the groups within the multifaceted opposition. 
While it is true that the revolution was spontaneous,6 leaders of the opposition had to 
rethink and revise their ideas to adjust to popular demands. This was true for both 
Marxists and Muslims. The common understanding by the left in Iran is that it was 
Muslim leaders who borrowed from Marxist ideology, and not the other way around. It is 
more plausible to claim, however, especially during the revolution, that it was Marxists 
                                                 
4 Hybrid organizations are those that used both Marxism and Islam to create a third view. Naturally, some 
inclined more toward Islam and some more toward Marxism. 
 
5 Maziar Behrooz. 1999. Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran. London, New York: I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, p. 11.  
 
6 Ibid. p. 13. 
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(some, not all) who did the ideological borrowing from Islam and who converged 
ideologically. This dissertation seeks to demonstrate how the self-identified Marxists 
could become advocates of Islam and avid supporters of the Islamic Republic 
government. 
  As the revolution progressed toward the establishment of a new state, several 
Marxist organizations abandoned their ideas of a separate movement and embraced Islam 
as a revolutionary alternative. Those who were conscious of this amalgam, including 
Ehsan Tabari, a prominent theorist of the Tudeh Party, claimed that they knowingly 
merged with Islam. They have rationalized their conversion to Islam as a new ideology as 
reasonable and scientific.7 According to Tabari, part of the reason behind the failure of 
the Marxists in Iran was “Marxist disbelief in religion including Islam, and their proud 
rejection of rich Islamic principles.”8 Among Marxists with overt deference to Islam are 
those who claim to have tactically (short-term and for the good of the revolution) 
borrowed ideas, but not ideology, to mobilize and organize the revolutionary masses.9 
For them, there were two types of Islam: one form as advocated by clerics such as 
Boroujerdi, who defended the Shah, and another form as espoused by advocates of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Islam. The former, dubbed reactionaries, were trying 
to degrade the real, resistant Islam, “an Islam whose amplifier is Imam Khomeini. These 
[reactionaries] were trying to provoke the oppressed Muslims of the world against our 
victorious revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”10  
                                                 
7 Ehsan Tabari. 1992. Kazhrahe (Diversion). Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications. 
 
8 Ibid. p. 14. 
 
9 Donya, Theoretical and Political Journal of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran. No. 6, 
September 1980. 
10 Ibid. p. 18. 
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  For some researchers, Islam is a progressive movement with answers for 
everything; for others it is an ideology for a resistance movement. According to Michael 
Fischer, “Islam creates meaning. It is what tells people how to behave, a world view that 
has an answer for all human problems.”11 Theda Skocpol claims that “Islam is a gradual 
organizer with a network of clergy which resists and opposes inside and outside 
oppressors to mobilize people and start a revolution.”12 For John Foran, cultural elements 
within Islam are useful in resistance. Foran states, “The culture of resistance is the result 
of many groups. They analyze the political economy using cultural elements which 
correspond to the experience of everyday life.”13 Foran further says, “the path for a 
political culture and Islamic discourse was made [prior to the 1979 revolution]…[the] 
resistant Islam of Khomeini, the fundamentalist Islam of Shariati, and liberal Islam of 
Bazargan, and the Liberation Movement were among the nationalist constitutional 
culture.”14  
  What I hope to achieve in this dissertation is an examination of Iranian Marxism 
and Marxists, and an understanding of the degree to which they have been influenced by 
Islam to convert to Islam. Although there is a brief look at Muslim groups and hybrid 
organizations, the dissertation is mainly focused on the Marxists and their Islamic 
inclinations. The main idea is classification of the dynamics of this relationship. The 
particular focus is on Iranian Marxists and culture-specific Iranian Marxism. This study 
                                                 
11 Michael Fischer. 1980. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Madison, WS: University of 
Wisconsin Press. p. 14. 
 
12 Theda Skocpol. 1994. Revolution in the Third World. NY: Cambridge University Press. p. 249. 
 
13 John Foran. 1999. Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution. 
Translated by Ahmad Tadayyon. Tehran: Rasa Cultural Services, 1999. p. 122. 
 
14 Ibid. 
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follows the trajectory of Marxism and Marxists in Iran in the 20th century, and 
specifically, examines the Marxists’ inclinations toward Islam and Islamic ethics, their 
ideological conversion at times, and their tradition of using Islamic terminology.  
  Readers must bear in mind that this work is not a based on representative sample 
of all Iranian Marxists, but instead is an attempt to create an ideal type (a la Weber) of 
those Iranian Marxists who accepted Muslim influence.15 According to Weber, ideal 
types are: 
 One-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great 
many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints 
into a unified analytical construct.16  
 
 This work is, therefore, not an exhaustive review of all literature published by Iranian 
Marxists, but rather those who were especially influenced by Islamic ideology and its 
belief system. 
 
 Methodology  
  In order to establish itself after the revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran used 
repression to eliminate all opposition. Nonetheless, two major Marxist organizations, the 
Tudeh Party17 and the Fadaeean (majority)18, collaborated with the Islamic Republic 
state. Although they became advocates of Islam, the regime did not spare any group or 
individual in the opposition. As a result, even these collaborators soon became the subject 
of political persecution, following the elimination of other Marxist and Muslim 
                                                 
15 Max Weber. 1949. Methodology of the Social Sciences. Glencoe, Ill: Freepress. 
 
16 Ibid., p. 90. 
 
17 A major Marxist organization founded in 1941. See chapter 5 for more details. 
18A Marxist organization that split from the original Organization of Iranian Fadaee Guerillas a few months 
into the revolution. See chapter 5 for more details.   
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organizations. Anyone caught with written material that questioned Islam, the Islamic 
Republic government, or any member of the government, especially Ayatollah Khomeini, 
was immediately arrested and subject to execution.  
 While both Marxists and Muslims played a major role in organizing the opposition, the 
influence of Muslims on Marxists during the revolution has not been thoroughly 
examined. This is especially true of the influence of Islam on Iranian Marxists. Due to the 
nature and outcome of the revolution, study of Marxist organizations and their role during 
the revolution has been neglected. The most interesting part of their involvement was in 
providing ideological support for the new Islamic government. They were instrumental in 
creating a political ideology that gravitated more and more toward Islam. Some Marxists 
despite an ideological conflict with Islam both in realms of theology and more 
importantly polity, were able to make the necessary adjustments to concur with Islam. 
For this topic, therefore, the author has examined publications produced by some Marxist 
organizations and groups during the two years of upheaval (1978-1980). 
  Using Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge as a 
constructionist methodology, this dissertation sets out to explain those variables active in 
the conversion of Marxists to Islam in Iran. The contentious politics between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and leftist organizations has gone through ebbs and flows, but has 
always remained antagonistic. Many Iranian Marxists, to this day, are in a state of shock 
in observing the establishment, and consequently the perseverance, of the Islamic 
Republic. At first glance into any Marxist organization’s literature, one would be 
convinced that Muslims had stolen the revolution and, contrary to its true nature, dubbed 
it an Islamic revolution. 
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  Reading Iranian Marxist literature reveals an unconvincing duality: Marxists did 
all the work yet Muslims took the credit; the masses were secular yet the outcome was 
religious. Marxist literature is replete with this contradiction. How could a revolution as 
such, result in an Islamic Republic? The anomaly of the intention of the revolution and its 
consequence became the subject of many Marxist publications.  
  Except for Marxist literature, I was not able to find serious research referring to 
Marxist political activity and the outcome of the revolution. The more I researched and 
the more I traveled to Iran, the more strongly I saw the need for new thoughts and ideas 
related to Islam and Marxism. It seemed that Marxism as a Western idea should be 
entirely out of place in Iran, especially if it did not take into consideration Shi’a Islam as 
it relates to Iranian history. What would Iranians say to a ruthless criticism of Islam, as 
put forth by Marx? Marxist critique is not only anti-Islam and anti-traditional Islam, it is 
also a Western or non-Islamic concept.  
  The question for me was no longer how Marxists and Marxism influenced the 
Islamic revolution or participating Muslims. Rather, it became how Marxists were 
influenced by Islam and Muslims in a struggle against a despotic regime. It was not 
Muslims who used Marxism as a political tool, but Marxists who used Islam to seek 
popular support. The contention here is that Marxists were too immersed in Islam to 
recognize that they were deterred from criticizing Islam in a ruthless critique that Marx 
would have approved of. Marxists contributed to creating an Islamic republic without 
even realizing their role in doing so.  
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Research Design  
  For years Iranian Marxists have been entangled in an unending discussion on how 
to interact with the Islamic Republic of Iran. To this day they have not been able to agree 
on any specific political strategy. A major point of conflict has been whether they should 
accommodate with the Islamic regime, or try to overthrow the regime through a 
revolution. To this end, discourse often revolves around whether collaboration with the 
Islamic Republic government is a possibility. Deep rifts among Marxists have persisted 
for close to three decades with no concrete results. I will try to show the deep Islamic 
roots that exist within the purview of Iranian Marxists and that as a consequence, there 
persists lack of a critical view of Islam. This is in part what has caused their theoretical 
stagnation. Any Marxist organization contemplating political power and state building 
would have to seriously consider Islamic culture within Iranian society. This research 
uses the sociology of knowledge to examine the ideas of Iranian Marxists, specifically as 
they relate to the ideas of Islam and those of the Iranian Muslim movement.  
  I decided to study the question of Marxists and their collaboration with the 
Islamic regime using a collection of primary sources that was uniquely at my disposal. 
Once I got a hold of the collection, I had to decipher the material related to Marxists 
converting and collaborating with Islam and Muslims. Simple political allegiance was 
insufficient; to agree with an Islamic government on political issues does not demonstrate 
the pervasiveness of Islam. It may only indicate a short-term coalition. There had to have 
been more to the use of Islam by Marxists. These sources would not reveal much about 
the fundamentals of Islamic belief in all aspects of life, that is, in all socialization 
processes. Studying the question of how Marxists shifted their ideology to adhere to 
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Islam was the original intention of this research. However, while researching the question 
at hand, I came across a deeper, more profound adaptation of ideology by the Marxists – 
a cultural or contextual adaptation.19 To gather data illustrating both kinds of adaptation – 
ideological and contextual – both primary and secondary sources belonging to Marxists 
were examined.  
  For a depiction of socialization through Islam that would include all Iranian 
Marxists, I had to gather data from many sources. I read biographies written by Marxists, 
memoirs, and material pertaining to how the Islamic ethos related to struggle, e.g., 
martyrdom. Through these sources I realized, for the first time, the depth of Islamic belief 
in the construction of the social world of every Iranian, including Marxists. It became 
clear to me that in order to get to the depths of Islam within Iranian Marxism, I had to 
study not just literature but behavior, socialization processes, and more importantly 
culture-specific beliefs. For this purpose I used a constructionist method, Karl 
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge.   
  Constructionist sociology sets the stage by asking questions such as: Who creates 
the social and political definitions? Where do ideas come from? What are the 
circumstances that give rise to certain actions? This method of questioning does not take 
anything for granted. Meaning is not inherent in the act; it must be constructed. There is, 
therefore, a never-ending skepticism toward determinism. Set against positivist 
sociology, that which measures the ‘out there-ness’ of the causes of social phenomena, 
constructionism begins and ends through the ‘in here-ness’ of the social issue. Thus the 
causes for creation of an Islamic Republic in Iran can be found in the Islamism of the 
                                                 
19 These ideas became clear to me through conversations with Dr. Mesbahi; Associate professor of 
International Relations at Florida International University. He demonstrated the significance of the culture 
of Islam within Iranian Marxists through our discussions, which he dubbed “Contextual Islam.” 
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Iranian population. By the same argument, the reasons behind Marxists converting to 
Islam before and after the 1979 revolution are to be found within Marxists themselves. 
The question of how Iran ended up with an Islamic republic as a consequence of the 
revolution can be answered by Marxists; all they need to do is look inside and observe the 
intensity and depth of Islamic belief within themselves. Through a constructionist 
argument, the religion of Islam can be treated as an independent variable. Here Islam 
generates, creates, struggles, and makes definitions and moral judgments.  
  Using Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge as a method to study the roots of 
Islam within Iranian Marxism requires the demonstration of Islamic belief as background. 
Marxist leaders were brought up as Muslims and were active in Islamic groups. These are 
related to the depth of Islamic belief within Iranian Marxism and within Marxist 
individuals. Several factors proved important in understanding the extent of Islamic belief 
among Marxists. To begin with there was their upbringing, how they were socialized into 
the world through an Islamic understanding of the world. Through socialization, language 
is constructed. Hence their prevailing terminology, even political terminology, was 
Islamic. Islamic concepts such as martyrdom (shahid) were key ingredients used by 
Marxists and Muslims alike in terms of resistance and fighting against the oppressors. 
Furthermore, gender relations among Marxist groups adhered to the same Islamic ways 
of gender separation normative in Islamic upbringing. Islamic traditions were so tightly 
adhered to that often Marxists did not need to convert to Islam; it was their only way of 
life, the only world they knew. The adaptation of Islam to the political life of Marxists 
was both strategic and tactical. It was strategic in Islam’s non-separation of religion and 
state, which Marxists never questioned, and tactical in acknowledging an Islamic 
 12
government as a viable anti-imperialist revolutionary alternative. The latter made many 
Marxists change their orthodox Marxist belief system entirely. 
  Included in this dissertation is a brief history of the events related to instances of 
Marxist-Muslim cooperation. It begins in 1920, with the cooperation of Marxists and 
Muslims against the central government in Iran, and against the Russian and British 
forces. Later, in the 1960s, following the uprising in the city of Qom, the Marxist and 
Muslim struggle entered a new era in fighting against the Shah. The early 1970s saw the 
inception of armed struggle as a new stage in opposing and later overthrowing the Shah’s 
regime. This led to the 1979 revolution, which was the culmination of the involvement of 
Muslims and Marxists in the political setting.  
  Political discourse in Iran is usually studied and portrayed with Muslims 
(especially Shariati and the Mojahedin) using Marxism. In this dissertation, however, the 
idea is reversed. Although the author does not claim that this is the only study of Marxists 
becoming Muslims, it is certainly rare to find such an argument in Iranian political 
writing. The primary literature referred to in this dissertation is specifically used to 
address the question of how and why Marxists became Muslims. Once the Islamic regime 
announced the opposition groups to be subversive and anti-revolutionary, their books and 
all written material were banned. As a result books were destroyed and an attempt was 
made to erase a piece of history from the minds of Iranians.  
 In the summer of 2003, I became privy to a large collection of primary sources. They 
were put at my disposal by a close friend, someone I grew up with in Iran. Our 
discussions about Iranian Marxists and their shortcomings over the years led this person 
to believe that reading some primary sources would help me gain perspective on the 
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entire process of the 1979 revolution. These materials were books and booklets, flyers, 
and political newspapers banned by the Islamic regime following the political purges of 
all opposition groups in 1981-1982. The books were mainly by the Tudeh Party of Iran. 
Topics covered a variety of subjects. They were mostly on Islam and the new Islamic 
Republic of Iran, and how Marxists should or should not work and collaborate with the 
regime. At that time I had no plans to include the material in any form of writing or 
academic research. 
  Although 24 years had gone by, the topics and subjects depicted in the material 
still seemed alive and fresh. Many of them had later fomented splits, political positions, 
and events that had grave effects on the outcome of the revolution and the groups 
themselves. There was a rich history in every topic mentioned. My familiarity with the 
history of Marxist organizations in Iran during the revolution helped me sort out events 
and groups. This collection became the material that would enable me to dissect what had 
actually occurred during the revolution. With a few exceptions, almost all of the material 
consisted of primary sources, invaluable for a sociologist. They were views and political 
positions on specific events and personalities of the revolution. During the period of the 
formation of the new state, many groups became involved in intense political discussions 
to determine its future. The magnitude of this process made political actors scrutinize 
every political position and idea put forth by all group and parties, making groups delve 
into their ideology more than ever before. They either adhered to Islam and an Islamic 
regime or distanced themselves from it altogether. 
  Originally my research was to include an exclusive study of major Marxist 
organizations, demonstrate their adherence to Islam, especially to the Islamic Republic 
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government in Iran. Once the collection of material was discovered, I looked for specific 
references made by Marxists about collaborating with the Islamic regime. There were 
particular events that would require Marxists’ attention; addressing these events would 
indicate to others the degree to which they deviated from Marxism. The direction of my 
initial research was to investigate Marxists’ perception of ideological affinity with Islam 
and Muslims. The task of investigating a more profound use of Islam by Marxists came 
later as I was finishing analysis of the primary sources. This is the point at which the idea 
of contextual Islam became a viable subject for investigation.20  
  Prior to finding this collection of materials, there were seldom primary sources 
available to those who lived abroad. This was especially true two years after the 
revolution, when all such books were banned. The collection presented an opportunity for 
me to reanalyze what had been originally analyzed by the original actors. Prior to reading 
the material, my only sources of information on the events of the revolution and the 
groups involved were materials published abroad. These sources included idiosyncratic 
interpretations of the views and events in Iran. As a result, the reader lacked an 
opportunity for objective interpretation and analysis. Finding this collection, therefore, 
was an exciting discovery, whether or not the materials would be used in a paper.  
  Naturally, I read the collection in quest of the sophisticated methodology through 
which Marxists rationalized working with an Islamic regime. Despite my original 
intentions, I detected not only a tactical, short-term collaboration with the Islamic regime, 
but a deep conversion to Islam by actors who, according to their professed ideology, 
should have been more critical. The ease with which some Marxist groups justified a 
                                                 
20 The idea of contextual Islam was constructed by Dr. Mesbahi who was on my dissertation committee. 
Through extensive discussions with him he demonstrated how an Islamic belief system was part of every-
day life of all politics and political activity including that of Marxists. 
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political collaboration with Muslims required a deeper understanding of the culture. The 
search for political and short-term acceptance of Islam led me to investigate the 
fundamentals of such an ideological conversion. Collaboration with an Islamic regime 
could indicate substantial Islamic belief and ideas within the ranks of Marxists and that 
was what I set out to find out. 
 
 Description of Sources 
  The primary sources used to depict Marxist adoption of and conversion to Islam 
are actual flyers, pamphlets, books, and papers published by the Tudeh Party (hezb-e 
tudeh Iran), Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaeean Majority and Minority (sazman-e 
cherik-ha-ye fadaee-e khalgh-e Iran), Paykar (sazman-e paykar dar rah-e azadi-eh 
tabagheye kargar), Organization of Iranian Peoples Mojahedin (sazman-e mojahedin-e 
khalgh-e Iran), the Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari), as well as 
Marxist and Muslim individuals. These were the groups most active during the 
revolution. Secondary sources are books written in Persian about Iran and the 1979 
revolution in Iran, in addition to books written by non-Iranian authors after the 
revolution.  
  The primary sources came from a collection of literature buried in the yard of an 
old house in a remote village of 30 to 40 families, a long drive from the capital city, 
Tehran. At the time of my travel in 2003, the last 10 kilometers were not paved and 
consisted only of a dirt road that led to the village. It is hidden in a valley in a 
mountainous region in northern Iran. There we found the books and booklets untouched – 
the way the owner had left them close to 20 years before. The owner of the books had put 
the books in three layers of plastic bags and then in gunnysacks, and had buried them in 
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the front yard of a house. We dug up the gunnysacks and carried the bags into the house. 
The material had remained intact. This was a collection of books, flyers, pamphlets, 
hand-written books, and papers, mostly of Marxist groups. The entire collection consisted 
of about 300 to 320 pieces. It was mainly the owner’s political activity during the 
revolution that had motivated her to stash the collection in a safe place. These were the 
“banned books worth saving” according to the owner.21 It should be made clear that such 
material was available to any researcher at the time. What made it special to me was a 
chance to study and examine fresh and first-hand primary sources. 
  The owner of the collection had hidden them in fear of getting caught by the 
Islamic regime, which might have caused my contact a long-term prison sentence or even 
execution. The collection had to either be destroyed or hidden in a very safe place. For 
almost two years after the revolution, some groups’ publications were still in circulation 
among leftists and Marxists in Iran. This person’s duties in the organization consisted of 
keeping a copy of each publication. The 300+ books, booklets, and pamphlets were 
“probably one-tenth of the entire collection,” the owner had told me. Most of the books 
were burned or thrown into lakes, rivers, and wells. The stashed-away collection was 
handpicked as qualitatively the most important items.  
  I was trusted with the materials not only because of the owner’s long relationship 
with me, but perhaps more importantly, because I would be able to utilize the collection 
and contribute toward writing a piece of history usually not the subject of social scientific 
research. We had engaged in long on-going discussions on the role of Marxists during the 
revolution.  My contention was that some Marxist groups played a major role in the 
stabilization of the new Islamic regime although it was ironic for Marxists to collaborate 
                                                 
21 For purposes of protecting the owner, names cannot be disclosed. 
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fully with an Islamic government. As a Marxist who had participated in the process of the 
revolution, the owner did not share my view on this irony. Along with many others they 
were avid supporters with years of experience and political know-how – mainly 
underground for several years. My informant was in charge of particular workers’ unions 
after the revolution. These unions were pronounced illegal and later scattered. Later this 
person was in charge of distributing the group’s written material, which also became 
labeled anti-revolutionary by the Islamic regime. This person was arrested and 
incarcerated three times for short periods of time. This had great impact in giving up the 
overt political life. Sharing the hidden collection seemed to relieve this person of historic 
responsibility. I feel as though, said my contact, “I’m liberating myself.”  
  The owner insisted that the Marxists’ approach was the only rational way to 
interact with an Islamic government and that an Islamic state was almost inevitable. 
According to this person my absence in Iran during the revolution did not allow me to 
have a correct view of events. The disclosure of the collection of materials was to prove 
this person’s point that it was a rational decision for Marxists to become defenders of 
Islam and that reading this collection would give me a better idea of the events of the 
revolution. By reading the material, I was informed, I “would be able to put my 
delusional views in perspective.” 
  Due to a history of despotic conditions, most Iranian opposition groups opted for 
very small booklets, hence extremely small print (reading some of the material required a 
magnifying glass.) This would make for written materials more convenient to transport 
and easily concealed.22 Some of the publications could fit in one’s shoes, socks, hats, 
                                                 
22 Size of books and publications varied from a normal book size, 6 by 8 ½ inches, to 4 ½ by 6 ½ inches, 
and a smaller version of 3 by 5 inches. 
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sleeves, within the linings of jackets or pants, even some body parts.  Although the Tudeh 
Party tried to print its work consistently the same size, it was always a matter of 
availability of paper, ink, and other requirements. The official political organ of the party, 
“Mardom” (people), was consistent in color but varied in size. It averaged 40 to 80 pages 
of small print. The more controversial topics were collected in occasional publications 
labeled “Masa’el-e Emrooz” (Current Affairs) under various names, such as 
“Donya,”(World) “Nameye Mardom,”(People’s Letter) and “Zamime-ye 
Mardom.”(Appendix to ‘People’) These were printed in larger size booklets.  
  Publications of the Liberation and Equality Group were very small – 4 by 6 
inches. They had no cover and no table of contents. They usually consisted of one topic 
addressed on the front page. They invariably started by calling “comrades” [Marxists] 
and “brothers and sisters” [Muslims] to action. Publications of other groups, such as The 
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas (minority) and (majority) were also 
among this collection. However, since the majority-minority split occurred more than a 
year after the revolution, the subjects covered had less to do with Islam and the new 
Islamic regime and more to do with their own intra-organizational discussions over the 
split. Both organizations printed their political newspaper under the same name, Kaar 
(labor). The distinction was the two words, aghalliyat (minority) and aksariyat (majority) 
in their name on top of the front cover.  
  Among the items in this collection was a very small booklet belonging to a third 
group that split from the Fadaee Guerillas. This 88-page publication was published under 
the title, mosahebe ba Ashraf-e Dehghani (An Interview with Ashraf Dehghani). Ashraf 
Dehghani was one of the leaders of this third group, which went under the name of 
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Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas, eliminating the word ‘organization’ from their name. 
Their argument revolved around the question of the legitimacy of the new Islamic 
regime. They labeled the new regime as despotic from the very first weeks of the 
revolution and refused to recognize the Islamic regime as a legitimate political body. 
Ideologically speaking, this group distinguished itself as the opposite of what the Tudeh 
Party was trying to achieve – a comprehensive collaboration with the new political body. 
This group was anomalous among Marxists, most of whom recognized the legitimacy of 
an Islamic regime from its very inception. Within the content of their political writing, 
the defense, justification, and rationalization of an Islamic ideology was sparse; however, 
their emphasis on martyrdom as a requirement of revolutionary authenticity persisted. 
  The ability to review these materials was invaluable. The person allowing me 
access had trusted me in two ways: first, that I would not reveal her identity and second, 
that I would put the material to good use. We had grown up together so trusting me was 
not a problem. What this person was more concerned about was how I would use the 
collection for political or academic purposes.   
  The reader should bear in mind that at the time of the revolution, such materials 
published by political groups, Marxist and Muslim, were not banned. Two to three years 
after the revolution, however, all political publications were pronounced ‘anti-revolution’ 
and ‘anti-Islamic,’ hence illegal. During this period, 1980-1982, when political 
persecution and oppression of the opposition was at its peak, most books and other 
written materials were destroyed. The fear of imprisonment, torture, or possible execution 
left little room for risk-taking; hence books were seldom preserved. I was able to retrieve 
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the materials only because they had been buried in this particular village. According to 
the owner, “they were too valuable a treasure to destroy.” 
  Once I had the more than 300 books and booklets at my disposal, I eagerly started 
the process of reading almost the entire collection in the next few weeks. I began by 
reading the titles and later the contents. Most of the materials were in an official book 
format; I assumed their publisher to have been the same organization that printed the 
material. There were no chapters, rather topics spoken about by the chairman of the party 
or group, or they were responses to certain other Marxist or Muslim groups.  
  I first separated the books by organization. Within the collection were a number 
of books from almost all the Iranian Marxist groups, but most of the material belonged to 
the Tudeh Party. They covered many topics that these organizations had written about 
during the years of the revolution such as the role of Marxists in the revolution, why 
Marxists trusted Muslims, why Marxists would collaborate with an Islamic government, 
why Muslims should trust Marxists who do not believe in religion and God, and the 
nature of the relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Islamic regime.  
 I remained in the village for another three days reading as much of the material as 
possible. With no distractions, no television, no telephone, I was able to not only read but 
also discuss every issue with the owner of the collection. We then headed back to Tehran 
with the entire collection in the trunk of the car. The owner of the collection was still 
apprehensive about traveling with the books. Although 24 years had gone by, I could still 
detect this person’s anxiety. We took the books home and I began reading all I could for 
the next few weeks. It was after this period that I contemplated writing about the contents 
of this interesting collection. Finding it was the main reason I chose the topic at hand.  
 21
  With my annual visit to Iran drawing to a close, I needed to decide how to take all 
these items back to the states. Simply putting them in bags or suitcases was not a viable 
option as airport security is very tight in Iran, and bags and suitcases are thoroughly 
searched at several checkpoints. Although these materials were no longer banned, it was 
not a good idea to risk getting caught with so many of them. Books with titles from 
Marxist organizations would make any security officer want to take a second look. We 
thought of scanning every page and e-mailing the material, but that was too arduous of a 
task and pages usually came out distorted and unreadable. Finally, a family member 
suggested mailing the most important books and booklets, the ones the author absolutely 
needed, via DHL. This international company, which luckily had an office in Tehran, 
hardly checked the contents. Close to 70 books and booklets were shipped, and I 
handwrote the remaining useful material and quotations in a notebook.   
  The literature represented an amalgam of many subjects, but all were related to 
either the revolution or activities before the revolution. Some 80 percent of the collection 
consisted of the Tudeh Party’s political organs and booklets. These became my main 
sources. After reading most of the material, I began to select those I thought would help 
in examining and refining my contention. My initial idea was to show the irony of Iranian 
Marxists’ conversion into Islam. It was therefore based on ideological conversion only; 
how some Marxists collaborated with Muslims in stabilizing an Islamic state and how 
they justified it by providing ideas of legitimation. I culled the material based on the 
views put forth by some Marxists, especially the Tudeh Party, on how to cooperate with 
the nascent Islamic government. Tudeh’s defense of Muslim clerics and the Islamic state 
was an irrevocable position held by the party. They perceived the clerics and Muslim 
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activists as anti-imperialist and in collaboration did all they could to solidify an Islamic 
political entity. This was even true, as we shall read, in forming the forces of repression, 
the Revolutionary Guards (sepah-e pasdaran). Thus all material selected was related to 
the main argument of this dissertation:  What the Tudeh Party thought of Muslim clerics, 
Muslim activists, anti-capitalist ideas of Islam, necessities of forming an anti-capitalist 
Islamic state, legitimating the Islamic forces of suppression, viewing groups in opposition 
as anti-revolutionary, and most importantly the role of Ayatollah Khomeini as a 
revolutionary leader. Since most of the sources were repetitious in their arguments, only a 
handful is included here. These materials all pertain to the subject of the Islamic state and 
Marxists – those that illustrate the author’s argument of demonstrating the relationship 
between Marxist groups and Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
 Procedure for Analysis 
  The selection of the literature to use for this dissertation was related to its content 
and organization. I chose materials put forth by groups, Marxist or otherwise, that 
included an analysis of the revolution, Islam, and cooperation with Muslims. Initially it 
had been curiosity about the types of documents that were banned after the revolution 
that generated interest.  
 Prior to finding these sources, most of what I had read about the revolution had been 
secondary sources published by Marxist and Muslim groups. The possibility of finding 
primary sources, especially from the immediate post-revolutionary era, was remote. The 
collection described in the previous section allowed for reviewing pertinent material 
firsthand.  Most of the material belonging to the Tudeh Party consisted of published 
 23
question-and-answer sessions by the party. Many controversial questions were asked, and 
Nour-al Din Kianuri, the head of the Party at the time, responded to them.  
 After reviewing the available data, I decided to adopt a pattern suggested by the writings. 
This pattern pointed to four categories of selection. First, the materials were separated by 
organization. Second, Marxist organizations were chosen as they pertained to the subject 
at hand, how they perceived Islam and the Islamic state. Third, organizations that mostly 
spoke about the proximity of Islam and Marxism were selected. Fourth, a pattern of 
defending political Islam, vis-à-vis theological Islam, was sought. The contents of these 
pamphlets and books relate to the topic of this dissertation in that they mainly show the 
political and ideological conversion of Marxists into Islam. In this collection, contextual 
Islam is not mentioned since the material merely deals with ideology and perception of 
political power in relation to some Marxists. The content from the books is directly 
translated without analysis. Most of the content is straightforward and speaks to the issue 
at hand.  
  The research is therefore descriptive, using existing publications to interpret what 
was put forth to justify certain political practices. I also made use of dditional direct 
sources that were published legally and illegally during the turbulent times of the 
revolution. This period includes one year before and one year after the takeover of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (1978-1980). Some of the documents can be found in the 
archives and on the websites of the relevant organizations. 
  Since this type of content analysis of existing material has not been performed by 
other researchers, the available secondary literature is very limited. Most such literature 
was banned well into the mid 1990s. Prior to that, banned documents were not in the 
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public domain, denying researchers access to them. Consequently such documents not 
only constitute the literature review for this dissertation, they may also be recognized as a 
review of literature pertaining to the Iranian revolution. All of the writings are in Persian. 
The author translated them, at times seeking second opinions from translators in Iran. 
  The question was what made a Marxist-Muslim conversion possible for some 
Marxists? How were Marxists convinced that political adaptation to Islam would bring 
about a socialist or social democratic government? In addition to the collection found in 
Iran, I have used secondary sources to demonstrate a consistency in the usage of Islamic 
belief among certain Marxists. While the primary sources used here can clarify some 
questions related to political positions on Islam and the Islamic regime held by some 
Marxists, they would not give the reader a wider scope of events vis-à-vis a history of 
Marxists and Islam in the Iranian movement. Use of the primary sources alone would not 
clarify the rich history of Marxists and Islam; it would seem abstract and lacking in 
historical context since they could shed light only on a short period of Marxist activity 
and political position. It was necessary, therefore, to use other sources to provide the 
socio-historical content.  
  For this purpose I have used mainly sources written by Iranian Marxist and non-
Marxist analysts and social theorists. Their material was more often than not published in 
Persian. A small number are also available in English, Ervand Abrahamian’s23 work, for 
example. These secondary sources have helped in examining the events and personalities 
influencing Marxists through Islam. Furthermore, since the primary sources used here are 
only those of Marxists, they do not mention Islamic literature and Muslims as actors.  
                                                 
23 Ervand Abrahamian. 1982.  Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: University Press. 
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  This dissertation uses the sociology of knowledge to understand Marxists vis-à-
vis Islam; therefore, an analysis of Islam within Iran is necessary. To this end, the 
writings of some prominent Muslim theorists are included. In addition, to demonstrate the 
influence of Muslim political activity on Marxists, a brief history of Muslim political 
activity is necessary. In the collection of Marxists’ primary sources, contextual Islam is 
not depicted nor is it a matter of concern. Since, I have attempted to clarify contextual 
Islam through a brief history, which also includes acts, beliefs, latent values, and 
terminology.  
  Chapter four, where the main objective is to demonstrate ideological conversion 
of Marxists into Muslims, uses mostly primary sources to show the clear deviation taken 
by Iranian Marxists. These materials demonstrate how some Marxists abandoned their 
skepticism of religion, and more significantly, supported a state that used religiosity to 
stabilize an otherwise precarious regime. The primary sources are only sparsely referred 
to throughout the other chapters. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Internalization, then, implies that the objective facticity of the social world becomes a 
subjective facticity as well. The individual encounters the institutions as data of the 
objective world outsided himself, but they are now data of his own consciousness as well 
         Peter L. Berger 
 
 
Marx: Ideology, false consciousness, economic system/superstructure 
 
To better understand why it is important to examine the irony of Iranian Marxists 
becoming Muslims, it is necessary to review Marx’s ideas on religion and the role of 
religion as false consciousness, alienation, and an opiate for the masses. Marx uses 
religion as a dependent variable, as a symptom of a world that suffers alienation. In Iran, 
however, and for the purposes of this paper, religion is dealt with as an independent 
variable, an important social factor that generated certain behavior among Marxists in 
Iran. An essential point of Marx’s sociology of knowledge is that ideas may work to 
repress a class, as does religion. The failure of Iranian Marxists to contemplate this 
concept is the foundation of the irony of Marxists adhering to Islam in Iran.  
For Marx, false consciousness is that which confirms human servitude, rather than 
emancipating the species’ essence. False consciousness hinders the universal class of the 
proletariat in its liberating and developmental role and leads the bourgeoisie to 
misleadingly impose its sectarian outlook as a universally valid view. The superstructure 
of illusion deters class emancipatory activities by obscuring both the role of reason and 
its objective in the historical process.    
In The German Ideology, Marx puts forth the fullest treatment of his materialist 
conception of history. He states that ideas have no existence independent of physical 
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reality. He rejects Hegel’s notion that ideas determine experience in favor of a materialist 
view that experience determines ideas: 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language or real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear 
at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to 
mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, 
religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their 
conceptions, ideas, etc.—real active men, as they are conditioned by definite 
development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to 
these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than 
conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.24  
 
Marx argues that the essence of individuals is determined by the material economic 
conditions—“what they produce and how they produce”—in which they live out their 
very existence.25  
 This fundamental part of Marxist analysis gives priority to the material aspect of 
human experience over ideal aspects of that existence. Marx can be understood as 
emphasizing the economic component of social experience as the decisive element, the 
relationship between economic institutions and other social institutions. Art, religion, 
science and law, for example, are captured in this model of structure and superstructure. 
They are derived and supported by the underlying economic structure. The superstructure 
includes political parties and institutions, prevailing morality, and different aspects of 
culture, namely religion. As sets of ideas, these play a role in determining action. In 
Marx’s thoughts ideas can play a significant role. They are important as ideologies and at 
                                                 
24 Robert Tucker. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. (p. 154). 
25 Ibid., p. 150 
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times explain the actions of men. These ideas have important effects through religion or 
propaganda.26
 Directly related to religion, Marx puts special emphasis on consciousness, the 
idea that humanity is a knowing species. It is not merely knowing, but knowing in 
relation to the material world and acting upon the material world. Consciousness is 
awareness of humans in their actual life process. Being conscious and productive are 
essentially the same. Marx claims that it is necessary to distinguish between true and 
false consciousness. False consciousness accepts the nature of the world uncritically. It 
supports, validates, and perpetuates the system of exploitation and oppression. Religion, 
like other forms of ideology, can in certain contexts be a vehicle for false consciousness.  
 Marx’s discussion of religion in the ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ is 
visible in this quotation: 
Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering 
and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, 
the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of a soulless situation. It is the opium 
of the people.27
 
This quotation seems to indicate a duality in Marx’s thought about religion. It is both an 
expression of alienation and a perpetuation of alienation, thus false consciousness. Marx 
does not see religion as necessary within society, or as part of human nature. As an 
instrument of alienation, it is only necessary when alienation exits. Alienation is a 
symptom of the exploitation of one class by another, and when this exploitation ends, the 
                                                 
26 Barry B. Levine. 1986. “Methodological Ironies in Marx and Weber.” International Journal of Moral 
and Social Studies. Vol. I, No. 3: Autumn. 
 
27 Tucker. p. 54. 
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need for religion also comes to an end. The duality that is intrinsic to the beginning of 
religion is a false duality. 
 Religion as an illusion plays a dual role in false consciousness. On the one hand, 
religion creates an illusory form of happiness, and it makes those who accept it willing to 
accept the existing conditions of their world. It also plays an ideological role in creating 
false consciousness. As religion is part of the superstructure, representing the ruling 
economic class of a given society, it validates and justifies that economic structure. 
Further, religion is related to politics ideologically, and it is controlled and used by the 
ruling class to placate the ruled majority.   
 The ruthless criticism of religion by Marx does not leave the adherent any room 
for an unbiased view of religiosity. Marxists must address the question of religion 
critically. The reason Iranian Marxists did not criticize religion and Islam is two-fold. 
First, they lived in a culture permeated by Islam. Second, during the revolution many 
Marxist groups viewed Islam and an Islamic government as a truly revolutionary 
alternative. It is my contention that Islamic upbringing and socialization processes, which 
create contextual Islam, are interconnected with the acceptance of political Islam as an 
alternative form of revolution. To demonstrate the interconnection of contextual Islam 
and political Islam, the author will use the sociology of knowledge as a method to 
articulate and extrapolate an analysis of Islamic beliefs among Marxists in Iran. This 
method is used to examine the conditions that gave rise to Islamic ideas that allowed 
them to compete with and prevail over other philosophical ideas, such as Marxism. 
 
 
 30
Marxism, Religion and Relations of Production 
 According to Karl Marx, productive forces develop gradually and steadily, while 
relations of production are comparatively fixed at any given stage.  
This produces the possibility and reality of a growing time lag between the stage 
of development of productive forces and the relations of production or class-
structure of a given society. The irresistible growth of the productive forces then 
bursts through the integument of the relations of production which have become a 
fetter on the productive forces.28
 
The Shah’s modernization process was forced on Iranians from the top down, having 
created no real infrastructure to speak of. Productive forces were precarious, sporadic and 
irregular; they were absent in terms of creating any meaningful social force. 
Infrastructure was not built, and a solid capitalist class was not formed. By the time the 
Shah was overthrown, Iran had only 26 miles of highway; schooling was lacking, and 
unemployment was rampant among rural-to-urban migrants. A few hospitals and some 
clinics existed, but these were mostly concentrated in the capital city of Tehran. The only 
economic resource that allowed for the Shah’s caricature of modernization was the vast 
surplus of oil, especially in the 1970s. The capitalist Iranian state-monopoly that took 
shape had the form of a narrow skyscraper, lacking any solid foundation in the form of 
relatively broad, modern, private capitalist, and petty bourgeois social structures.  
The social relations that had been implanted from above proved not to act as an 
agent of change.29 The Shah’s agrarian reform forced a significant number of peasants off 
their land and into the cities looking for work. Unlike in some Latin American countries, 
the state did not and could not act to build a viable infrastructure. The peasant migrant 
                                                 
28 Eugene Kamenka. 1983. Karl Marx. NY: Penguin Books, p. 570. 
 
29 Boris Kagarlitsky. 1995. The Mirage of Modernization. NY: Monthly Review Press.  
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was faced with the unavailability of jobs in the cities and became marginalized. 30 The 
marginalized migrant was disconnected from his peasant background and could not forge 
new social bonds. His way of life was: 
uncertain, [he was] no longer a peasant, but not yet an experienced worker; 
already an urban resident, while retaining a rural psychology…what grew up was 
not a proletarian but a traditionalist consciousness, since the established 
proletariat was overwhelmed by new arrivals from the villages. Dissatisfaction 
grew even more rapidly among the traditionalist and semi-traditionalist layers.31
 
The marginal first-generation urban migrants became the main opposition force, 
who gave their fundamental and unconditional support to an Islamic authority. They 
transferred their long-established belief system of Islam, with its patriarchal and 
traditional values, into the cities, creating the basis for one of the strongest Islamic mass 
movements in the Middle East. This created a fertile ground and became the seeds of the 
Iranian revolution. In a peculiar way, the Shah helped build the same social force that 
would years later produce his overthrow. Salvation came with Islam. Mosques became 
the only place where it was possible to criticize the Shah’s regime.  
The Iranian Marxists fought hard to create a viable social alternative but were not 
able to create the social bonds in their organizational efforts, unable even in their 
vernacular to make the necessary connection to the masses. In Iran, contrary to what 
Marx argued, relations of production could not compensate for the time lag because the 
development was not the development Marx had in mind. If the process of modern 
development had been a real capitalist development, and a revolutionary proletariat had 
                                                 
30 In Latin America, as opposed to Iran, the state became an active agent in urban development by taking a 
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been established. According to Marxist thought the Iranian revolution might have 
rejected religion as an alternative superstructure. The Shah’s simulated modernization 
(development), however, did not eliminate religion; rather, it strengthened Islamic ideas 
and values. It did not follow Marx’s ideas and Marx’s ideas on an underdeveloped 
economy did not help understand what was in fact happening. 
 
Scheler and Mannheim on the Sociology of Knowledge 
 
Sociology of knowledge investigates the interconnections between categories of 
thought, knowledge claims, and social reality – Seinsverbundenheit, as Mannheim puts it, 
the existential connectedness of thought. Karl Marx was a pioneer in this field of study, 
with his theory that under certain historical conditions, economic realities determine the 
ideological ‘superstructure’ by way of socioeconomic processes. This concept remains a 
central issue in the sociology of knowledge. The sociology of knowledge, however, owes 
its decisive development to the work of Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim. According to 
Scheler, who first introduced the term Wissenssoziologie (sociology of knowledge), this 
method emerges as an analysis of the regularities of those social processes and structures 
that pertain to intellectual life and to modes of knowing. Karl Mannheim extended the 
idea as a theory of the existential connectedness of thought. His sociology of knowledge 
is concerned with intellectual and spiritual structures that inevitably take different forms 
in different social historical settings.  
 Max Scheler extended the Marxist notion of substructure by identifying different 
real factors, which, he believed, conditioned thought in different historical periods and in 
various social and cultural systems in specific ways. These real factors have sometimes 
been regarded as institutionalized instinctive forces, and as representing an ahistorical 
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concept of substructure. What limited Scheler’s ideas was his insistence on the eternal 
life of ideas and values, which, however, was not helpful to explain social and cultural 
change. His ideas were developed further by Karl Mannheim. 
 Like Scheler, Mannheim extended the concept of substructure, suggesting that 
biological factors, psychological elements, and spiritual phenomena might take the place 
of primary economic relations in the substructure, but he did not believe that scientific 
and technical knowledge could be subjected to sociological analysis. He thought that the 
sociology of knowledge was destined to play a major role in intellectual and political life, 
especially in periods of crisis and conflict, by examining sociologically the conditions 
that gave rise to competing ideas, political philosophies, ideologies, and diverse cultural 
products. In his view, the sociology of knowledge technique could call intellectuals to 
their passion of striving for synthesis, and change their relationship to groups, 
organizations, and parties contending in society, giving them distance and objectivity.  
The religion of Islam gave social and political protection to Iranians, and in turn 
the people gave that protection to clerics and Muslim organizers. They protected Islam. 
The protection given to Islam, by the people, by the Marxists, or even by the Shah is what 
Karl Mannheim would discover in Iranian life, using his sociology of knowledge method. 
Such methodology would dissect and demonstrate the ubiquity and intensity of Islamic 
belief. From its very beginning, dating back to 1920, Marxism was influenced by Islam. 
Once researchers study the trajectory of the Marxist movement, its modes of thought 
would be understood as a part of that history. A principal thesis of the sociology of 
knowledge is that there are modes of thought that cannot be sufficiently understood as 
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long as their social origins are not clear.32 Iranian Marxists were not conscious of the 
social origins of Islam within their ethnic interpretations of Marxism. It is indeed true that 
Marxist organizations were theorizing about the sociopolitical conditions in Iran. 
Nevertheless it would be false to deduce that all the ideas and sentiments that motivated 
the organizations had their origin in Marxism alone and can be adequately explained 
solely on the basis of their own life-experiences.  
Further, according to Mannheim, sociology of knowledge as a method seeks to 
comprehend thought in the concrete setting of its historical-social situation, out of which 
individually differentiated thought only very gradually emerges.33 Thus, it was not 
Marxist groups in general, or even isolated individuals within these groups, who analyzed 
and did the thinking about a revolution but rather certain groups who had developed a 
particular style of thought in an endless series of responses to certain typical situations 
characterizing their common position. It is incorrect to say that these groups were not a 
product of their historical social conditioning. Rather, it is more correct to insist that they 
participated in thinking further than what others had thought before them. Every group, 
whether Marxist or Muslim, was therefore in a two-fold sense predetermined by the fact 
of growing up in a specific society. On the one hand, they found ready-made situations; 
on the other, they realized that in those situations there were appropriate patterns of 
thought and conduct.  
The social conditioning through Islam involved an internalization of the Islamic 
ethos even in the political realm generating a total acceptance of political Islam. It would 
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make sense for Marxists to agree with Muslims on particular ideological points, on 
specific political affairs leading to a tactical unity to defeat the enemy. However, given 
the wide separation between the two schools of thought in constructing ideal societies 
and the states that run them, it would be ironic, if not contradictory to collaborate in total 
ideology. Peter L. Berger’s ‘sacred canopy’ proves useful to help explain how this 
separation of ideologies is bridged. The sacred canopy is the set of beliefs that permeate a 
particular culture. These set of beliefs, in the case of Iran, stem from Islamic ideology.   
 
Peter L. Berger and the Sacred Canopy 
Peter L. Berger calls the prevalence and the penetration of a social phenomenon 
such as religion a ‘sacred canopy.’ 34 That is, certain beliefs (in this case, Islam) become 
so prevalent and the taken-for-granted that all activities are filtered, recognized, and 
managed through them. In the case of Iran, the argument is that Islamic behavior was not 
only perpetuated by Muslims, who were influenced through Islam directly, but fostered 
by Marxists as well. For instance, while Marxists had set their ideological guidelines, 
they were not able to shed critical Islamic beliefs such as martyrdom. The Islamic belief 
in martyrdom became the canopy that hovered over all thought and all activity. 
Voluntarily sacrificing one’s life for an ultimate cause was a precondition for achieving a 
better society in both Iranian Muslim and Marxist thinking. Martyrdom, in fact, 
guaranteed future success.  
This belief regarding death is somewhat contrary to what Berger posed. Relating 
to death, Berger wrote:   
                                                 
34 Peter L. Berger. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: 
Anchor. 
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Witnessing the death of others and anticipating his own death, the individual is 
strongly propelled to question the ad hoc cognitive and normative operating 
procedures of his “normal” life in society. Death presents society with a 
formidable problem, not only because of its obvious threat to the continuity of 
human relationships, but because it threatens the basic assumptions of order on 
which society rests.35
The Islamic canopy operated differently. Iranian Muslims and Marxists did not 
perceive the idea of death as disorder creating anomie. Dying for the cause contributed to 
an entirely new order. In fact, martyrdom, and certainly a culture that thrives on the 
notion of martyrdom, moves forward by the idea of sacrificial death. Contrary to Berger’s 
idea, death is encouraged in such a case. The word ‘fadaee’ (in Persian), used by both 
Marxists and Muslims at different times in the Iranian political movement, actually 
means ‘one who sacrifices one’s life for the cause.’ The most important idea that brought 
Muslims and Marxists together, especially during the years prior to the 1979 revolution, 
was the idea of martyrdom. To sacrifice one’s life for the cause, to become a fadaee, was 
the ultimate method not only to fight the Shah’s dictatorship but also to prove the 
authenticity of a revolutionary organization. Martyrdom, modesty, and patriarchal beliefs 
were the contextual Islamic ethos within the Iranian culture; Marxists were no exception. 
Marxists implemented the idea of martyrdom within their political struggle as one 
ultimate measure of a genuine and authentic revolutionary. Although no Marxist justified 
martyrdom with an Islamic rationale on the surface, the enthusiasm with which it was 
welcomed, without a doubt, was related to Islamic values. The culture of Shi’a Islam—
contextual Islam, rationalized and further reinforced martyrdom as the unit of 
measurement for an Iranian revolutionary.     
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 23. 
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Once the political and the parliamentarian methods of the Tudeh Party36 and the 
National Front37 proved useless, it was time for a more serious fight, one that did not play 
by the established legal rules. Armed struggle was the method, but martyrdom was the 
engine that pushed revolutionaries forward, the midwife that gave birth to an entirely new 
movement. Martyrdom became the challenge of an authentic revolutionary. When the 
Tudeh Party and its tactics of legal-constitutional activity in fighting the Shah were 
gradually undermined, the question became a matter of who was more revolutionary in 
fighting the Shah’s regime. Martyrdom, as generated by the Shi’a culture of Iran, was 
taken for granted by theorists as the unit by which a true revolutionary was measured.  
Generally, and consistent with Berger’s notion of a sacred canopy, Islam creates 
meaning. It is what tells people how to behave and presents a worldview that has answers 
for all human problems.38 Islam thus became an organizing linchpin with a network of 
clergy. Through Islam they were able to resist and oppose inside and outside oppressors, 
to mobilize people and start revolutions.39  
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman in their book, The Social Construction of 
Reality, articulate three aspects of social life that explain the social construction of 
reality: that society is a human product, that society is an objective reality, and that man 
is a social product. They use Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology to understand human 
culture and reality as it exists. They ask, how does culture present itself to us so as to 
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appear real? How is it possible that different groups of people can accept utterly different 
kinds of reality? For them reality is defined as “a quality of appertaining to phenomena 
that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volitions.”40 Thus reality is 
that which appears as independent of our own will or choosing. Reality is something that 
exists outside of our will; it is there, outside of us, available to everyone. Berger and 
Luckmann’s definition implies that we do not choose reality; it is imposed upon us. 
Culture becomes reality for us apart from any intentional act on our part – a force of its 
own. We learn how to think and feel as we are programmed into a culture through 
socialization. Thus culture appears natural and real to us because it is intrinsic to the way 
we exist. It is not the individual that creates reality but rather the culture; it is a social 
construction and not an individual opinion. 
 There are three phases to the construction of social reality, according to Berger 
and Luckmann. First is ‘externalization’– the ongoing outpouring of human beings into 
the world, both in their physical and mental activity.41 The way in which we create and 
externalize this new world is through culture. Culture has two primary attributes. It is 
transmitted through time, and it produces meaning. Both elements are important, but the 
production of meaning is what makes culture potent. Culture produces human quality. 
Participants within a context are guided to believe, value, think, and feel in specific ways.  
 The next step is ‘objectivation’– to make something an object that had not been 
one. It is what makes meaning real. Without assigning meaning, human action and 
interaction would be impossible. Once meaning has been objectified, it takes on the 
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characteristics of facticity – meanings become facts. Meanwhile, through our upbringing 
we get stories about the world, which work as legitimations – stories that give the social 
and power relationships a cognitive and moral basis. Social worlds need legitimation 
because humans are constantly in search of meaning.  
The third process is ‘internalization.’ The word socialization means the 
internalization of a society’s culture, and is related to the very beginning stages of the 
process. It is important for four reasons. First, during these beginning years, a child is 
completely dependent upon his or her parents. All that the child needs to survive comes 
from the primary caregivers. Second, this period of time is the most emotionally charged 
that an individual will experience. Because our strongest memories are the ones that are 
emotionally charged, events, explanations, and language are imprinted securely upon the 
brain and are most readily recalled. Third, the self is produced through primary 
socialization. Humans are not born with a self. We acquire it through language-learning 
and role-taking. We come to know the crucial roles, status positions, values, beliefs, 
interpretive schemes, ideas, concepts, and all that function in the place of instinct during 
this time. Finally, during socialization, there are no competing worlds. Therefore, there is 
no problem of identification because there are no significant other worlds from which to 
choose. There are no competing voices, no options; we do not have a choice in the truths 
and realities we are given. 
 One of the functions of legitimation is to make the socially constructed world 
appear natural and not the result of human agency. And no knowledge, according to 
Berger and Luckmann, does this as well as religion. There are four benefits of using 
religion as legitimation in the construction of reality. First, human institutions are seen as 
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manifestations of the underlying structure of the universe. Second, religion defines 
disorder as evil. Through order-making, we impose order on geography by creating state 
and national boundaries; we impose order by defining endless varieties of human 
behavior by classifying them as, for example, male or female. Third, religion permits 
individuals to feel an ultimate sense of rightness. Fourth, religion provides integration for 
marginal situations. There is no circumstance or experience for which religion does not 
provide a framework of meaning. Everything is brought under an umbrella. 
Internalization of religious beliefs does not take place only in church or mosque or 
synagogue; it is found in the most intricate parts of social relations. 
 Thomas Luckmann, in his book, The Invisible Religion,42 presents a significant 
argument in deconstruction of the association between religion and religious institutions. 
He suggests that this association, and the empirical decline of attendance at these public 
institutions, led sociologists in the 1960s to assume a progressive decline in religion and 
the advance of secularization. Sociologists, according to Luckmann, saw churches as 
‘islands of religion (or irrationality)’ in an increasingly secularized world.43 But, he says, 
religion is not coextensive with its institutional form, but has a much wider basis in 
society. It is ‘the conditions under which “transcendent,” superordinated and “integrated” 
structures are made socially objective.’44 That is, religion is the general condition that 
locates the individual in society. Secularization, the separation between religion and 
everyday life, was more visible when Luckmann wrote this piece. Not many sociologists 
believe secularization to be as forceful today. Luckmann suggested that while institutions 
                                                 
42 Thomas Luckmann. 1967. The Invisible Religion. New York: Macmillan. 
 
43 Ibid., p. 23. 
 
44 Ibid., p. 26. 
 41
are an example of religious behavior, they do not constitute the whole religion. In fact, 
religion as a system of meaning is necessarily social, though not institutional in origin.45 
Individuals are born into societies that have constructed sacred worldviews. These 
worldviews are then passed on to children through processes of socialization, and become 
the basis through which the individual becomes a person both on a social and individual 
level. This is very similar to Berger and Luckmann’s analysis of internalization—the 
worldview that is perceived as objective becomes the basis for individual subjective 
action in the world.  
 
Max Weber’s Causality and Probability  
 Weber’s notion of causality can be helpful to further explain the historical 
intersection of practicing Iranian Marxists with Islamic beliefs and concepts. Max Weber 
did not share the view that the social sciences are unable to construct general causal 
explanations of historical events or societal development.46 Weber created a middle realm 
between the generating of abstract laws characteristic of the natural sciences and the 
accumulation of historically specific facts that some believed must guide the social 
sciences. He thought of the determination of causality as an attempt to establish the 
probability that a series of actions or events are related. His notion of causality is very 
different from the traditional scientific usage, which sees it as the positing of permanent 
and necessary relationships between variables. While in natural science, (X) temperature 
above 100 degrees centigrade will cause (Y) water to boil, in social science, social 
relationships are not carried out with that fixed and singular causal ‘elegance.’ Thus 
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sociologists cannot say with the same degree of certainty that an increase in education 
among a population, for example, will result in fewer children. Sociologists can, 
however, set out to determine the set of factors that, when taken together, have a causal 
correlation with a particular outcome. Using ideal types, the sociologist can develop 
general arguments that establish a probable relationship between a combination of causes 
(e.g. Islamic upbringing, belief in martyrdom) and a particular consequence (Marxists 
becoming Muslims).  
 According to Weber, developments in the intellectual, psychological, political, 
and religious spheres have relative autonomy even though they may all mutually 
influence one another. There is no pre-established harmony between the content of an 
idea and the material interests of those who become its advocates, i.e., a causal 
relationship. Weber’s intense interest in social change made him work to create an 
interpretive system different from that of Marx. He attempted to show that the relations 
between systems of ideas and social structures were diverse. He believed that causal 
connections went in two directions, rather than just from the economic (productive) 
system to the superstructure.  In the case of Iranian society, the different variables 
involved in making Marxists behave as Muslims—upbringing, a fighting ideal, tyranny, 
the struggle against a tyrant, martyrdom, and a race for a revolutionary authenticity—
historically induced Marxists to become Muslims. 
 
Marx on Religion 
Religion is not just about belief. There is also a social dimension of acceptance 
and support from a community of believers. Placing oneself in such a community 
provides a clear social identity. This social identity may take place on a micro level—
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emotional support, and also on a macro level—political affiliation. Karl Marx’s historical 
materialism has focused on the macro level—the role of economic and social power 
relations. The key idea for Marx is that ideologies are systems of ideas that, although they 
may be false, nonetheless appear as appealing and correct. Ideologies function as a real 
historical force in determining how individuals and groups see themselves and the world. 
Ideologies are products of the interaction of previous beliefs with changing social and 
psychological circumstances. They provide answers for various social and political needs, 
while simultaneously constraining individual perception and action, by systematically 
misrepresenting true social relations and possibilities.47
 According to Marx, social systems are characterized by three major properties: 
economic, ideological, and political. Their economic function is related to reproduction 
of human material life through the production and distribution of goods. The institutions 
through which this ongoing reproduction is achieved are called the ‘economic base’ of 
society. This economic base in turn functionally determines the social relations of 
production’ as specific structures of ownership, power and control over productive 
forces, and the social division of labor through which material production and 
distribution are organized.  
 The ideological function that especially addresses the contextual belief system is 
concerned with the mental reproduction of human life through the production and 
distribution of ideas. These are the ideas through which people come to identify 
themselves and to make sense of the world they live in; they are fundamental in 
answering questions related to belief about society, nature, identity, morals, ethics, and 
priorities. People are not born with these ideas; the ideas have to be constantly produced 
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and distributed through institutions. Finally, the political function is concerned with 
overall social integration through dispute regulation, adjudication, law and defense, 
ultimately grounded in the legitimate use of coercion and violence.  
 According to Marxian thought, the social belief system and its ideas are 
programmed into each new generation through moral education prior to any significant 
development of the individual’s critical thinking system. From this point on, according to 
Marx, the life process of the exploited masses is constructed towards continuous and 
active development of such ideas. This takes place without the opportunity for any sort of 
examination or critique. According to Maurice Godelier: 
For the installation and maintenance in power of part of society (the male sex, an 
estate, a caste or class), repression is less effective than adherence, and physical or 
psychological violence counts for less than intellectual conviction, which brings 
with it acquiescence, if not the co-operation, of the dominated.48
 
Therefore, religious ideas and practices are integral to the production relations of the 
economic base and do not merely reflect or endorse such relations. According to Marxist 
thought, however, just as capitalism will outlive its usefulness as a force for progress in 
human life and will threaten to destroy the very conditions that make human life possible, 
so will religious ideas. They serve predominantly to obstruct true perceptions, rationalize 
exploitative social relations, and nurture false hope.  
 Anti-theological thinkers, like Marx, address religion as a human construct 
without the need for a supernatural or transcendental other. This allows for the 
examination of the role played by religion as a social human artifact, and the nature of 
religion as an institution. 
                                                 
48 Maurice Godelier. 1988. The Mental and the Material. London: Verso. (p. 156). 
 45
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their 
real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their conditions is a call 
to abandon a condition which requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, 
therefore, the embryonic criticism of this vale of tears of which religion is the 
halo.49
 
 Marxist analysis of religion has been challenged by some social scientists as over-
emphasizing the negative aspects of religion and ignoring its potentially revolutionary 
aspects. This approach sees Marx viewing religion purely as an ideological instrument by 
which the ruling class prevents the working class from either realizing that they are being 
exploited or from acting against the structures that enable that exploitation.  
The rise of Islam in the Middle East, and particularly in Iran during the 1979 
revolution, is a specific example of this rationale. Islam, especially in the last decades, 
has been frequently associated with challenges to totalitarian authority and despots in the 
Middle East. The rise of Islamism in the realm of politics can also be seen as a response 
to neo-colonialism. It has functioned as a movement frequently challenging, rather than 
validating, economic relations. In this light, Islam in the Middle East has some 
similarities with Liberation Theology in Lating American. Catholic Liberation Theology 
in Latin America has provided a voice for the poor under totalitarian dictatorships. 
Adherents of Liberation Theology, as distinct from the typical practice of the Catholic 
Church, which traditionally defended state authority, have generated challenges to 
governmental policies. Both these religious movements can be seen as challenging 
political power rather than legitimating it.  
 The answers given by these two religious protest movements should be seen by 
Marxists to be a form of illusion. Although they act against political oppression, their 
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answer will not ultimately resolve the problem, which is essentially economic. It should 
have been obvious to Marxists who followed Marx more seriously that despite Islam’s 
claim as a revolutionary movement, it was not directed toward fundamentally challenging 
and changing the economic system. They might question some forms of the 
superstructure, changing the individuals in power, changing the political structure from 
monarchy to parliamentarian, but they do not critique the capitalist system. In Marxist 
terms, they are a form of false consciousness buttressing capitalism. 
According to Marx, religion is desired, sought after, and practiced by a majority 
of the population, but the majority cannot see what is behind the religion and in the desire 
to believe in it. Religion is something that people hold onto in order to fulfill a certain 
desire. Religion is used by the rulers to suppress the population, but it suppresses people 
in an unseen form. In the Iranian setting, Marx’s ideas on religion would have to be 
inverted to fully grasp the role of religion. During the reign of the Shah, there was an 
emphasis on religion as a way of life, determining social relations, and also as a protest 
movement. While the Shah would emphasize modernization people insisted on an Islamic 
ethos. Despite Marx’s analysis, when it comes to the specific period of the Shah (the 
ruler) and the masses (the oppressed), it was the oppressed who insisted on religiosity and 
Islam, and not the ruler. In the latter parts of the twentieth century in Iran, religion came 
from the bottom, not the top.   
 
Martyrdom and Metaphysical Idealism 
As an ex-Hegelian, Marx equated metaphysical idealism with religion. Marx 
observed that idealism in belief—Marxists believing in martyrdom, for example—leads 
to metaphysical idealism, which leads to ‘theological prejudice.’ The logic of Marx’s 
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view is not hard to comprehend. Any theory that takes the problem of knowledge 
seriously enough to distinguish between the self as object and the self as knower or 
subject, is potentially idealist, because it is only as an ideal that the two can consciously 
become one. It concludes by giving more importance to the theoretical ‘copies of reality’ 
than to reality itself.  
 The basis for criticism of religion, according to Marx, is that man makes religion, 
religion does not make man. In other words, religion is the self-consciousness and self-
feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again.  
 For Iranian Marxists to adhere to Marx’s criticism of religion, they would have 
had to undertake a thorough critique of Islam. Yet, contrary to what Marx argues, the 
significance and prestige of Islam in the process of modernization did not diminish but 
rather increased. As Marx argued, the criticism of religion 
…disillusions man so that he may think, act, and fashion his own reality as a man 
who has lost his illusions and regained his reason; so that he may revolve about 
himself as his own true sun. Religion is only the illusory sun about which man 
revolves so long as he does not revolve about himself…It is the task of history 
therefore, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this 
world...Thus criticism of heaven is transformed into the criticism of earth, 
criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into 
criticism of politics.50
 
Marxists in Iran did not criticize the religiosity of the masses and religious leaders 
because they held the same values. This revolution was not a criticism of the past; it was 
to welcome the past. It left no room for criticism of the traditions and the illusions created 
by religion. In fact, Marxists were thinking of ways to interact with the masses through 
more religion, not less. In many ways Marx was both used and confused by Iranian 
Marxists. 
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 For Marx, a successful revolution would mean emancipation from Islam, 
especially in the political realm. However, Iranian Marxists would not even analyze or 
begin to critique Islam and its permeating social roots. Marxist affinity with Islam was 
maintained in Iran through politics and thus through the culture. It is now, more than 
ever, the language of political discourse.  
 In the next chapter the reader will become familiar with the concept of contextual 
Islam and what it meant as a political background for Marxists. Contextual Islam, 
ubiquitous in everyday social relations was significantly present in the practices, ideas 
and ideologies. It especially influenced many Marxist groups in the realms of politics in 
formation of the state. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
CONTEXTUAL ISLAM AND POLITICAL ISLAM 
 
Sacred is that sphere of life derived from social life that incorporates all the so called 
higher elements of life, such as reason, morality, science, sociality, conceptualizations, 
and the soul; distinguished from and opposed to the profane sphere of life.  
         Durkheim 
 
 
Following Mesbahi’s ideas regarding contextual Islam we can see that it acts as a 
‘sacred canopy’ in Iran. It is the penetration of the Islamic ethos and Islamic belief. At the 
taken-for-granted level it filters, recognizes, and manages all social activities. In this 
dissertation I refer to two types of Islam, Islamic political ideology and Islamic belief in 
everyday-life. They are distinct in that they contain qualitatively distinct forces. Islam as 
political ideology is substantially different from Islam as a value system – the Islam that 
permeates life and comes from within. Political ideology is more tangible, observable, 
and measurable. One can research Islamic political ideology by mere examination of 
written material and spoken words. It is apparent and empirically measured. However, 
contextual Islam, which saturates beliefs, mannerisms, attitudes, gender roles, and 
generally all aspects of social relationships, is more difficult to examine. Belief systems 
are latent within socialization processes and not often expressed at a conscious level. 
Therefore, they survive, transferred from one generation to the next, without criticism. It 
is the prevalence of such a belief system that Mesbahi referred to as contextual Islam.  
Karl Marx perceived religion as an agent of social control and a realm of life in 
which the individual immerses him/herself in the supernatural, in illusions, thereby 
giving the individual false hope. From his perspective, it is a distortion of a person’s 
being, because society is distorted. Religion is the heart of a heartless world, the 
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painkiller (opium) of the suffering masses in the world. Religious delusions function to 
throw a veil over the irrationalities of the systems of production.51  For Marxists, religion 
should be questioned and analyzed thoroughly, especially when attempting to convey the 
message to the masses. Iranian Marxists, however, have failed to address the question of 
religion, both in the culture of Iran and in matters of the state. They abandoned their 
skepticism about Islam, distanced themselves from a critique of religion, and were unable 
to create a political atmosphere in which religion was discussed and questioned.  
Who, if not the Marxists, should question religion and religiosity? How important 
was it to generate the discourse that delved into the depth of religion and Islamic belief? 
Furthermore, how important was it for Marxists to be able to separate religion and the 
state? The separation of these two entities involves hundreds of years of history. 
Certainly Marxists had to be aware that as alienating, illusive, and vague as religion is, in 
the hands of the state it could be an even more powerful instrument. To be sure, it is not 
the intention of this researcher to hold Marxists accountable for deep-seated Islamism in 
Iran. Iranian Marxists are the product of the same environment and Islamic ethic, 
behavior and belief as all Iranians; Islam is as much a part of their lives as it is for any 
other Iranian. But as self-conscious leaders, why have Marxists taken a non-skeptical 
view of religion throughout their political life? More concretely, could Marxists ever 
have questioned Islam and Islamic views in Iran? The answers to these questions are 
complicated and require serious research. Marxist groups are an important part of the 
Iranian political movement and one needs to investigate whether they ever had the 
                                                 
51 Robert Tucker, ed. 1978. “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in The Marx-
Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
 51
opportunity to confront Islamic belief. How did the prevalence of Islam allow Marxists to 
become a significant political weight in the politics of Iran? 
Even those who opposed the Islamic Republic government failed to further 
examine the role of Islam as a belief system. They looked to destroy the regime but never 
questioned its ideology, the same force that has been responsible in keeping the Islamic 
Republic in power 28 years after the revolution. Marxists tacitly accepted Islam, even 
though Marxism treats religion as an ideology that alienates the masses. This has been 
true both contextually, within the culture as a sacred canopy, and as political ideology –  
organizations and groups that strategically and tactically have collaborated with Islamic 
groups and the Islamic state.  
 Many Marxist groups argue that the Islamic Republic of Iran has remained in 
power only through suppression, control, imprisonment, and torture of its political 
opponents. What they neglect to realize is that for almost three decades, the Islamic 
Republic has used Islamic belief to its advantage at a social level to create a hegemonic 
ideology52. Much of its authority stems from its adherence to Islamic ideology. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran came to power through virtual nation-wide consensus. Millions 
of Iranians greeted Ayatollah Khomeini at the airport in Tehran when he first set foot 
back in the country. The Islamic Republic is not a coincidence, not an anomaly. It is the 
high degree of correlation between what people believe and what their government 
represents that has kept the Islamic Republic in control of the state. 
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 The author contends that Islamic belief so thoroughly permeated Iranian society 
and culture that Marxists could not have been aware of the depth of Islamism within 
themselves and the masses of Iranians. In fact, Marxists had little choice but to submit to 
Islam, either contextually, because of their socialization into an Islamic culture, or 
ideologically, because Islam was too powerful a political force to counter, hence the 
notion of Marxists becoming Muslims. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there 
were three components that made the irony of Marxists becoming Muslims unnoticeable. 
The three components of this “tripartite complex”, according to Mesbahi, included:  
 
“first , the contextual  Islam, the  pervasive Shi’a culture and socialization, especially 
with central figures of Shi’a Islam,  Imam Ali and more specifically Imam Hussein, and 
the story of the  martyrs of Karabala which acted as the visible and invisible sacred 
context, second,  the ideological Islam, Islam as a potent and competing anti-Shah and 
anti imperialist revolutionary  ideology, and third, the ruling Islam, Islam as the 
unavoidable political reality of the prevailing  power structure ruling and  controlling 
Iran immediately after  the revolution.”53  
 
According to Mesbahi, Marxists: 
 
 “had been raised,  like millions of other Iranians, with the first,  almost as their  social 
and emotive oxygen, had to intellectually compete and respond to the second , and finally 
had to make a political choice and adopt a survival strategy in dealing with the reality of 
the third”. The saga of Marxists dealing with Islam  thus took place in a complex 
environment imbued with variations of Islam in its  cultural, ideological and governing 
manifestations.”54
 
This chapter examines both the prevalence of Islam in the culture of Marxists and 
in the political ideology of resistance, which lent itself to the formation of an Islamic 
state. Islam prevailed in political resistance, fighting the Shah’s tyranny, mobilization of 
the people, and more importantly, the ability of Muslims (clerics) to organize a state – all 
of which Iranian Marxists failed to achieve. As a result, Marxists had to follow in the 
                                                 
53 Interview with Mesbahi, Oct. 13, 2006. 
 
54 Ibid. 
 53
footsteps of Muslims in these major realms of political life, mainly due to the legacy of 
resistance left by Muslims in the Iranian political movement. Marxists converted to and 
accepted Islam in three areas:  1) radicalism and resistance, 2) martyrdom, and 3) 
formation of an Islamic state under the notion of Shi’a Islam’s authority of the Jurist 
(velayat-e faghih). 
 In these three areas, Marxists were so profoundly influenced that their conversion 
to Islam was seamless. A resistance movement established by Islamic ideology, the 
notion of martyrdom as instrumental to achieving liberation, and the formation of a state 
based on an Islamic ethos prevailed in all aspects of political life. Marxists observed and 
learned from the sacred canopy of Islam; their political learning had come from Islamic 
ideology. These three major criteria determined the power relations among all those 
involved in political thought, life, and activity. 
 
Islam: Resistance and Revolution 
According to John Esposito, a leading expert on Islam, during the Iranian revolution, 
Shi’a Islam 
proved to be an influential and powerful tool with deep native roots. It was able to 
organize a common goal for political-religious leadership for the common 
historical identities and beliefs and values. It also generated an ideological 
structure, and through this structure gave meaning and legitimacy to an oppressed 
and oppressor movement. To an extent where a variety of groups were able to join 
in, clerics like Khomeini, Mottahari, Taleghani, and Beheshti, in cooperation with 
more secular and non-cleric figures, created reformist and revolutionary 
ideologies.55
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According to Sadegh Zibakalam, a leading Iranian observer,56 Muslim leaders 
were able to speak the people’s language in demanding what the Shah had neglected to 
achieve. People’s expectations, demands, social hopes, and political wishes materialized 
through Islam. People who were neglected, oppressed, and exploited under the forces of 
despotism were able to use religion to demonstrate their discontent.57 Zibakalam views 
the 1979 revolution as a victory that was mainly led by Muslim intellectuals with Islamic 
expertise. He claims that their usage of Islam created a massive revolution. According to 
many Marxist organizations, including the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee 
Guerillas (OIPFG)58 and the Tudeh Party,59 it was the Marxists who did most of the 
organizing and agitating, especially during the years prior to the revolution. Marxists 
claimed that during the revolution Muslim clerics had deceitfully stolen the revolution 
and labeled it ‘Islamic.’60                                                                                                                               
 Who did the organizing during the revolution and what underlying reasons caused 
Marxists to become Muslims or use Islam as an ideology? The argument is that a history 
of the transformation of Marxists into Muslims made this conversion of ideology so 
unobstructed and effortless that it seemed almost natural. The seamless usage of Islam by 
Marxists is precisely why research on this issue has been virtually nonexistent. While it 
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may seem controversial and ironic to both ideologies, this adaptation of Islam by 
Marxists has not been the subject of many papers or books. 
Islam, as claimed by many of the researchers, gave rise to the revolution in 1979. 
This claim is not limited to Muslims alone. Among the researchers are leftists and 
Marxists who have reached the same conclusion. Islam, so deeply rooted in Iran, was 
significant in determining not only the consequences of revolution but also the path it 
followed. According to Skocpol:  
In Iran, uniquely, the revolution was made—but not everyone will note, by any of 
the modern revolutionary parties on the Iranian scene. Not by Islamic guerillas or 
by the Marxist guerillas, or by the communist Tudeh Party, or by the secular-
liberal National Front. Instead it was made through a set of cultural and 
organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal 
enclaves that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah. … No 
innovative revolutionary propaganda retailed to the masses overnight, in the midst 
of a societal crisis, can serve this purpose. But a worldview and a set of social 
practices long in place can sustain a deliberate revolutionary movement. … 
All sectors of Iranian society were coalescing under the rubrics of Shi’a Islam, 
following Khomeini. After the Shah definitively broke with the clergy, the 
political center of gravity shifted toward firm political opposition, and later, 
revolution.61
 
In this light, there is consistency between her view and what took place during the 
1979 revolution in Iran. Acceptance of Shi’a methods and vision—radicalism, martyrdom 
(shahadat), and Shi’a Islam’s idea of authority of jurist (velayat-e faghih)—was clearly 
noticeable among Marxist organizations.  
Some Marxist organizations toned down their analyses of a social-political 
revolution, deliberately overlooking their irreconcilable differences with religion and 
religious political alternatives. To conform to the religion of Islam is especially an 
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anomaly for Marxists since Islamic ideology does not separate itself from the state and 
state-run institutions. Skocpol believes this ideology deliberately made the revolution: 
Revolutions are not made deliberately by revolutionaries or mass-based 
movements. … [But] if ever there has been a revolution deliberately made by a 
mass-based social movement aiming to overthrow the old order, the Iranian 
revolution against the Shah surely is it.62
     
According to Skocpol, ideologies reveal through action the practical strategies that 
revolutionary leaders follow as they act to bring about outcomes. In Iran the ideology of 
Islam functioned as guidance for revolutionary leaders. 
The strong roots of Islam and Islamic culture in Iran are hardly a mystery to 
anyone familiar with Iranian culture. The role and significance of Islamic ethics in social 
and political movements are as profound in organizations as they are in individuals in 
Iran. Islamic ethics can also be observed in non-Islamic or secular organizations. For 
example, gender relations established within Marxist groups attest to this lifestyle of 
patriarchy, which in Iran, in addition to the enduring influence of native culture, also 
stems from Islamic ideology.63  
Forrest Colburn refers to an intellectual culture as a prevailing paradigm: the 
Islamic values, expectations, phraseology, iconography, and implicit rules that expressed 
and shaped collective intentions and behavior in the Iranian revolution. Like other 
authors, he believes that Islam as a belief system and Muslims as organizers were better 
prepared to lead the masses: 
Several factors explain the success of Islam as a revolutionary force where 
Marxism-Leninism had failed. The clerics in Iran had a wider and more effective 
organizational base than the Marxists from which to mobilize popular opposition 
to the Shah. And Islam had a resonance and legitimacy with the entire population 
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that Marxism-Leninism could only aspire to have. Finally, the moral authority of 
Islam protected the clerics from the kind of brutal suppression encountered earlier 
by secular organizations.64
 
Islam’s moral authority did not make a difference to the way the Shah perceived his 
enemies. He nonetheless thought that the Muslims, in cooperation with the Marxists, had 
conspired to topple his regime. He dubbed the Iranian political movement prior to the 
1979 revolution as the ‘black and red conspiracy,’ the ‘infiltration of communists into 
Muslim ranks,’ ‘Marxist-Muslims,’ and many other combinations of names.65
Condescending intentions in these names notwithstanding, the proximity of 
Marxists and Muslims in theory and practice was undoubtedly present. Almost one year 
prior to the February 1979 revolution, an article written in the state-sponsored newspaper, 
Ettela’at, on December 25, 1977, accused Ayatollah Khomeini of treason and resistance 
against progress and women’s liberation: “The red and black reactionaries have 
recognized him [Khomeini] as the most appropriate person to fight against the Iranian 
revolution66 [referring to the Shah’s ‘white revolution’].” It further accused Khomeini of 
being the main figure in trying to establish a “colonial plan devised by the red and 
lack.”67 The article referred to the conspiracy of Islamic movements in the Middle East, 
coordinated with communists led by the Soviet Union.  
                                                 
64 Forrest Colburn. 1994. The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. p. 31. 
 
65 Ervand Abrahamian. 1988. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 
575, 607-611.  
 
66 Red symbolized Marxists, and black represented Muslims. This color coding was used mainly by the 
Shah’s government. 
67 Emaddeddin Baghi. 1991.  A Survey of Iran’s Revolution (barressi-e enghelab-e Iran). Tehran: Saraee, p. 
226.     
 58
 The Shah’s efforts to connect the two political movements never ceased. It was 
brought to the public’s attention even after his Prime Minister, Jamshid Amouzegar,68 
was ousted and replaced by Ja’far Sharif-Emami.69 In a special meeting in the parliament, 
Sharif-Emami spoke about the same conspiracy. Evidently, he perceived Marxists as the 
perpetrators and Muslims as the victims. To fight against the government through 
violence is not the Iranian people’s way of doing things. And if people 
 
were all good Muslims, they would not fight their government, so obviously 
someone else is responsible. Documents have shown that Marxists were the main 
cause, but they realized that it is not possible to do it alone. So they recognized 
that under these conditions, they could achieve their goals through religion. They 
infiltrated the religious ranks. Slogans chanted by the people (on different 
religious occasions) testified to these communist directives. From what we have 
observed, the slogans were completely Marxist.70
 
Marxists would rationalize their collaboration with Muslims only in the context of 
politics. This connection between Marxists and Muslims, including their motives and the 
extent of their cooperation, manipulation, and sincere camaraderie, remain a largely 
unexamined social phenomenon. To many Muslims, the notion of cooperation and/or 
manipulation by Marxists is intolerable and offensive. Emaddedin Baghi, an Iranian 
social scientist, believes that Marxists practiced an “arrogant manipulation” on Muslims. 
He states: 
Marxists think of themselves as the only vanguard of anti-imperialist struggle in 
the world. They monopolize any struggle against oppression and imperialism. 
They think of any religious or non-Marxist force as bourgeois, petite bourgeois, or 
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feudalist. They believe that religious groups would not be able to lead people’s 
anti-imperialist struggles, and because they [Muslims] lack essential 
understanding of imperialism, they end up in conciliation with imperialism.71  
 
Baghi’s statement contains an element of truth. What is more important is 
whether in the case of Iran, the above statement was true. On the contrary, however, it 
was Iranian Marxists who were doing most of the converting. This alteration enabled the 
Marxists’ monopolization, as he calls it, of the resistance movements. It also explains the 
Marxist justification of the viability of Islamic belief. The intellectual arrogance referred 
to by Baghi was wishful thinking on the part of Marxists. It also became a trap that led 
Marxists to immerse themselves in contextual Islam. 
 
Islamic Resistance and Radicalism 
Organizations such as the Fadaeean of Islam (Fadaeean-e Eslam) had long ago started an 
Islamic resistance movement, going back to the time of the Shah’s father, Reza Shah. 
They were the first organized group of Muslims to gather some popularity through their 
actions. In 1945, Mojtaba Navvab Safavi founded Fadaeean of Islam. He wrote a small 
pamphlet under the title Religion and Vengeance, (din va entegham), attacking the non-
religious and promising them an Islamic revenge. He was referring to Reza Shah’s attack 
on Islam and religion; the Shah was putting pressure on religious institutions and 
individuals to shed their lives of religious activity and belief. Fadaeean, to prove their 
serious belief in what they claimed, assassinated Ahmad Kasravi, a prominent secular 
writer of the time.72 They protested women entering the bazaar and mosques without 
proper Islamic cover. They protested against Hazhir, the Prime Minister; they attacked 
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liquor stores, and they made a point of traveling to Palestine to fight against Israel.73 In 
1948, Prime Minister Hazhir’s parliament denounced Islam as the official religion of 
Iran. This political act may have caused his death. Ironically, the assassin, a member of 
the Fadaeean of Islam, was the same person who had earlier been exonerated by Hajir’s 
government for assassinating Kasravi.74 In 1950, the Shah, despite his own tendencies, 
appointed General Haj Ali Razmara to calm the growing discontent. But before Razmara 
could begin to control a movement that would give rise to strong nationalist sentiment, he 
was assassinated.75
An important Muslim group that continued its role in the opposition leading the 
revolution was the Council of Islamic Alliance (shora-ye ettehadi-ye eslami). This group 
did not recognize the legitimacy of the Shah’s government and began its political 
opposition by refuting three major actions:  
1. Eliminating the religiosity of representatives 
2. Taking an oath on ketab-e asemani (divine book) and not the Koran 
3. Giving women the right to vote and be elected to the parliament76 
 
They disagreed with these actions because they represented the Shah’s effort to 
dispose of religion in his government. This was a verbal struggle, but there were other 
activities carried out by this group. On January 21, 1964, several young followers of the 
committee followed through with the plan to assassinate Prime Minister Hassan Ali 
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Mansour. The Shah’s government took this as a serious blow, and many important 
figures among the clergy were arrested or executed; Ayatollah Khomeini was exiled to 
Turkey. The Alliance carried on sporadic activities from 1964 to 1970, but was not able 
to gather more popularity. According to Pahlavan:  
Since the 1960s, leftist guerilla thought and armed struggle had won over all opposition 
groups and large sectors of nationalists, and even religious people showed interest and 
were attracted to it…under these conditions, the Council of Islamic Alliance became 
vulnerable and lost its practitioners. Important figures of the Alliance started working 
with the Mojahedin (Muslim guerrilla group) and defected from the Alliance.77
 
But activities of radical clerics and Muslims did not cease, and they continued their 
political provocation. Their activities, with the aid of Marxist guerillas, were setting the 
stage to overthrow the Shah. 
The Shah’s regime began a consensus-building program with the implementation 
of a referendum on land reform under the guise of a “white revolution.” Its emphasis was 
land reform, and its main amendments were: 
1. Annulment of landlord-serf relations 
2. Nationalization of all forestland  
3. The sale of state-owned factories to finance the land reform 
4. Profit sharing for workers in the manufacturing sector 
5. Election reform 
6. Compulsory education [in rural areas] through an ‘education army’ 
 
Khomeini’s response to the referendum was swift and direct; he called it anti-
constitutional.  As a result, the clergy’s resistance shifted into a new phase. In 
Khomeini’s telegram to the Prime Minister Amir Alam on October 18, 1962, he pointed 
to the unconstitutionality of the mandates. He added that the people of Iran would surely 
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resist such laws and would not remain quiet.78 Several days later, in a more provocative 
letter directly to the Shah, Khomeini addressed Alam’s endeavors as subversive. He 
mentioned that Alam had continued to act against the constitution and had taken 
measures, through his thugs, to censor the media.  
 “Mr. Alam has openly proclaimed his differences with the Koran and the  
constitution. … [He] thinks that by changing the name of the Koran to the Divine 
Book he can pronounce it as unofficial and replace it with any other holy book 
such as Avesta [the book of Zoroaster] or the Bible. On behalf of the Iranian 
people, I shall ask you not to trust such people whose sycophant behavior has put 
the blame on you for their anti-constitution and anti-religious acts.”79
 
Several days earlier, however, before Khomeini’s letter, the Shah had paid a visit 
to the city of Qom. After the prayer and the Islamic ritual, he made a vehement speech 
about the religious opposition: 
Some ignorant and backward people whose brain has not developed yet always stand in 
the way of progress. The black reactionary [Muslim] does not understand, and for a 
thousand years his brain has not developed. He thinks that life is to be spent somehow 
finding some money to live on and some food to eat and a place to sleep. …Well, living 
on the dole no longer exists [referring to khums and zakat]. In the new six-step laws, we 
have thought of everyone. But who will oppose such law? Black reactionaries, the 
ignorant who are dense and malicious. The destructive reds are obvious, and 
coincidentally, I hold less of a grudge against them. He [the communist] openly says that 
I want to give the country to foreigners [Soviets]; there is no deception and lying on his 
part… they are forthcoming with what they believe in.80
 
After the military raid and the killing of several of the clergy in Qom, Khomeini 
sent the Shah several harsh messages. But during his speech on the anniversary of 
original Islamic Martyrs of Shi’a Islam (in the incident of Karbala), Khomeini gave his 
sharpest criticism yet: 
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We can conclude that they are aiming at the fundamentals, that they disagree with 
foundations of Islam and clerics, and that they do not want this foundation to 
exist. Israel does not want Islamic clerics in this country. Israel does not want this 
country to have scientists, and Israel suppresses our clerical school through its 
black mercenaries. They suppress us, and they suppress you the people. They 
want to take over your economy, to destroy your commerce and agriculture, and 
to confiscate your riches. Israel, through its mercenaries, wants to destroy what 
stands in their way. The Koran is in their way and must be destroyed, the clergy 
are in the way and must be eliminated, our schools and other centers of science 
are barriers and must be destroyed, and if other clerics are later in the way, they 
too will also be killed, thrown from the rooftops, breaking their arms and legs. In 
order for Israel to reach its interests, the Iranian government has violated us to 
help the Israeli plan.81
 
The Islamic movement specifically, and the Iranian resistance movement in general, was 
not the same after the suppression in the summer of 1963. It became more organized and 
more radicalized. The new generation of Muslims was learning from other Third World 
movements and implementing their ideas. Even nationalists were now more active and 
radical. 
The guerilla movements, both Marxist and Muslim, resulted from a long tradition 
of political culture of resistance, especially in the 1960s. Their armed opposition 
radicalized the Iranian opposition. The political activity against the Shah from 1963 to 
1979 became more obvious with the role of many guerilla movements in opening up and 
forcing a political culture to the surface. The prelude to the adaptation of an Islamic 
ideology by Marxists was noticeable within this movement. Many Marxists did follow 
the Islamic traditions rooted in the culture by pursuing politics advocated by Muslim 
clerics who later founded the Islamic Republic. Some organizations consciously toned 
down their Marxist rhetoric in favor of Islam.82 They thought their Marxist analysis of a 
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complete revolution would revive itself in the shrouds of Islamic concepts. This 
ideological change occurred only in some Marxist organizations and to address political 
issues that demonstrated, for example, the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic 
government.  
It was during this period that the activities of radical clerics and Muslim activists 
in general constructed the political discourse for years to come. The uprisings instigated 
and organized by prominent clerics strongly contributed to the future events during the 
1979 revolution. Almost all those who played a role in opposition to the Shah took on 
important political positions after the revolution. The organizers of movements during the 
1960s were the leaders of the revolution in 1979. Their resistance began mainly as a 
consequence to the Shah’s White Revolution.  
By July 1978, the Shah felt the effervescence of serious opposition; he stated that 
there would be democracy and political freedom in Iran as in European countries: 
We will have freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of 
press…patriotic people and those who yearn to see their country progress will 
opine. …Others too will be able to express their views. …Of course in a 
democracy, people will vote and we will accept their votes.83
 
These were mere words and therefore not very appealing to a population that was 
already furious about his dictatorship. At this juncture, the question that concerned 
Iranians was just how his regime would be toppled. In effect, the Shah’s deeds had 
rendered his words useless and were causing more anger. While he spoke of democracy, 
he was holding thousands of political activists in his prisons. He also added thousands of 
new members to his notorious secret police, the SAVAK.  
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The strength of Islam as a mobilizing force should be added to these underlying 
causes. The Shah’s political repression is precisely what the clerics capitalized on. In 
explaining ideas that brought people together, many authors took Islam and Islamic 
culture into account. Thus, in their analysis, Islam played the most fundamental role in 
the 1979 revolution, and in fact was the most important underlying reason.84 According 
to these authors, revolution occurred because the Shah neglected to show respect for this 
national religion and the clerics. As a result, all uprisings, strikes, riots, and similar 
activities were conducted only to construct an Islamic alternative. According to Amid 
Zanjani, an Iranian political theorist: 
The only cause, as the first and main cause that gave rise to revolution from birth 
to victory, is the Shah’s actions against Islam. He saw the life of his regime, 
gathering foreign support, and establishment of his despotism contingent upon the 
suppression of Islam.85   
 
Zanjani perceived Islam as the main threat to the Shah. Therefore, the Shah’s anti-
Islamic policies would work to eliminate ideas that questioned his policies. When the 
Shah began his fight against Islam, he thought that eliminating Islam would save his 
regime, resolve domestic and foreign conflicts, and guarantee the life of his empire. And 
since the Islamic country and population were dependent on clerics and supporters of 
Islam, he was faced with cleric resistors who spoke the Islamic language, reflecting the 
demands of Muslim Iranians.86
 Muslims utilizing an Islamic ideology toppled the Shah’s regime. It is especially 
logical since true Muslims would resist and fight against any secular despot. Iranian 
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political theorist, Manoochehr Mohammadi’s analysis holds more accountability for 
Islam as a motive and ideology. He presents a conservative and religion-centric view. 
Mohammadi states that 
the lack of attention paid to dominant Islamic values and indifference to the 
demands of religious leaders provoked religious emotions in Iran… These 
included excessive freedoms, lack of discipline, corruption and prostitution, lack 
of respect to public [women’s] modesty, Bahais and Zionists occupying key 
positions in the government, changing Islamic history, control of the economy by 
Bahais like Sabet Pasal and Zionist Elghanian, backward moves, and the 
encouragement of Iranian history before Islam. 87
 
Through their political struggle, Muslims dubbed the Shah the despot and the 
United States a foreign force that imposed its culture and faithless secular ideas on Iran. 
Just as the Muslims, Marxists viewed the Shah’s regime and all its institutions as a 
puppet of the United States imperialism that maintained a dependent capitalist economy. 
It was the Muslims who initially introduced armed struggle by assassinating prominent 
figures in the Shah’s regime. Following that lead, Marxists eventually started armed 
struggle against the Shah in Siahkal.88 Although Muslims started their struggle as a 
protest movement, it eventually became a movement that demanded the overthrow of the 
Shah’s regime. Therefore, it was both Muslims and Marxists who advocated a revolution 
(Islamic or social-democratic) as the only viable solution. Both schools of thought 
advocated nationalism. It was the most important duty of a revolutionary to defend Iran 
in the face of foreign aggressors or imperialists.   
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88 On February 8th 1971, a group of Marxist guerillas initiated its first armed attack on one of Shah’s police 
precincts in the region of Siahkal. This group, in collaboration with two other groups, formed the 
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas. For more details see chapter 6 on Marxist organizations.  
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 Both Marxists and Muslims were socialized into learning how an Islamic 
resistance movement develops as an adamant opposition to the Shah’s regime especially 
after the 1963 uprising. Islamic activity by clerics and non-clerics permeated Iranian 
society after Khomeini declared his opposition against the Shah. Even the National 
Front,89 a somewhat secular nationalist movement, was influenced by these activities. 
Led by Muslims, the Liberation Movement split from the National Front. Furthermore, 
the Mojahedin,90 an armed Islamic group, was born into Iranian political life as a result. 
The new Marxist guerilla movement, and even some Tudeh Party members, were heavily 
influenced and were learning from Muslim political activity. By the late 1960s and early 
1970s, a new radical political movement had been established.   
 
Martyrdom 
Marxists adopted the same ethics of Islam as advocated by Muslims. They 
believed in simplicity and modesty in attitude, behavior, and clothing. Accumulation of 
wealth was looked down upon since it connoted worldly possessions and greed. Marxists 
insisted on clothing that demonstrated modesty and a humble personality. Colorful 
clothing and music, especially the Western type, was denigrating to both groups. It was 
these similarities, set in an Islamic society that helped lead the Marxists to accept Islam 
as a sociopolitical background.   
Muslims set the stage for a political struggle through several criteria. Consistent 
with the founders of Islam, they believed martyrdom to be a required sacrifice to achieve 
an ideal society. It was also a necessary method to fight against the enemy. Marxists too, 
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perceived martyrdom as a positive notion of ultimate sacrifice for the ultimate cause. 
Each martyr opened another window toward the new egalitarian society. Martyrdom 
demonstrated to the masses the Marxists’ commitment to their cause. A voluntary death 
might under certain circumstances be considered heroic. The distinction between suicide 
and martyrdom is in the eye of the beholder. According to Arthur Droge and James 
Tabor, there are five characteristics of deaths distinguished as martyrdom: 
1. They reflect situations of opposition and persecution. 
2. The choice to die, which these individuals make, is viewed by the authors as 
necessary, noble, and heroic. 
3. These individuals are often eager to die; indeed, in several cases they end up 
directly killing themselves. 
4. There is often the idea of vicarious benefit resulting from their suffering and 
death. 
5. The expectation of vindication and reward beyond death, more often than not, 
is a prime motivation for the choice of death. 91 
 
The Muslim ideal of martyrdom originated in a warrior culture. The ideal is one of active 
struggle (otherwise known as jihad) in which the will to die in the way of God is decisive. 
It is also significant that those who die in shipwrecks, childbirth, or illness may enjoy the 
rewards of the martyrs in paradise.  
 During the latter parts of the nineteenth century up to the 1980s, colonialism and 
foreign invasions in the Middle East gave rise to an entirely new understanding of 
martyrdom. The political events of recent decades have led to a resurgence of the ideal of 
actually dying as part of the struggle in the way of God. Contemporary justifications of 
martyrdom that do not necessarily rely on the luxuries of the otherworld are espoused by 
some non-Muslims. It is not only the Iranian Marxists who rationalized martyrdom, but 
also Palestinians and Sri Lankan Marxists, to name but two of the other examples. The 
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Koran is absolutely clear on the Muslim’s duty to struggle in the service of God, and on 
the rewards enjoyed by those slain in the course of that struggle. According to the Koran 
“those slain in the way of God, He will not send their work astray. He will guide them, 
and dispose their minds aright, and He will admit them to Paradise, that He has made 
known to them”.92 While in Christianity, it is the martyr’s death rather than his fighting 
that carries the ultimate religious significance, with Islam the opposite is true. Those who 
fight “in the way of God” have a special status beyond the promise of Paradise. They are 
“mightier in rank with God.”93 Their sins will be forgiven;94 whether slain or victorious 
they will receive a vast reward.95 The one certain reward associated with martyrdom is 
eternal life: “Do not say of those slain in God’s way that they are dead; they are living, 
only you do not perceive.”96
 A martyr is a person who chooses to suffer or die rather than give up his faith or 
principles; a person who is tortured or killed because of his beliefs; a person who suffers 
a long period of great pain or misery for his/her cause. Christian history is filled with 
officially proclaimed saints who tolerated persecution and died willingly for their faith – 
St. Stephen, John the Baptist, and most importantly, Christ himself. Just about the only 
warrior who became a martyr in Christianity is Joan of Arc. She killed and was willing to 
be killed to defend her God.  
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 In Jewish tradition there are also people who die for their faith. In the Masada 
event in the first century, Jewish Zealots decided to kill each other rather than face 
capture by the Romans. Like Muslims, Zealots interpreted important events in the 
founding period of their religion as precedents for their tactics and to mean also that 
“those who died in this struggle secured their places in paradise.”97  
In Islam, the definition of shaheed (martyr) also includes several types of death. 
The word shaheed is usually used to describe everyone from innocent children killed in 
war to gunmen who open fire in a crowded marketplace. Martyrdom is a powerful 
concept in the modern Muslim world, one that summons the earliest days of Islam’s 
turbulent history in the seventh century, when followers of Muhammad died defending 
their faith.  
To seal one’s belief through one’s death was the main characteristic shared by 
Muslims and Marxists. Martyrdom was advocated by prominent clerics and intellectuals 
as a measure of resistance. Ayatollah Mottahari, a prominent cleric who was assassinated 
only several months after the revolution said on reviving martyrdom, that we cannot 
“separate ourselves from the martyrs [in Karbala] when the right moment comes.” 98 Both 
Mottahari and Shariati99 opposed any mode of identification with the well-known battle 
of Karbala and martyrdom that did not simultaneously create a sense of heroism, sacrifice 
and activist commitment to control one’s destiny. Mottahari argued that those who truly 
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believed in the martyred Imam Hussein and followed his path with sacrifice were 
themselves martyrs. He clearly extended the sacred Shi’a history into contemporary 
politics. He believed in Islamic activism and harshly criticized passive Islam. If Muslims 
wanted to do the right thing, they would have to “refer back to our past and to our 
historical records.”100 This meant the history of Karbala and the struggle Hussein led 
against Mu’awiya’s army.  
 Perhaps the most concise and articulate statement of the significance of a martyr 
was given by Ayatollah Taleghani. He was a radical cleric who persevered in his struggle 
against the Shah, and died early after the revolution on September 10, 1979. He often 
preached in continuance of the revolutionary movement and claimed that death or any 
hardship should not be feared by those who struggle to change the direction of history. 
He referred to the Koran in defense of martyrdom: 
With a soul invigorated by light and energy, and with a vision penetrating and 
perceptive [the Koran] removes the barrier of the martyr’s death from their path, 
and removes the word of their death from their tongue. [So we] consider the 
martyrs so alive and lofty that their spirit is life-giving and uplifting for the earthy 
creatures, and their dead body, unwashed and unshrouded, gives blessings to the 
wretched, their gravesite the site of pilgrimage for the living hearts, the boiling of 
their blood giving life to dead bloods.101
 
In Iran, martyrdom is a powerful weapon that is directed toward the West, the 
occupier, the invader, the oppressor (tyrant), and is shared by all those who believe in the 
struggle against the national enemy. Few places on earth revere death and martyrdom as 
intensely as Iran. This is partially due to the fact that Shi’a Islam was founded on the 
memory of Hussein’s death in the battle of Karbala. During the Muslim celebration 
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known as Ashura, Shi’as use the commemoration of Hussein’s martyrdom to dedicate 
themselves to the memories of the martyrs of their recent history. 
Martyrdom became a notion that gave birth to an authentic and genuine Muslim 
revolutionary.102 It became instrumental. By the late 1960s a true revolutionary was a 
revolutionary who gave his/her life for the ultimate cause. A martyr withstood torture to 
the point of death without uttering a word. Despite the Tudeh Party’s refraining from the 
idea of martyrdom for decades, the new Marxists had to welcome death and martyrdom. 
Ultimately Marxists learned that without adhering to martyrdom they would not be a true 
political alternative in the eyes of the Iranian masses. The death of a Marxist 
revolutionary not only proved to the masses the seriousness of his/her devotion but also 
mobilized the masses. 
 
Karbala and the Inception of Shi’a Islam   
Consider the event that gave rise to this belief in Shi’a Islam, which started with 
the death of two prominent Imams in the latter part of the seventh century. The concept 
began with a conflict between two movements which later became known as Shi’as and 
Sunnis. The former were followers of prophet Mohammad and his blood descendents, 
and the latter were followers of prophet Mohammad and his political descendents. After 
the death of Ali, Mohammad’s cousin and son in law, Ali’s elder son Hassan took over as 
a caliph. Ali’s rule had been controversial, and he had been passed over for succession 
three times in a row. Hassan’s takeover, although for a short period, involved constant 
conflict against Muawiya, a member of the rival Umayyed clan. Hassan’s rule lasted only 
six months. However, it was his brother Hussein who had defied Yazid, Muawiya’s son, 
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and challenged his political power. Hussein and 71 members of his family were martyred 
in Karbala, located in southern Iraq, on the 10th day of the Arabic month of Muharram in 
the year 680.  
The killing of Hussein and the other members of his family became a symbolic 
turning point in the Shi’a religion. It was introduced into Shi’(ism) as the notion of freely 
and passionately giving one’s life in the path of God. Currently, Shi’a Muslims (13 
percent of all Muslims) around the world commemorate the event by mourning and self-
inflicted wounds to feel compassion with the original martyrs of Islam. The followers of 
Mu’awiya, on the other hand, became the Sunnis, and although the conflict was over who 
would succeed prophet Mohammad, the Karbala event is conspicuously one of the events 
that marked the split between Sunnis and Shi’as. 
Shi’ism became consolidated, especially with the death of Hussein. According to 
Seyyed Hussein Nasr, a well-known authority on Islam, Shi’ism continued as a protest 
movement of increasing political significance “but did not gain political power over any 
extensive area of the Islamic world until the Safavids conquered Persia [Iran] in 1501 and 
established a twelve-Imam Shi’ism as the official state religion.”103 For Iranians (or 
Shi’as in general), Ali symbolized a political activism to mend social injustices for the 
masses of poor people (mostaz’afin). The fact that Hussein fought to his death instilled in 
Shi’as the firm belief of suffering and martyrdom. In the twentieth century, especially 
during the 1979 revolution, he became a symbol of political resistance, revolution, and 
final hope. Shi’as consider visiting his tomb in Karbala second in importance only to the 
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Hajj in Mecca. Ashura mourning sessions are regularly held in Iran to remember Hussein 
and his family’s death and suffering, and to promote the reverence of martyrdom.  
During the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini recalled the importance of martyrs and 
mourning sessions, remembering martyrs for his audience of clerics. In his speech on 
June 20, 1982, he said: 
These mourning sessions have developed young men and youths who voluntarily 
go to the war fronts seeking martyrdom and feel unhappy if they don’t achieve it. 
These Ashura mourning gatherings develop such mothers who urge their sons to 
go to the war fronts and if they do not return, the mothers wish they had more 
sons to send or say we have other sons to send to the war fronts.104
 
Shi’as identify with the death of Hussein and his struggle against Muawiya and 
his troops. His martyrdom has influenced nearly all that happens in the social-political 
world. According to Davis, it even influences how they perceive cheerfulness and having 
fun.105 The Shi’a leader, Khomeini, decreed that good Shi’as should not decorate their 
homes lavishly. He believed that Muslims have to pay constant homage to Hussein’s 
suffering at Karbala. According to Khomeini, “an Islamic regime must be serious in 
every aspect of life…there is no fun in Islam. There can be no fun or enjoyment in 
whatever is serious.”106 In the cities of Iran, public spaces promote religious values and 
remembering martyrs. Streets and alleys are named after martyrs, and artists use public 
spaces to draw murals of these martyrs. In a mystical way, this is how some Iranian 
Shi’as transcend themselves to feel the suffering endured by Hussein and his family and 
supporters.  
                                                 
104 Joyce M. Davis. 2003. Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and despair in the Middle East. New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, P. 49.  
 
105 Ibid. 
 
106 Ibid. 
 75
In her book, Intellectual Trends in Twentieth Century Iran, Negin Nabavi 
demonstrated the deep roots of Islamic belief in Iran. She stated that the discourse of 
“authentic culture” gained “prevalence in response to a combination of ‘third-worldism’ 
and the movement of counterculture predominant in the West.”107 The more the Shah’s 
regime glorified the ideas of Westernization and cherished Western culture, the more 
leftist intellectuals, including Marxists, became interested in the authentic culture of 
martyrdom, somber behavior, and modesty. As Nabavi points out: 
If Islam and its values became prevalent in the 1970s, it was for their worldly 
potentials. Religion and mysticism were old notions that, if interpreted in a new 
light, could bring about the change that other ideologies had failed to achieve. It is 
no wonder then that once the first manifestations of a religious opposition to the 
regime began, secular progressive intellectuals did not question the meaning of 
this rhetoric. Instead, they gave it their full backing.108
 
The urgency of giving one’s life for the cause, martyrdom, became so prevalent 
that even participating Marxists wrote extensively on how such action could lead to 
adventurism. The Tudeh Party, which wanted nothing to do with the idea of death and 
martyrdom, persistently criticized the method and claimed it was adventuristic. Their 
constant criticism of sacrificing one’s life and refutation of martyrdom contributed to 
their lack of acceptance by the people. Even among the leaders of main Marxist 
organizations, members and sympathizers warned about the potential consequences of 
martyrdom. They warned that armed struggle does not mean getting killed for the cause. 
But a shift in such a deep-rooted principle was almost impossible. Even Marxists such as 
Bizhan Jazani, who was tortured and later executed by the SAVAK, was apprehensive 
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about the idea of martyrdom as mere sacrifice of blood. His warnings to his comrades 
follow: 
To ignore the objective conditions which are relevant to the growth of the 
revolutionary movement; to consider the role of the vanguard out of its context, 
and to peddle the notion that the sensational sacrifice of some elements of the 
vanguard will immediately (or in a short time) attract the support of the masses, or 
even encourage their active participation in the struggle, is adventuristic. Such 
conceptions about armed struggle should be replaced by a Marxist understanding 
of the dynamics of society and of the revolutionary movement in general. …Too 
much emphasis on the role of the “Fadaee,” resorting to constant invocations of 
“Martyrdom” to offset the absence of a mass movement, and the belief that the 
sacrifice of blood is sufficient for the start of the revolution are aspects of 
adventurism.109
 
Adventurism it might have been, but for that historical period, martyrdom was the 
driving force behind a serious struggle against a dictator who had stifled all methods of 
dissent for a frustrated opposition. In addition, it provided Marxists and Muslims with a 
method of struggle that refused to play according to the rules of a punitive political 
system. Martyrdom became the ultimate proof of invincibility. The individuals who did 
not fear being punished were strange phenomena that not even SAVAK torturers could 
fathom. 
As argued previously, the notion of martyrdom became a unit to measure 
authenticity among Marxists and Muslims. Muslim groups and organizations within the 
opposition rejected the Shah’s modernization process and were willing to give up their 
lives for maintaining Islamic values intact. They opposed modernization, adhering to 
traditional Islamic values. Major Muslim organizations made essential changes in Iranian 
political history. These organizations contributed significantly to setting the political 
discourse in Iran. A fundamental manifestation of a revolutionary was to become a 
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martyr. Who could be more serious and authentic in fighting the Shah’s tyranny? In the 
eyes of the Iranians, martyrdom finally gave birth to Marxists as serious revolutionaries. 
Decades of skepticism about Marxists in Iran ended with Marxists becoming martyrs. 
Ironically, martyrdom helped Marxists prove their authenticity. Only when they gave 
their lives for the first time in the Siahkal region, while fighting the Shah’s army, did the 
population consider them real revolutionaries.  
 
Marxists Using Islamic Ideology to Defend a Revolutionary Line 
 
Iranian Marxists found the idea of martyrdom, although metaphysical,110 a 
practice that challenged the false consciousness of the masses. In effect they used 
religion, what Marx considered false consciousness, to exterminate an alternate false 
consciousness. Indisputably, even Marxists who believe in the idea of martyrdom do not 
believe in the afterlife and the story of angels awaiting them. The concept of martyrdom, 
however, has become a belief system for many Marxists. Moreover, in their literature, 
martyrdom is often referred to as a necessary condition for achieving an ideal society. 
Here are two examples of such usage, but from different perspectives.   
Khosro Golsorkhi111 and Karamat Daneshian,112 were two Marxist revolutionaries 
who were tried by the Shah’s military court and later executed by the Shah’s military. 
Both Golsorkhi and Daneshian believed in the concept of sacrificing self, despite their 
adherence to Marxism. These two individuals represented the two types of Marxism that 
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against Golsorkhi.  
 78
developed in Iran. For Golsorkhi, Islam was ideological. It was an ideology that 
encouraged a struggle against the oppressor. For Daneshian however, Islam was 
contextual, it is in the way he was raised and socialized: his belief in martyrdom for him 
guaranteed a brighter future.  
For Golsorkhi, a socialist economy could be represented by an Islamic state. He 
claimed that “in a socialist economy, Islam is acceptable as a superstructure.”113 His 
defense in court, while he was being prosecuted for conspiring to assassinate the Shah 
and his family, conveyed one of the most interesting ways Marxists adapted Islamic 
values contrary to their own.  
During his defense, he mentioned Ali (the first Imam of Shi’a Islam) as the ‘first 
socialist’ and Hussein (the third Imam of Shi’a Islam) as ‘the greatest martyr of the 
people of the Middle East.’ He gave an intricate description of why he, as a Marxist, 
believed in continuing the line of Ali and his son Hussein as two martyrs who gave their 
lives for the oppressed. In his speech on the similarities between Marxism and Islam, 
Golsorkhi, conveyed the depth of Islamic belief in martyrdom among Marxist 
intellectuals. His synthesis of Islam and Marxism was one of a kind, yet highly 
acceptable in the Iranian resistance culture. On January 8, 1974, Keyhan, a state-
sponsored newspaper, wrote: 
Khosro Golsorkhi, defendant in row two, for his last defense, after reciting a 
poem, defended the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. He dubbed himself as a 
follower of the school of Marx and said several words on the conditions of Iran. 
The main judge warned the defendant to speak only in his own defense and that 
he was not permitted to say anything outside of that context. After the warning, 
the defendant handed his [written] defense to the court’s secretary. 114
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This was Keyhan’s description of Golsorkhi’s defense. However, the interesting 
details were not mentioned. The entire defense, which lasted only several minutes, spoke 
volumes on how Marxism developed within the Iranian opposition. Golsorkhi began by 
citing a saying from Imam Hussein: ‘Ennammal Hayat, va Aghidatto-Jahad’ (Life is 
nothing but a struggle for your belief).  
I will begin my talk with a quotation from Hussein, the great martyr of the people 
of the Middle East. I, a Marxist-Leninist, have found, for the first time, social 
justice in the school of Islam and then reached socialism. In this court, I am not 
bargaining for my life or even my life span. I am but a drop in the great struggle 
of the Iranian people. A people to whom belong Mazdaks, Maziars, Babaks, 
Yaghoob Leith Saffaris, Amoughlus, Pasyans, Mirza Koochaks, Aranis, 
Roozbehs, and Vartans.115 Yes, I am not bargaining for my life, because I am the 
child of a fighting people. 
 
He was interrupted by a state official calling him a liar; undaunted, he continued: 
 
The real Islam in Iran has always played its part in liberation movements. 
Behbahanis and Khiabanis are genuine examples. Today, too, the real Islam is 
contributing to liberation movements in Iran. When Marx says, in a class society, 
wealth is accumulated on one side and poverty, hunger, and misery on the other, 
whilst the producer of wealth is the poor, and Ali116 says, a castle will not be built 
unless thousands become poor, we cannot deny that there are great similarities. 
This is the juncture of history in which we can claim Ali to be the world’s first 
socialist. The life of Hussein117 represents our current life conditions, willing to 
give our life for our oppressed people being tried in court. He was among a 
minority. And Yazid118 had the throne [sic], soldiers, and power. He [Hussein] 
stood and became a martyr. Yazid occupied a part of history, but what prevailed 
in history was the path of Hussein. This is how, in a real Marxist society, Islam is 
explicable as a superstructure. And we too approve of such Islam, the Islam of 
Hussein.119
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 The common struggle for Muslims and Marxists was indeed the opposition to 
modernization and an imperialist culture. Golsorkhi spoke about censorship in Iran. Such 
censorship, he claimed, was not found anywhere else in the world:  
This is how a mummified culture, which is the consequence of comprador 
bourgeois production relations in Iran, stifles progressive books and thoughts with 
its censorship…what must be dictated to the people of Iran is the souvenir of 
American imperialist culture.120
 
At this point of his defense, the military judge warned Golsorkhi that his 
statements were irrelevant. Golsorkhi, upset about the accusation, responded that he 
would say nothing in his own defense, and if not allowed to state what he believed in, 
would rather take his seat and say nothing. Not allowed to continue, he took his seat.  
The other defendant, who was executed after being sentenced by the same court, 
was Karamat Daneshian. His defense statement was not like Golsorkhi’s and adhered to a 
very secular Marxist course. He included no words about Islam in his defense. The 
objection of this defendant, however, had the same tone against the Shah and 
imperialism. His examples of those international organizations resisting similar 
oppressive political conditions were nonreligious as well. His defense is included here to 
depict the difference between secular Marxist thought and Islamic Marxist thought. 
During his defense, he was constantly interrupted by the judge and the state attorney. He 
spoke of injustice throughout the world because, as he put it, there was unannounced 
martial law in Iran: 
Military courts automatically approve their own legitimacy. …millions of people 
in the armed forces, without having an active role in society or production, are 
busy in a useless game. The budget spent on the purchase and maintenance of this 
military power is as useless as the game itself… [interrupted, he continued] such 
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force has no other purpose than the suppression of people’s voice of liberation. 
The shootings of farmers, peasants, and people’s fighters [political resistors] are 
their principle duty. Revolutions have shown that even the mightiest of powers 
will fall. All revolutionaries, plus the people, have always fought against class 
differences. Successes achieved by the oppressed in this path have proven people 
victorious. Liberated people, social movements on their way to liberation, 
reverberates the news of shedding poverty, corruption and injustice in the world. 
Such worldwide victories also affect the Iranian movement. In addition, the 
commencement of any movement is contingent upon its local conditions. If you 
think that with the arrest of a small group—torture, imprisonment, and 
execution—you can claim victory and put an end to all resistance…[interrupted, 
continued] Observing the resistance throughout the world you cannot conclude 
your triumph. Despite the prosperity reached by two-thirds of the world 
population, remember the heroic people of Vietnam and how they caused 
American imperialism to flee like a dog with its tail between its 
legs…[interrupted and he was not allowed to continue].  
 
He submitted his written defense to the secretary of the court and took his seat. 
Sentenced to death, five days later, both Golsorkhi and Daneshian had another chance to 
defend themselves.121
Golsorkhi, in his second defense, kept his Islamic Marxist ideas consistent and 
claimed that he was being tried because he believed in Marxist thought and that he was 
sentenced to death by a military court. Reiterating his Islamic beliefs while remaining a 
Marxist, he said: “I am a Marxist-Leninist, and I respect the Shari’a laws of Islam. I 
believe that nowhere in the world, in dependent countries and colonies, can a nationalist 
government exist unless it is built upon a Marxist infrastructure.” Daneshian, in his 
second defense, had even stronger words for the court: 
During the first mistrial, and its fascist order, you did not hear my entire defense 
or the defense of my friend Golsorkhi. But my defense is nothing but defending 
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the rights of oppressed and poverty-stricken masses and attacking the enemy of 
the people. If you do not fear people’s resistance, you do not believe in the death 
of the ruling class in Iran. History has shown this reality and will again…our 
belief in the victory of the Iranian people’s movement and all class societies in the 
world is our greatest power. I should add that the ruling classes have never liked 
Marxism.122
 
In Daneshian’s will, there are some contextual Islamic undertones about death and 
martyrdom, the metaphysics of how a martyr would guarantee a better future;  
Death is our most modest gift to the people. Each death is a small window closing 
on nihilism. And each death is a panel of mystery closing on lies, corruption, 
poverty, and hunger. Thus, a window will open that lets in the light of life. Let us 
sacrifice our life for this light – this light.  
 [signed by Daneshian as] People’s Fadaee, Karamat Daneshian; February 8, 1974. 
No Marxist in Iran has entered a life of political struggle without, sometime or another, 
reasoning with the statement above. The word Fadaee, (one who is willing to sacrifice 
his/her life for a cause) is used by both Marxists and Muslims to refer to the nature of 
their struggle. The concept has strong roots in Islam and comes directly from the notion 
of martyrdom. There is first an acceptance of one’s sacrificial life and death. This gives 
meaning to the cause and its progress. To live a life of Fadaee is to live selflessly. To give 
your life for the cause is to sacrifice the ultimate human possession, one’s life for the 
ultimate reason. A famous Marxist song popularized by Marxist Fadaeean claims that in 
the path of people, if one life is given, thousands will rise. It maintains that to become a 
Fadaee and to give your life for the cause is not in vain. According to Muslims, Islam’s 
martyrs, Ali, Hussein, and Abbass (the brother of Imam Hussein, a great martyr of 
Karbala), made clear before their deaths that this would guarantee a brighter future. It 
would demonstrate to nonbelievers the nobility of their cause, Islam. A culture of giving 
life for the cause is part of tradition in Iran. According to Shi’a belief, the imitation of the 
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fate of Hussein, the ultimate Martyr of Islam, instantly opens the gates of paradise.123 
Marxists too, have taken this idea for granted. They have come to believe in it as a 
scientific method of entering the political struggle in a metaphysical manner. The non-
scientific method of martyrdom related to victory, and its inconsistency with the 
scientific methodology of Marxism is a clear contradiction. 
 
Formation of State and Islam 
In their overriding concern with opposition to the Shah, Iranian Marxists did not 
plan on the formation of a state that represented their social and political ideas. In this 
realm of polity, Muslims were far ahead in the game of state building. Muslims did not 
get a chance to practice their art of organizing a state until the revolution of 1979, but 
they had contemplated the possibilities decades before.  
In March of 1950, a member of the Fadaeean of Islam, Khalil Tahmasbi, 
assassinated the newly appointed Prime Minister, Razmara. Eliminating Razmara created 
a political atmosphere that contributed to the rise of Mosaddegh’s government. It was 
under such an environment that the necessity for the existence of a group such as 
Fadaeean of Islam was questioned. Why just a resistance movement if an Islamic republic 
is possible. The assassination of Razmara was agreed upon by both Ayatollah Kashani 
and the National Front (the group Mosaddegh belonged to), indicating its close 
relationship with Muslims. Fadaeean of Islam insisted on an Islamic republic, and for the 
first time the issue of an Islamic state was presented. However, Mosaddegh and 
Ayatollah Kashani disagreed.  Mosaddegh had responded to their request for an Islamic 
republic: “Won’t the gentlemen leave an Islamic ruling to another government and 
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request it from an Islamic government? My Government will not last forever.”124 It was 
these events that made the Fadaeean of Islam less significant, to the point where their 
own leader, Navab Safavi, after being released from prison said, “We will begin a period 
of decline (fetrat), because the fight between Mosaddegh and the Shah is not over Islam 
but over power [government], but I have an Islamic contention. And while problems are 
not settled, I will remain quiet.125 In effect, Mosaddegh’s government de-prioritized the 
necessity of building an Islamic state. 
 According to Katouzian, Safavi’s silence was not indicative of neutrality. His silence 
only signified the Fadaeean of Islam’s disapproval of Mosaddegh’s government and 
hence, condoned the Shah’s return to power.126 Although they did believe in 
establishment of an Islamic government they never reached their objective. In 1955, five 
members of the group, including Safavi himself, were arrested and executed for an 
attempt to assassinate the Shah’s new Prime Minister, Hossein Ala. 
 Despite Fadaeean of Islam’s radical acts and rejection of the secularization of Iran, the 
main reason for their temporary popularity, they never developed a sophisticated 
ideology, much less a concrete program for an Islamic government. Their priority was to 
instill Islamic belief from the bottom and not through the state. According to Safavi’s 
writings, the first principle in their ideology claimed that: 
For many years there has been a curtain drawn over Islamic truth and 
illumination, and it has prevented the shedding of Islamic light on the hearts of 
children of Islam and Islamic nations in the world. Islam is a religion of practice 
and action. Superstition has covered the real character of Islam and the fault 
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belongs to religious clerics. …Therefore, to achieve real Islam we must take 
superstition, sectarianism, and dark thoughts away from Islam, for Islam is a 
religion of worship and human salvation.127
 
It did not however, mean that an Islamic state was not preferable. Among the 
principal beliefs of the Fadaeean was that religion should not be kept separate from 
politics. They criticized clerics who avoided the realm of politics and believed that the 
clerics had helped develop a spirit of indifference and apathy among Muslims. 
Khoshniyyat wrote, “Fadaeean of Islam tried to break the frozen atmosphere of the 
clerical school in Qom and replace clerics’ apathy and indifference with protest and 
struggle.”128
 Among their plans, although less pronounced in their literature, was to establish an 
Islamic government. They believed that living according to Islam was contingent upon an 
Islamic state and that Islamic rulers must use their power in executing two central laws of 
malzoomat va monkerat (obligations and prohibitions). This, in fact, was as far as the 
Fadaeean of Islam went with politics and their program for political power. Their intent 
was simply to forbid and control certain items such as women’s clothing and alcohol. 
They had, for example, never mentioned velayat-e faghih (authority of jurists) and its role 
within an Islamic state.  
Many members of the Council of Islamic Alliance occupied important positions 
within the government of the Islamic Republic. Many considered the Council as one of 
the most powerful institutions in relation to political expertise in state-building. The 
                                                 
127 Hossein Khoshniyyat. 1981. Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab Safavi: aghayed, mobarezat, va shahadat. (His 
Thoughts, Struggles and Martyrdom). Tehran: Nashr-e Saraee. p. 217. 
 
128 Ibid, p. 227. 
 86
Council was essentially a closed, organized group seeking power, expanding Islamic 
values, and condemning any revision.129
In his article, Hamid Enayat offers a summary of how clerics in this alliance were 
able to take on state power. It is historicist and rational, and worth mentioning because it 
demonstrates the level of preparedness by the clerics to take control of the state. He 
claims that among the reasons behind the cleric’s success was  
their political experience. By participating in sporadic political movements, such 
as the Tobacco Uprising in 1892, the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, the 
National and the Oil Movement in 1952, and the 1963 uprising, they gathered lots 
of experience. In all of these events, intellectual groups pushed aside the clergy 
after succeeding. But the clergy consequently learned from all of this, and by 
arming themselves with such experience from the very beginning, they prevented 
the liberals and radicals from defeating them once again.130  
 
Among the groups of clerics, according to Abrahamian, Ayatollah Khomeini’s group was 
the most political and most radical. Most of the members of this group had been 
Khomeini’s pupils. In his first work in 1945, Discovering Secrets (Kashfol-asrar), 
Khomeini alluded to not getting involved in changing or overthrowing the state.131 But 
later, in the 1960s, he revised his views and insisted on the involvement of the clerics in 
politics and economics by organizing an Islamic state. Because “the rule of Islam is the 
rule of law,” he claimed, “those who know the law and even beyond that, theologians, 
meaning clerics, must be responsible for it [the Islamic state].” It would be they “who are 
to protect all matters related to executing, running the bureaucracy and planning in the 
country.”132 He advocated heavy involvement in politics by the clerics, but he was careful 
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about misinterpreting what an Islamic government exactly meant. The following, which 
Khomeini wrote in his book,  Authority of the Jurist: Islamic Rule, (velayat-e faghih: 
hokoomat-e eslami) is quoted in Abrahamian. He stated what Islamic Jurisprudence 
literally means pertaining to constitutionality and law. Islamic ruling is neither tyrannical 
nor absolute; rather, it is ‘constitutional.’133  
Of course not constitutional [read contingent], meaning its contemporary usage is 
determined by the vote of the majority. Constitutional [read contingent], in the 
sense that rulers in their executing of laws are contingent upon what has been 
determined by the Holy Koran and the Tradition of Mohammad. This culmination 
of conditions is the same as Islamic laws that have to be implemented and 
executed.134  
 
Khomeini’s analysis or directives on why clerics must be involved in politics and 
policy making became a guideline during the revolution. Many of Khomeini’s pupils 
were prominent clerics: Montazeri, Khalkhali, Rafsanjani, Khamenei, Mottahari, who 
became powerful figures after the revolution. Their involvement in state-making, state-
running, and state-ruling is hardly imaginable without Khomeini’s interpretations of 
velayat-e faghih. 
 Khomeini made clear his interpretation of Islamic ruling long before the revolution. The 
Islamic government, he wrote, “is the rule of the Divine Law upon people.”135 
Consequently there is no legislative body in the Islamic government. The supreme leader 
of authority in an ‘Islamic Republic’ is qualified by virtue of two characteristics: 
knowledge of the Divine Law and justice. Any other kind of knowledge, sacred or 
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secular, is irrelevant. By virtue of the knowledge of the Divine Law, “the jurists have 
authority over the rulers.”136 In his writing Khomeini reiterates the role of the supreme 
leader and claims that due to the jurist’s indisputable authority, all other positions of 
power fall directly under him. The jurist is knowledgeable in all Islamic laws and he is 
the most just. 
If rulers are Muslims they ought to obey the jurists. They have to ask the jurists 
about the [Islamic] laws and regulations, and then act accordingly. Thus the true 
rulers are the jurists themselves, and the government ought to be officially given 
to them, not to those who because of their ignorance of the [Divine] Law have to 
obey the jurists.137  
  
On the other hand, Marxists in Iran were merely involved in the art of resistance 
and not what would have to be done after the revolution – literally the morning after the 
revolution. Muslims were obviously thinking not only about resistance but also how to 
build a state that would answer to the necessities of an oil-rich developing capitalist 
economy and keep Islamic faith ever present. The Islamic state would also be able to 
address issues of nationalism and patriotic fervor. Nationalism, advocated by the new 
Islamic Republic, captured the attention of Iranians in defending their country against the 
Iraqi invasion of Iran. While the government mobilized masses of Iranians with the aid of 
Islamic belief,138 their political rhetoric was nationalist. Many Marxist groups and 
individuals, e.g., the Tudeh Party and Fadaeean (majority), volunteered to fight for the 
country with a nationalist ideology.  
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The Muslim preparedness in taking control of state power was another reason 
which eased the conversion of Marxists into Islam. Muslims, especially cleric leaders, 
had concrete plans on taking over the state. They had considered the idea dating back to 
the early 1960s. During the 1979 revolution, it was only Muslims who pushed for state-
building. This was while Marxists were involved in perpetual in-fighting. Marxists’ 
political conversion into Islam, especially during the years of the revolution, was strongly 
tied to the Muslim takeover of the state. In many ways Marxists thought of the Islamic 
Republic as a stepping stone to socialism, and at times very close to a socialist − non- 
capitalist − state. 
The three areas of resistance, martyrdom, and state-building constructed the 
sacred canopy for the Iranian political movement. It was contextual Islam that Marxists 
learned from. Their conversion to Islam makes sense in the context of power relations. In 
the face of a despotic regime, who had the power to set the stage for an ultimate struggle? 
What was the hegemonic force in the realm of Iranian politics?  In all three categories, 
Islamic ideology and ethos prevailed, obligating Marxists to convert.  
 In the next chapter I will examine how contextual Islam and the ideology of Islam 
became a possibility for Marxists. Through methods developed in the sociology of 
knowledge, I will demonstrate how Islamic belief is present in particular Iranian Marxist 
organizations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MARXISTS WHO BECAME MUSLIMS DURING THE 1979 REVOLUTION 
 
Contrary to resentful sophistry and interpretation, our party’s support of this 
thought[Khomeini’s] does not indicate disagreement with democracy or betraying 
toward principles of civilization…our party does not believe that Khomeini or his true 
believers are taking Iran through the gates of the Middle Ages  
    Kianuri, Chairman of the Tudeh Party 
 
In preceding chapters the reader became familiar with contextual Islam, the 
prevalence of Islam within Marxist and non Marxist groups and Islamic ethics as the 
sacred canopy. In this chapter specific Marxist organizations that converted to an Islamic 
ideology and approved of an Islamic republic will be examined. Many of their leaders 
and members were born into an Islamic culture which helped shape their thoughts and 
ideas. Their agents of socialization were imbued with Islamic belief and philosophy. 
What are the consequences of being born into this background of Islamic belief? Will it 
transcend in to the realms of politics and political movements? It was not only Muslim 
leaders of the opposition who were raised and socialized through Islam. Their Marxist 
counterparts went through very similar socialization processes and internalized similar 
Islamic beliefs. Islamic perspective was the hegemonic way of analyzing all that existed.   
 In addition to the contextual Islamic ethos there is the ideological acceptance of 
the philosophy of Islam. The ideological convergence was a more specific method 
through which Marxists were becoming Muslims. This type of convergence occurred 
during the 1979 revolution. The most significant part of a Marxist discourse in accepting 
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the ideology of Islam was put forth by the Tudeh Party and groups that joined the Tudeh 
Party later. Among them were the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerrillas 
(majority)139 and the Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari). These 
three organizations specifically wrote and spoke about the acceptance of Islam as a 
liberating ideology. In this chapter some of their written material is examined. Through 
their writing one can comprehend how Marxists were able to rationalize Islam as an 
ideology that would mobilize Iran’s oppressed. As Maziar Behrooz claims, “never before 
in the history of communism in Iran, and very rarely in other parts of the world, has a 
Marxist organization collaborated so closely with the state in the suppression of other 
Marxist groups.”140
 
Tudeh Party and the New Islamic Republic 
Most of the material used in this chapter is selected from the Tudeh Party’s organs 
and publications during and after the revolution. Their publications are used as primary 
sources and have been translated by the author. For the entire decade of the 1980s into 
the mid-1990s these publications were banned. Most of the material can now be found in 
the archives of the pertaining organization’s website. The written material is related to the 
Tudeh Party’s Chairman, Nour al-din Kianuri141, who was a prominent member and the 
spokesperson for the Tudeh Party during the revolution. He was one of the executive 
committee members of the Tudeh Party. He fled Iran and resided mostly in East Germany 
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until 1979. During the revolution he went back to Iran and became the main 
spokesperson for the Party during the years of the revolution. He was appointed as party 
spokesman to convince both Muslims and Marxists the Party line of becoming close 
affiliates of the Islamic Republic. He remained a key figure even after being incarcerated 
by the Islamic Republic. His Islamic affiliation goes back to his grandfather, Ayatollah 
Fazlollah Nuri, who was a prominent clergy during the social turmoil of the 1906 
Constitutional Revolution. Initially Ayatollah Nuri supported the revolutionaries but later 
turned against them. He was later executed by the revolutionaries.  
 For most Marxists working with an Islamic government was questionable, while 
for some Muslims the nature of a Marxist organization such as the Tudeh Party working 
in collusion with the Islamic government was an anomaly. The Tudeh Party’s acceptance 
of Islam was an ideological anomaly for Marxists and Muslims. Marxists were doubtful 
because the newly established Islamic government was practicing its suppression through 
religion. Muslims did not want to believe the Tudeh leadership because they did not want 
to share political power with atheist, nonbelievers, koffar. They were Soviet-controlled 
communists who questioned Islam, according to Muslims. Skeptics of both sides were 
questioning the Tudeh leadership. Some of their discussions were meant to deliberately 
debunk the party’s support, affiliation, and cooperation with either the left or the right, 
Marxist or Muslim. The Tudeh Party was accused by both religious Muslims and Marxist 
organizations to be conforming to the opposite side. Same controversy pertained to 
various smaller groups that incorporated a measure of Marxism into their Islamic 
ideology, e.g., Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari). 
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The following piece appeared in Donya142, in July 1979. At the time, an Islamic 
Republic government had been established but still called the Provisional Islamic 
Republic. There was no presidential position, but Bazargan, as Prime Minister, was head 
of the state. His government lasted for 275 days. The author is a prominent figure of the 
Tudeh Party, Ehsan Tabari, a sociologist and a prolific writer within the party who 
ardently defended the Islamic way of the revolution. 
In the recent years, he argued, the Tudeh Party had put forth the slogan of 
“destruction of the anti-democratic and anti-nationalist regime of the Shah”143 before all 
other organizations. According to Tabari, their party was the one to “approve with 
perseverance, the struggle of Khomeini’s line against what he [Khomeini] called taghoot 
[referring to an idol that was worshipped in Mecca before the advent of Islam also 
denoting evil and corruption]”144 Tabari later explained the reasons his party supported 
Islamic resistance and more specifically, Khomeini’s line: 
Contrary to resentful sophistry and interpretation, our party’s support of this 
thought [Khomeini’s] does not indicate disagreement with democracy or 
betraying toward principles of civilization…our party does not believe that 
Khomeini or his true believers are taking Iran through the gates of the Middle 
Ages. Furthermore, contrary to what our opposition claims, we have not dissolved 
into or converged with Khomeini’s line, or from ‘fear’ of being pronounced 
‘illegal.’ Our politics toward our allies are not the politics of dissolution, but 
politics of ‘alliance and criticism.’145
 
Alliances may have been at the bases of Iranian politics at the time, but as 
demonstrated later in this section, criticism of their Muslim allies did not really steer the 
Tudeh Party. Tabari later took a more conservative and functionalist approach by 
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indicting the ‘ultra leftists’ who disagreed with the Tudeh Party. He claimed that their 
intentions are less important than are the consequences of their actions. The result of their 
actions of opposing the Islamic line is to defend the United States and anti-
revolutionaries. Historically, he claimed, “It has not been intentions that matter rather the 
resulting consequences that are fomented by taking positions.”146 Thus he used the 
popular metaphor, “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”147
 Tabari’s definition of alliance and equal partners can also be interpreted in a different 
manner. In this case, according to the Tudeh Party, an Islamic force was the only force 
that could provide leadership to stabilize a revolutionary Iran. Most Marxist groups 
believed that it was not so much of an alliance but rather a submission that the Tudeh 
Party was conciliatory toward the Islamic regime. In the same article, addressing liberals 
and leftists, Tabari explained which group belonged to which side. Reviewing different 
ideas of liberals, and ‘ultra leftists’ in the opposition, he stated: 
[an] anti-revolution[ary] (the operatives of imperialism and of the toppled regime) 
is not too hopeful for revival, [he] looks upon this line [liberals] with a minimum 
of desire, but hopes that supporters of this line (liberals, social democrats, and 
super leftist elements) will defeat Khomeini’s relentless line. This line uses the 
name of Mossadegh, the nationalist prime minister of Iran, in opposition to the 
great dignity of Khomeini. This line resents us because we voted for an Islamic 
Republic and Khomeini…We have repeated this ten times, we demand a union of 
all forces, from liberal bourgeoisie to nationalist to the most leftist along with the 
religious fighters, however, led by Imam Khomeini.148
 
For the Tudeh Party it was not difficult to differentiate positions in regards to the 
Islamic Republic government. However, the problem was how to explain their policies to 
the masses. How was it that a Marxist organization became an advocate of Islam and 
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further defended the Islamic government more fanatically than the Muslims? This had to 
be explained especially to their supporters, and to other leftist and specifically Marxist 
organizations. The party spent most of its time clarifying its views on the necessity of an 
alliance with the Islamic Republic for supporters and Marxist and Muslim groups who 
were skeptical about Tudeh Party’s sincerity. It must be noted that not only the Tudeh 
Party, but the Organization of People’s Fadaeean-OIPF (majority)149, and the Liberation 
and Equality Group were also having to defend—in their writings—how and why to 
support Islam, Muslims, and the Islamic Republic.   
 
Tudeh and Islamic Jurisprudence  
By defending the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran the leaders of the 
Tudeh Party isolated themselves from other Marxist groups. They abandoned other 
groups and organizations to demonstrate their faith in the Islamic Republic. Their 
perception of other groups within the opposition shows their devout following to the 
government. By this time the Tudeh Party had not only dominated the political arena, but 
had also found a strong great ally. Leaders in the Tudeh Party were confident about their 
policies toward the new Islamic government. Kianuri announced his party’s support for 
all whose actions and thoughts were in accordance with their program. He claimed:  
We believe that other than our party,the most steadfast and determined position 
belongs to true believers of Ayatollah Khomeini’s thoughts on the fight against 
imperialism, the reactionary regime of the Shah, and the struggle for people’s 
democratic rights and for democratic freedoms. We believe, given today’s 
conditions, that these groups are the closest allies to the Tudeh Party.150  
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Kianuri and the Tudeh Party agreed about what he called, mistakes, made by 
groups in the opposition, especially when it came to supporting the new Islamic 
government. He clarified those mistakes made by Fadaeean (Minority) and responded 
that, “The biggest tactical mistake made by OIPFG is their incorrect and severely 
negative position on the referendum [to recognized the Islamic Republic], and for not 
voting for an Islamic Republic.”151 He explained how failure to vote for an Islamic 
Republic was comparable to taking sides with Shapur Bakhtiar152, imperialism, and other 
reactionary groups. The question of a referendum was brought up repeatedly in different 
settings by the Tudeh Party. But accepting an Islamic referendum was a controversial 
decision made on the part of the Tudeh Party. For a considerable number of Iranians, 
from the left or the right, a vote for a referendum that recognized an Islamic constitution 
by a Marxist-Leninist party had raised some suspicions.  During this period, nine months 
after the revolution, the new state’s official Islamization program was focused on 
establishing an Islamic government, and one of the first things to be accomplished was 
the writing of an Islamic constitution. This was a necessary step for Khomeini and his 
supporters. The idea of velayat-e-faghih (Islamic jurisprudence) would place Ayatollah 
Khomeini as marja-e-taghlid (source of emulation) at the head of the new government. It 
was established in articles 5 and 107 of the new constitution153 which placed the power in 
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the hands of the clergy.154 For the Tudeh Party, however, this was a victory for their party 
line. Thus Kianuri’s thoughts on whether voting for an Islamic constitution would be in 
conflict with Marxist lines of the party was obvious: “I have to bluntly admit,” he said, 
“that Imam Khomeini’s role in steering the revolution to its original path has been very, 
very, positive and decisive.” He affirmed that this is why the Tudeh Party “seriously 
supports Imam Khomeini.”155  
 For a Marxist group, power held by an Islamic state and Islamic law should raise serious 
questions. But the Tudeh Party was persistent about accepting Islamic authority and 
velayat-e-faghih. The Tudeh Party claimed it had already clarified its position: 
 
We believe that velayat-e-faghih, while Imam Khomeini is still living, will not 
damage the revolution. However, it will create a problem in times after Khomeini, 
and we have to discuss it [whether anyone else is able to take over Khomeini’s 
role as the supreme leader] then. We believe that for this period, the role of Imam 
Khomeini as a leader of our revolution is very significant and considerable. So we 
believe that for now, by criticizing the negative and emphasizing the positive 
parts of the new constitution, without venturing into the question of velayat-e-
faghih, we must vote positively for the new constitution.156
 
Another point of contention among groups and even the Islamic state was Khomeini’s 
extent of authority, called marja-e taghlid (source of emulation). The question of ultimate 
authority, the power to be the final decision-maker given to Khomeini was still being 
debated among secular and religious intellectuals in Iran.  
A majority of people observing the strong tendencies of the Tudeh Party toward 
Islam still found this puzzling. How could the Tudeh Party accept an Islamic 
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jurisprudence and constitution led by clerics to be progressive? Kianuri, representing his 
party, addressed the question and reiterated the universality and significance of 
Khomeini, and how their party recognized his leadership right away. He stated, “From 
the beginning, we recognized that within Ayatollah Khomeini’s inclinations, which are 
absolutely within a religious framework, there are progressive elements.”157 All true 
progressive forces in the world with these same inclinations, he claimed, “have supported 
the progressive politics of Ayatollah Khomeini.”158  
The inclusion of political Islam and more specifically, Khomeini’s line of thought 
(and that of his followers) was essential for the Tudeh Party. For them, Islamic belief was 
a force that revolution and a post-revolutionary government could not do without. In a 
‘popular front’ advocated by the Tudeh Party, a mere union of the left was impossible. In 
their theoretical publication, prerequisites of a popular front were delineated. 159 In the 
‘United Popular Front,’ (jebhe-ye mottahed-e khalgh) those political groups, parties, 
organizations, and such can join only if they accept the constitution of an Islamic 
Republic, or if they agree to join under the leadership of Imam Khomeini. To stress the 
line on a popular front, Kianuri pointed out the political polarization including whether 
other organizations such as the OIPFG (Minority) and OIPM (Mojahedin) could join. He 
stated that: 
Those who want to join must specify their program and announce whether they 
want to organize an armed insurgency against the current regime and its 
constitution—which they call reactionary—or do they plan on working in the 
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framework of democracy, whose outlines have been recognized by the [new] 
constitution?”160
 
 At this point in the conflict between some of the Marxist organizations and the Tudeh 
party creating a united popular front had become a contentious subject often referred to 
by Kianuri. In a later discussion, he addressed the popularity of Islam and stated that 90 
percent of the population supports the Line of Imam and without considering the popular 
ideas, he said, “We will have found a mini popular front.”161 But fitting the notion of an 
Islamic Republic and the rare possibility to fit Muslims in a front framed by Marxists 
would create a problem. In addition to Iranian Marxists, they were other forces that the 
Tudeh Party had to immediately address. Among them were the Soviets. The Tudeh 
Party’s collaboration with the clergy was based on theoretical borrowing from the Soviet 
Union as part of a close relationship between the party and the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. Although there were some differences within the Tudeh Party and the 
Soviets, they were united on general strategy, according to Behrooz.162 However, the 
acceptance of Islam by the Tudeh Party was even more profound than mere Soviet 
policy. They became advocates of Islam and even its teachings and principles.  
 More than one year into the revolution, the Tudeh Party’s support of Islam was not 
waning but became more unyielding. In theoretical organs of the party, verses of the 
Koran were used to explain various sociopolitical problems. The usage of Koranic verses 
was questioned, given the party’s belief in materialist philosophy. Those who could not 
make sense of Tudeh Party’s defense of Islam were convinced that the Party was trying 
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to create a hybrid belief system consisting of Islam and Marxism. Supporters of the 
Tudeh were inquiring whether they are trying to mix Islam with Marxism-Leninism and 
construct a new religion. The suggestion was denied by the party and Kianuri once again 
referred to the Muslim majority in Iran and claims that we need to adhere to Islam 
because the majority of people want us to. He denied a hybrid belief system and insisted 
that they are not trying to deceive people.  
It is in no way like that. We must deal with Islam since it’s an ideology of a great 
majority of our population. In a society where we are trying to make fundamental 
changes, we cannot forego 97 or 98 percent of the people’s ideology and world 
view…our cooperation is a sociopolitical one, not ideological.”163
  
 
Tudeh Party after the Revolution 
Almost two years after the revolution, when a more stable government was in 
place, ideas had become more concrete and more specific. Intense political polarization 
had the country divided. This held true internally and externally for both the government 
and its supporters and those in opposition. The Islamic Republic government suppressed 
the opposition while stabilizing itself. Most Marxist and Islamic groups of the opposition 
were actively continuing their anti-regime activities. However, two major organizations, 
the Tudeh party and Fadaeean (Majority), became more persistent in their support for the 
Islamic Republic. Central to the political discourse at the time was the continued 
skepticism about Marxist support for an Islamic regime. It was often labeled as deceptive 
by critics of the left and right, Marxists and Muslims. Those aware of the ideological 
conflict between Islam and Marxism were skeptical: 
The support of Islam and the Line of Imam by the Tudeh party and the OIPF 
(Majority) is a deception. Today the party supports Khomeini because people are 
supporting him. This is a deception because they have seen the fate of OIPFG 
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[Minority] and OIPM [Mojahedin].164 Otherwise, the Tudeh party supports a 
communist system. Is an Islamic republic a step toward communism that would 
persuade your party to support it?”165
 
At this stage the Tudeh Party was quite content that their support for Islamic 
Republic has been firmly established. They knew that the nature of such inquiry meant 
two things: First, that this party and ally groups support Khomeini and Islamic Republic, 
and that the Mojahedin and Fadaeean do not—and are in trouble for it.”166 Furthermore, 
responding to the same concern, the Party spokesman explained that it was absolutely not 
the case, that the Party genuinely supported the Islamic state and there was nothing 
dubious about it: 
We are not deceiving anyone. If we wanted to deceive, we would altogether put 
aside scientific socialism and become like the Ranjbaran Party167 which was ultra-
communist until recently and has put all that aside and speaks of Islam only. Or 
like these Muslim Maoists who have now joined the Majles [referring to 
Paykar]…This [an Islamic Republic] is not a path through which we must travel 
to get to socialism…we fought to establish an Islamic Republic because we see 
forces within it that fight against misery.168
 
The Tudeh Party even acknowledged that the government has sent its overzealous 
supporters to beat up party members and cadre and to close down their offices. Their 
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support for the Islamic regime, however, did not wane. “They [Basijis]169 sentenced party 
members who supported Islam to death, and even carried their execution on the spot. But 
as long as we believe, based on our own principles, that the Islamic government is anti-
imperialist … we will continue to support it.170  
 Ironically, this is a period in which almost all party offices of the OIPF (Majority) 
and the Tudeh party were invaded and their members arrested. Summary executions of 
some members were carried out almost immediately. This would usually be sufficient 
reason for any group to question ‘revolutionary’ incentives. Tudeh Party’s response was 
still conciliatory while they addressed the killings. Kianuri, in his response even 
compared acts of the revolutionary guards to Shah’s secret police SAVAK. In 
Kermanshah, a city in Kurdistan: 
They [revolutionary guards] arrested a party member who supported the Line of 
Imam and executed him within 30 minutes. …They violated our constitutional 
freedoms. There is no reason to invade our offices. There is no reason to make 
false accusations of the party. These things are commonly practiced by the 
SAVAK. They burn our offices, but we will not hold the Islamic Republic 
accountable. … But they have not said one word about why such invasion and 
plunder has taken place.”171
Like Job in the bible, the Tudeh Party’s patience had been put to the test. And like Job, 
despite all that had been endured by party members and supporters, they still believed. In 
their analysis of the Line of Imam and why they supported the Line of Imam, the Tudeh 
Party constantly used Khomeini’s statements against American imperialism while 
defending oppressed classes. On the other hand, they never mentioned the statements 
Khomeini made about socialist countries and communism. Khomeini had always spoken 
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about the Soviets as another oppressive force, especially emphasizing their secular and 
atheist beliefs. However, the Tudeh Party addressed the question of the Soviets very 
diplomatically without getting into whether the Soviet Union is detested by Khomeini. 
Knowing too well Khomeini’s position on communism and especially the Soviets it was 
possible that the party deliberately refrained from addressing the question since the 
followers of Line of Imam were too antagonistic toward the Soviet Union. Despite the 
content of the question and its serious allegation made to catch the Tudeh Party at being 
too conciliatory, Kianuri diplomatically answers: “This is real simple. Our cooperation 
with other forces is based on our common points and not our differences.”172  
According to some authors, the Tudeh Party’s support of an Islamic Republic is 
only an extension of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. There is a political 
consistency, correlation, according to Behrooz: 
The cornerstone of the Tudeh strategy was the theory of a non-capitalist path of 
development…developing countries under the revolutionary leadership of non-
communist elements—but with close Soviet collaboration—could either bypass 
capitalism or put strict limitations on it, and eventually cross over to socialism.”173
 
There seem to be some issues, despite the Soviet policy of non-capitalist 
development and the Tudeh party’s adherence to that, which remain inexplicable. To 
ensure the development of a non-capitalist path, economies and economic developments 
are at stake. So why is an insistence on Islam the point of the Tudeh party’s conformism? 
Why the need to emphasize that 98 percent of the population in Iran is Muslim? The 
Tudeh party never mentions working with, or agreeing with, any prominent secular 
individual in the government. In fact, most of those who controlled and directed the 
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economy were secular and non-clerics. Non-capitalist development is related to the 
economy—the infrastructure—and not to any religion-superstructure, prevalent or 
otherwise.  
Regarding a capitalist production system in Iran, almost none of the economic 
structures left by the Shah were changed. Indeed, American firms had to flee but were 
quickly replaced by Japanese, German, French, South Korean, and other capitalist 
partners in the global economy. Surely, neither the Soviets nor the Tudeh Party thought 
of the United States as the only industrial capitalist (imperialist) country. Furthermore, 
the Islamic Republic never claimed an anti-capitalist or non-capitalist economy. And 
even according to some Islamic Republic leaders, this revolution had nothing to do with 
the economy. Maybe it is the Tudeh party’s definition of a non-capitalist economy that’s 
confusing. Because if the following is their definition, put forth by the most sophisticated 
party leader, other party members could not have generated anything more complex. 
Kianuri describes the non-capitalist path of development in his own strange tautology. 
“The non-capitalist path has one characteristic, and that is, it separates from normal 
capitalist development and takes a different path, which means not allowing the 
unchecked development of capitalism.”174
The Islamic non-capitalist path should be obvious at any given moment during an 
examination of the religion. One should be able to read, for example, the Koran or 
Hadith, written on Muhammad’s life experiences, and realize Islam’s non-capitalist 
nature. Therefore, for the Tudeh party, this should not have been a problem even before 
the revolution. But let’s examine some of what they wrote a few years prior to 1979 in 
their theoretical publication, Donya.  
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Tudeh Party before the Revolution 
Early to mid-1970s was a period of a more secular (non-Islamist) period of 
opposition. Islamic groups were active but certainly no particular organization held 
power over other groups. A publication of the Tudeh Party in the summer of 1975, 
addressed some of the most imperative issues for Iranian opposition. In one such 
publication, many sociopolitical concerns were mentioned. It included articles on the 
Soviet Union, political discussion with the Fadaee guerillas, the Shah’s military, betrayals 
by Maoism, and a few poems. 
 In these publications, usually 60 to 70 pages long, an Islamic belief system or 
philosophy was never mentioned.175 Nor was there any mention of an Islamic movement 
as a significant weight within the opposition, even though there were many of these 
publications, small and large, underground or openly active. In this period, a few years 
prior to the 1979 revolution, more secular allies were mentioned. Forces addressed as 
potential allies, although with their own weaknesses,176 were seldom given the 
importance of alliance. One need only review a few of these publications to see that the 
party was more concerned with whom they could not work toward a revolutionary 
program rather than who they could fit into a ‘United Front,’ which became their main 
concern after the revolution. On different occasions, however, some clerics were referred 
to as those who were arrested by the Shah’s secret police. The following paragraph 
depicts the general opposition, according to the Tudeh party: 
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Aggressive suppression of the SAVAK demonstrates the intensity of political 
tyranny. …Attacking mosques and arresting people of faith, collecting books by 
progressive writers, and even seizing religious books has become part of everyday 
life in Iran. Prisons are filled with political prisoners. Waves of arrests have risen 
among workers, students, clergy, artists, writers, officers, and soldiers.”177
 
In an analysis of how the Shah rationalized and justified his dictatorship, the 
clerics were mentioned, although under a different light and quite controversially. This 
time they are mentioned as part of the opposition, but with a conservative, rather than a 
progressive position. Clerics, according to this article, opposed the Shah’s policies of 
land reform, not from a revolutionary perspective but from a reactionary view. The article 
states that the “open opposition by large landowners and clerics dependent on land-
owning aristocracy against the land reform program was used by the Shah to establish the 
foundation of his individual dictatorship.”178 Ironically, the Mojahedin is mentioned on a 
deviating but positive note. The Tudeh Party repeatedly condemned the new urban 
guerilla movement that had recently prevailed in Iran and rendered Tudeh followers as 
incorrect for praising them. However, the Mojahedin were still perceived as sincere and a 
reflection of people’s anger: 
A point worth mentioning is the movement among the religious groups. These 
groups that are fighting under the name of People’s Mojahedin have great anti-
imperialist and anti-regime sentiments and also a great respect for Marxism. They 
fight against reactionaries who try to invoke anti-communist sentiments among 
religious people. Their struggle, although we reject their methods, is sincere and 
fits within the context of the religious movement’s fight against imperialism and 
the regime.179
 
In another organ of the party, effort was made to dissociate Islam from the East 
and put the East in a socioeconomic context rather than a religious context. This concept 
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in itself may remind the reader of “orientalist” thought. Orientalists—those who have 
studied the East, vis-à-vis the west—have found a strong correlation between Islam, non-
development, and historical stagnation.180 While the idea put forth in this publication may 
be considerably insightful, it takes away from the Tudeh party’s consistency about Iran 
and Islam in Iran, particularly after the revolution. So let us examine this inconsistency. 
An article in Donya entitled “Some Current and Acute Problems of Artistic Life in Iran,” 
says: 
A confusing point that has worked its way into the media in the past ten years is 
the supposed dichotomy between Eastern civilization and Western civilization. To 
say that we must not be “westoxicated”181 and should have Eastern civilization 
originality, and not equate the meaning of westoxication with bourgeois 
civilization and equate Eastern originality with religious belief and Islam, are 
issues that despite good intentions of the authors, are arbitrary and will not resolve 
social and historical problems. Yes, capitalism and socialism are opposite of each 
other, but we cannot put West and East or Western civilization and Eastern 
civilization on opposite sides of each other.182
 
The author tries to separate Islam from the East, in this case, Iran. There lies quite 
a difference between the ideas contained in this statement compared to what the Tudeh 
party claimed about the nature of Iranian revolution in 1979. In their publications after 
the 1979 revolution, the Islam and Islamic movement seems to be an inevitable and 
irrefutable feature of Iranian culture. Furthermore, not even during the revolution, that is 
the period before February 1979, was their analysis of revolution deeply related to Islam. 
In fact, they seemed to have made every effort to detach Islam from Iran, especially from 
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a political movement in Iran. But as we examine the Tudeh party’s literature during and 
after the revolution, particularly Islam and Islamic ethics, a few points become clear.  
 
Islamic Republic’s Denunciation of the Tudeh Party 
More than a year into the revolution there was much pressure on the Tudeh Party 
to explain its paradoxical alliance with the new Islamic government. Inquiries were made 
by Muslim and Marxist revolutionaries questioning Tudeh Party’s incentives. And 
despite the Islamic state distancing itself from the Tudeh Party, Kianuri was relentless in 
his party’s solidarity with Muslims. The question was, “Why has the party not responded 
to the Islamic Republic newspaper? The paper has denounced the Tudeh party’s politics 
at the moment when the party has shown its alliance with the newly formed Islamic 
Republic government.”183
Kianuri responded, by explaining how things usually become clear later for all 
who originally doubt some social explanations of sociopolitical phenomenon. For 
example it was the communists, he says, “who originally used the word ‘imperialism’ to 
depict how imperialism plunders and oppresses.”184 After a few decades, imperialism is 
being used by almost all who have acceded to the correct analysis of what imperialism 
really means.” According to Kianuri, “those who denounce our politics have crass 
intentions at heart. Anyone serious about this revolution could not possibly question our 
politics and our close relations with the government of the Islamic republic.” Ironically, 
this is precisely the period in which the Tudeh party’s offices were being attacked and 
looted. Despite this, Kianuri offer his explanation:  
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One must really understand that the sincere support of the Tudeh party and the 
true Iranian revolution, meaning the Line of Imam (emphasis in original text), 
has frustrated the enemies of the Line of Imam. It has also flustered those who are 
pretentiously in support of the Line of Imam, however, in opposition in deed. It 
has aroused their people in such way that they act destructively against the Tudeh 
party and its support for such genuine inclination.185
 
 In order to demonstrate the party’s fidelity to the Islamic Republic, he went on to 
explain how this may have been an anomaly and that such writing is not within the 
integrity of a serious and responsible newspaper like the Islamic Republic. He explains 
that “they have accused us of many things, but our party never did and never will take 
steps to exacerbate the conflict between our president186 and the Majles187 or the conflict 
between the president and the clerics.”188 Later, he reads a quotation from Ranjbar.189 
They (Ranjbaran) claim that the Tudeh Party paints itself with ideologies that do not 
belong to us: 
What does this mean? This means that the Tudeh party accepts an ideology, like 
an Islamic ideology, and pretends that they are Muslims. Then they penetrate 
within the clergy and create a harmony between those who get their commands 
from the Russian superpower and those who have accepted the prevalent social 
ideas—neoMuslims of Tudeh—or Tudeh members wearing the clergy turban.190
 
The convergence of ideologies during this period was an idea that was written 
about in almost all organs of political organizations. Other groups were inquiring about 
Tudeh Party’s political positions on many different issues concerning Islam and the 
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Islamic Republic. For instance, what was the party’s position on the takeover of the 
American embassy and hostage taking? This was especially important since some groups 
at the time claimed that the hostage taking feeds the bellicose wing of American 
politicians. Also the war against Iraq had started and Marxist groups were divided on 
defending their country, hence the Islamic Republic government. This position would 
cause them not to participate in the war and condemn it as a result. Furthermore the war 
in Kurdistan had become a crucial topic. Many Kurdish and non-Kurdish groups, 
especially Marxist, were fighting for an independent Kurdistan.  Also, what did the party 
think about the Mojahedin? The Mojahedin, according to many followers of Islam, had 
deviated from Islam. The Tudeh Party, defending the Islamic government had to take a 
position on all those who opposed it, namely the Mojahedin. What should the party have 
done about them? Did the Mojahedin stand in the way of Islamic democracy and side 
with the liberals? 
At the same time there is an intensifying conflict developing between the 
President Banisadr and the clergy, and the Tudeh Party had to clarify and take a position 
about this conflict too. What is the Tudeh Party’s position?191
The content of the questions above address many of the conflicts that persisted 
after the revolution. But further, they depict an important point about the political 
disposition of several political players at the time. There is a clear indication that these 
questions undoubtedly meant to delineate and recognize both allies and enemies of the 
Islamic Republic. On the one hand, these questions connoted a trust toward the Tudeh 
Party soliciting political resolutions. On the other hand, however, Muslim supporters of 
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the Islamic Republic government voiced their distrustful sentiments toward the (liberal) 
president and other Muslims such as the Mojahedin. Kianuri, keen on judging friend from 
foe, did not abandon recognition of the party as being in union with the Islamic Republic. 
He responded in an effort to clarify party’s sincerity in collusion with the Islamic 
Republic and rejected conspiracy theories generated to accuse the Tudeh party of having 
a hidden agenda. In one particular public conference he began sarcastically with 
conspiratorial ideas: 
The Tudeh party has invaded all of Iran, the Tudeh party controls the Line of 
Imam, and truthfully, it was the Tudeh party that organized the Line of Imam 
originally. Also, the majority of the members in Majles and the party of the 
Islamic Republic are really Tudeh clerics. …Cleric(ism) and Tudeh(ism) drink 
from the same spring; they are two heads of the same dragon, two horses pulling 
the same wagon, the same union of black and red [referring to the Shah’s notion 
of the union between Muslims and Marxists] and the same classical colonial 
interests of Russia and Britain.192
 
Kianuri, quotes further from supporters of the Shah abroad. The source of the 
union between “black” and “red” is reflected in the ideas of Ayatollah Kianuri and 
comrade Beheshti.193 Therefore, he concludes, the Tudeh party’s principle in “defense of 
the Line of Imam Khomeini, in support of anti-imperialist and populist Lines of 
Khomeini, has been correct and indestructible.”194 So to summarize and give convincing 
response to the original complex question of who is on what side of revolutions and what 
is to be done with deviant Muslims like the Mojahedin, he concludes with some of 
Khomeini’s statements: “We must all unite and gather the same forces that fought against 
the Shah, and we must seriously revise our thinking systems in order to refute those who 
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critique us.”195 Union and revision may have been viable reasons for these Marxists to 
cooperate politically with the new Islamic government and to modify ideology in 
adherence to Islam. We can further explore such complication by examining some of the 
more relevant ideas put forth by the Tudeh party and their new allies, OIPF (Majority). 
The Tudeh Party and the Fadaeean (majority) were working with the government 
as the conflict between the government and other organizations intensified. Given the 
suppression of the forces in the opposition many were questioning Tudeh Party’s 
incentives to work with the Islamic government. In a gathering headed by the Tudeh 
Party someone in the audience asked why the Tudeh party participated in last Friday’s 
march while flyers for the march were distributed by the Party of the Islamic Republic? 
What the question really indicated was how are Marxists being organized by Muslims? 
Kianuri’s answer is more political and rational than philosophical and organizational. He 
points out the common enemy, imperialism, and claims that to defeat the common enemy 
his party will work with anyone supporting the cause. The march, he stated, “was to 
declare support for the Imam [Khomeini], and support Imam Khomeini for us is to 
support his ideas of anti-imperialism and his popular positions.”196 Tudeh’s argument 
revolved around the notion that their party’s cooperation with the regime was in fighting 
the conspiring enemies. They claimed that they were currently “defending the 
government of the Islamic Republic against conspiracies and pressures from imperialism, 
from conspiracies of anti-revolutionaries.”197
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Tudeh-Majority Alliance 
Did the Tudeh party have strategic plans with the Islamic Republic? Were they 
looking to give up their socialist agenda or empowering the working class for an Islamic 
regime? They had previously stated that their support for the Islamic Republic is a 
strategic support. Did it mean that they were principally against the leadership of the 
working class? Kianuri representing the party responded confidently that:  
we said that our cooperation with Muslims is due to fundamental social upheavals. This 
is a strategic cooperation, meaning we will work together to the point when socialism is 
constructed. …This implies a sincere cooperation of supporters of scientific socialism 
with supporters of Islam and Line of Imam, and that between them and us, so far as social 
problems related to constructing socialism is concerned, there are no antagonistic 
(unsolvable) contradictions.198  
 
 As the Tudeh party declared itself closer to Islam and the Islamic Republic, they 
distanced themselves from some of the Marxists. Following a significant division and a 
subsequent split within the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (OIPFG), 
one sector, which later called themselves aksariat (majority), made clear distinctions 
between anti-regime attitudes versus attitudes supportive of the regime. The Majority, 
which took the latter position, drew gradually closer as a result and eventually merged 
with the Tudeh Party. Tudeh leaders and supporters were quite content with the new 
collaboration with the majority. The Tudeh Party’s position on the split within the OIPFG 
was clarified by Kianuri in a question/answer session. He not only answers the question 
but also articulates the main difference between the two groups involved in the division: 
We think it is to the organization’s (Majority) advantage because any time a 
deviant group splits from a popular organization, it makes the organization 
stronger. It helps to revise and correct the organization’s lines. This group of 
minorities, we think, is politically deviant, and as far as political struggle, 
adventurist. And their leaving the OIPFG is a big help for this organization to side 
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with us. It speeds up the process. This way, OIPFG [Majority] will reach a perfect 
revolutionary line.199
 
The majority of the members and supporters of OIPFG united with the Tudeh 
party and eventually merged on ideological grounds. They dropped the word ‘guerilla’ 
from the name of the organization and calling themselves the Organization of Iranian 
People’s Fadaeean (Majority). On March, 1981, they officially recognized the Tudeh 
Party as a workers party and the Soviets a revolutionary socialist state.200 Contrary to the 
position held by the OIPFG (Minority) that the Islamic regime was a dependent state and 
that it must be overthrown, the Majority believed the Islamic Republic regime to be anti-
imperialist. They believed that the Islamic Republic’s political independence and anti-
imperialist position were signs of the regime’s revolutionary character.201 Two major 
Marxist organizations siding with the Islamic regime dealt a heavy blow to the entire 
Fadaee organization and other Marxist groups in Iran. According to Behrooz: 
The Majority-Tudeh alliance offered its knowledge of the opposition, thereby 
helping the state uproot it. In the case of the Majority, its leadership initially declared its 
loyalty to the IRI’s constitution and declared the opposition movements (Mojahedin, 
Kurdish movement and other Fadaiyan [sic] factions) counter-revolutionary, offering this 
guidance to its supporters in August 1981: ‘the organization’s supporters must be aware 
of their duties in this critical situation. Uncovering the policies of he counter-revolution 
in the work-place, in the family, and in any place where the masses are present is one of 
your most important duties.202
 
 As a result, however, political lines of demarcation were more easily drawn. 
Precarious and vague notions of whether the Fadaee organization supports the Tudeh 
Party, hence the regime, were no longer topics of discussion within the group. For the 
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Tudeh Party and OIPF (Majority) Marxists who did not side with them in defense of the 
Islamic Republic had betrayed the revolution. Thus the Tudeh Party was now a party 
working hand in hand with a reppressive regime. On the other hand, Tudeh party and 
OIPFG (Majority), who declared that all those against the Islamic Republic were to be 
considered as siding with imperialism were against all other groups in the opposition. 
That included other noncompliant Marxists and individuals from the former regime, in 
addition to liberals. For instance when the Iranian Communist League203 attacked the city 
of Amol, the Majority, proud of its partnership with the regime claimed that their 
organization along with the Tudeh Party of Iran: 
From the very early moments of the attack by counter-revolutionary intruders, 
participated, shoulder to shoulder with the people, the Basiji, and the security 
forces, in their suppression and defeat. Two of our comrades and Tudeh members 
were wounded…and are in hospital at the time.204
 
Conflict between the new Islamic Republic government and the nonconformist 
organizations and individuals was rapidly growing. As Marxist organizations, the Tudeh 
Party and the Fadaeean (Majority) were pressed to determine the class-base of the Islamic 
Republic.205 In order to defend the Soviet thought of support for petite bourgeois and 
anti-imperialist government Tudeh Party had to insist on the Islamic regime to be of a 
petite-bourgeois background. Therefore, they had to address the relationship between 
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Khomeini and petite-bourgeoisie, and why the party recognized him as representing the 
petite bourgeoisie. Kianuri referred to most clerics as those who belong to small and 
medium petite-bourgeoisie. He claimed, that “these clerics hardly come from a big petite-
bourgeois background.”206  
As far as the Tudeh Party was concerned the Islamic regime was a liberating and 
anti-authoritarian force. They put Iranian clerics on par with the liberation theology of 
Latin America. Kianuri stated that such a revolutionary religious wave has only risen 
recently, and if we are to analyze it correctly, we must say that in  
Iran it has achieved and has expanded to its highest form, but it is not only an 
Iranian phenomenon. Such a revolutionary religious wave has existed in Latin 
America for years. There, too, lower ranks of the Catholic Church are in solidarity 
with the workers, and in countries such as Brazil and Argentina, they are fighting 
against dictators. Their solidarity is very significant. In Northern Ireland, a 
considerable number of Catholics defend people’s revolutionary struggle against 
capitalists who are mostly Protestant. If you can recall, the Pope, [John Paul II] 
while visiting Latin America, warned the Catholic Church against getting 
involved in political struggle.207   
 
Therefore, he concluded, since Khomeini’s line is among the revolutionary line 
defending the people, the party also supports Khomeini.  
By advocating Islam and defending the Islamic government Tudeh found itself 
constantly explaining why and how the regime was suppressing the opposition. A 
notorious cleric responsible for most of the executions of the anti-government groups was 
Hojjat-ol eslam Sadegh Khlakhali. 208 The Tudeh Party had to explain how they would 
support and individual like Khalkhali. What was the party’s incentive to support 
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Khalkhali? In an article in the political organ of the OIPFG (Minority) the Tudeh party 
was questioned on how they would support Khalkhali. Because he was a zealous Muslim 
who made sure an ‘anti-revolutionary’ opposition does not exist. Furthermore, he was 
among the parliamentary candidates the Tudeh party voted for. How did the Tudeh party 
justify voting for a person who had executed (or ordered the execution of) two of the 
party’s members? Interestingly, Kianuri treated Khalkhali like a party member in his 
answer. Initially he compared Khalkhali to members of the Chinese Communist Party 
such as Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Mao Zedong. He further said that while they 
were initially recognized as revolutionaries around the world, now they were looked upon 
as those who betrayed the Chinese revolution.209 Later, Kianuri mentions Trotsky as  
one who was not trusted by Lenin but was assigned the most important 
revolutionary position by Lenin, the Minister of War. And again, after the 
revolution, Trotsky betrayed the party. Can we say that Lenin made a mistake? 
No, we can never say that. At the time, Trotsky’s expertise on organizing was 
incredibly important for the revolution. Furthermore, Lenin was aware of his 
[Trotsky] weaknesses. Regarding Trotsky, he said, “He does not understand 
Marxism.” And after a complete betrayal, Trotsky was kicked out of the party.210
 
The Tudeh Party later addressed Khalkhali specifically and even paid tribute to his 
actions. They believed that although he may have made some grave mistakes he still with 
the revolution and has done great service for the people of Iran. According to Kianuri:  
Khalkhali is on the same side as the revolution and has served his duties well in 
annihilating criminals and servants of the previous regime. We said we would 
vote for him because, as the revolution’s state attorney, he accomplished a great 
deal. He executed several hundred pawns of imperialism with utmost bravery. 
…We believe that Khalkhali has made a serious mistake,211 and we wish he had 
                                                 
209 The Tudeh party’s position on China follows the Soviet’s position after the disagreement between the 
Chinese Communist party and the Soviet Union. After taking on the idea of “non-capitalist development,” 
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not. But mistakes made in Kurdistan and even more serious mistakes in the future 
cannot refute his great service for the revolution.212
 
Given the controversial relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Islamic 
Republic, its members were faced with some aggression on behalf of the more fanatic 
supporters of the Islamic regime. They were attacked and beaten at times not knowing 
how and whether to defend themselves. They wanted to know how party members and 
supporters should act in the face of differences with some of the government supporters. 
The Fadaeean (Majority) were facing the same types of attacks and aggressions by the 
supporters of the Islamic Republic. They too, were Marxists who had conciliated with the 
regime because they held the Islamic regime as petite-bourgeois and, therefore, a 
progressive and anti-imperialist state. For Fadaeean (Majority) this meant that the 
regime’s attacks against the Tudeh and their own members were not so important.    
While the party had told its supporters to defend the country and the Islamic regime, 
Basiji forces did not much care for Marxists and the non-believers. Kianuri, tried to 
placate the party’s supporters by giving an example. He read the following paragraph 
from a flyer by OIPFG (Majority) in Kurdistan: 
By forming organized groups, go to revolutionary guards and announce your 
desire to suppress anti-revolutionaries. By forming groups, help the transportation 
of martyrs and the wounded. … Explain to the people the necessity of working 
with the revolutionary guards.213
 
He explained that the flyer was important because his party was not the one that 
wrote it. The flyer belonged to the OIPFG (Majority). “This shows that there are other 
organizations that agree with our line,” he explains214. Here he compares Marxists and 
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Muslims and states, “Our revolutionary Muslims approve of this line of thinking, and 
Marxists really defend our revolution, but there are some problems with their policies.”215 
The “so-called Marxists,” he said, have made some mistakes which had really made his 
party work harder. The crime committed by a group named Paykar216 “against the 
Mojahedin, is a great historical crime in splitting Marxist forces and Islamic forces. This 
is creating a false Marxism in the guise of Maoism. It was blackmailing the only true 
Muslim force of the time.”217  
Faced with relentless suppression of the opposition by the Islamic government, 
the Tudeh Party found itself constantly having to justify its support for the regime. How 
did the party justify the suppression and what was the reason behind Tudeh party’s 
silence when it came to protesting the regime’s authoritarianism? They adhered to the 
anti-imperialist slogan and claimed that there is general agreement with the foreign policy 
put forth by the Islamic state. Foreign policy of the Islamic Republic revolved around the 
idea of anti-Americanism and interpreted by some Marxists to mean anti-imperialism.  
Anti-imperialism seemed to set the guidelines for the party. For example, according to 
the Tudeh Party: 
If Ayatollah Beheshti states that our foreign policy includes an anti-imperialist, 
anti-American tendency, we completely agree…and when Mister Dr. Beheshti 
states that we respect social freedoms to the point where a political organization 
has not conspired against the Islamic Republic, and is free to continue its 
activities within the context of the law, naturally we agree with that and condone 
it.218
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The Tudeh party and OIPF (Majority) were not the only organizations  inviting 
the population and more specifically the Marxist groups to rally around Islam. Another 
group, a close affiliate of the Tudeh Party and OIPF’s (Majority) close ally was the 
Liberation and Equality Group. They too, defended Islamic ideology and the Islamic 
Republic government. The following section includes some of their writings, especially 
during and after the revolution. 
 
The Liberation and Equality Group 
Another group, not comparable to Tudeh party in size, was a newly organized 
group called the Liberation and Equality Group (goruh-e azadi va barabari). From their 
political line and ideology, a similar tone as the Tudeh party prevails. They seem to write 
with less maturity, however, and seem more concerned with grass-root activities during 
and after the revolution. They also address the Muslim population and emphasize the 
necessity to unite with Muslims. In a booklet distributed just one week before the 
revolution, they call on the Muslims for solidarity and reiterate the revolutionary and 
progressive nature of Islam and seem a bit apologetic about Marxism. Addressing 
“revolutionary Muslims”, they wrote: 
In the name of Iranian communism, we are speaking to you, our natural allies. 
Yes, we recognize ourselves as your natural allies. …You believe that in order to 
establish social justice, one must use progressive and revolutionary laws and 
values of Islam, and we believe that in order to achieve this goal, while we respect 
Islam as a belief and faith of a majority of the population, we must use the latest 
scientific achievements. And this is in no contradiction with Islamic progressive 
and revolutionary values, especially of Shi’a religion. Our alliance is an objective 
reality and despite mistakes made by zealots on your side and ours, the blood of 
revolutionary Muslims and communists are joining together.219
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This group seems to be more to the point with the idea of appealing to Muslims’ inherent 
revolutionary fervency. Theirs was a more tactical unity than strategies of political unity 
aimed at forming a government. They usually did not mention bigger political objectives. 
In their writing means through which power is distributed in the state is not mentioned. 
However, they employ many words used by Muslims. In the following passage they use 
such terminology to stress Muslim-Marxist solidarity. They appealed to sentiments and 
feelings of Muslims by mentioning blood and sacrificing of life, a familiar tone related to 
Muslim allegories and the lives of the original martyrs of Islam. In the tradition of the 
Mojahedin they refer to Islam’s ultimate utopian society, a society similar to the Marxist 
version of classless communism.  Two months after the revolution calling upon the 
revolutionary Muslims they wrote: 
We are once again speaking to you, our natural allies. Yes, despite all zealous 
beliefs, dogmas, and closed-mindedness of the left and right, we recognize you, 
the true fighters against exploitation and oppression, sincere supporters of 
‘faithful classless society,’ as our natural allies and ourselves as your true 
friends…our solidarity is a sacred solidarity manifested in trenches of battle and 
[going through] ablution220 by the blood of our best comrades… we, as our part, 
hold dear this blood ridden promise, like the pupil of our eyes, despite the closed 
mindedness and deception of opportunists on the left and right.221
 
Despite Marxist ideas on religion and deity, this group wrote as if they also believed in 
God in the same manner as Shi’a Muslims. They used the Islamic terminology 
comfortably while addressing the Muslims. Unity with Muslims was the most important 
goal to achieve. Once unity was established, they move on to why and how such unity 
would be possible. Calling the revolution and democratic one, they wrote: 
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Our revolution has a democratic nature. People have risen to gain freedom, a true 
liberation for everyone and all classes; for women, men, for Turk, Arab, 
Armenian, Assyrian, Turkman, and Baluchi. In the vernacular of such revolution, 
(Allah-o-Akbar) ‘God is Great’, means ‘Long Live Freedom.’ For God being the 
greatest means that no one on earth can be superior to others and limit other 
people’s freedoms.222
 
They clarify whom they mean by Muslims who do not fight for freedom and 
equality. According to their literature, there are two different types of Muslims. There are 
those who nominally support Islam but believe in perpetuating capitalism and 
exploitation. Then there are others who are truly against capitalism and remnants of the 
previous regime. The latter are basically the clergy and clerics and the former, what they 
call, nationalist bourgeoisie. There is, they claim, “a difference between the Islamic 
Republic of Mr. Bazargan and Amir-Entezam, on one hand, and the Islamic Republic of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Taleghani223 on the other hand. 
To explain the collusion of Marxists and Muslims, this group uses some regional 
(Middle East) examples and concludes, therefore, that such solidarity is the ultimate truth 
of revolutionary resistance:  
Why is it that the so-called Islamic government of Saudi Arabia is among the 
most anti-communist regimes in the region, while in Palestine communists and 
Muslims are united? In Algeria there are close relations between communists and 
Muslim Mojahedin. And the Islamic revolution in Libya is strengthened through 
the aid and support of communist liberation movements.224
 
They mention that there is a steady increase of Muslims who truly believe in 
independence and freedom and a united classless society using guidelines of scientific 
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Marxism. Everyday Muslims find it to be true that communists are not the enemies of 
revolutionary Islam but their most genuine and sincere comrades.225
 In their publication, commemorating May 1st (Worker’s Day) there was more class 
analysis on the state and specifically the Islamic state. Addressing workers on whether 
clerics were among friends of workers, they explained that the clergy make up a sector of 
the intellectuals of our society and we know that intellectuals are generally from the 
middle class. But they “may follow and defend the interests of capitalists, middle- class, 
or workers. Progressive clerics have acted in solidarity with the people of Iran, and have 
at times—especially in this revolution—directly taken on the role of leadership.” 226
A subtle attempt was made in this publication to minimize the shortcomings of 
some of the clerics. While the group condemned Bazargan and Amir-Entezam and 
bourgeoisie and claimed that other folks were not to be trusted, their treatment of similar 
thoughts among the clergy was milder. In the same publication, they mentioned 
Ayatollah Shariatmadari as one who supports the reconstruction of the state and its 
military, which is in the hands of national capitalists, who do not particularly “defend 
workers and toilers.”227 Shariatmadari’s ideas, they wrote, are held up and supported by 
the Islamic Republic Party of the people of Iran. On the other hand, they claimed, “the 
Islamic Republic Party also supports Ayatollah Khomeini’s defense of the oppressed.”228 
The Liberation and Equality Group often defended and reiterated statements made by 
Khomeini and Taleghani. There is a distinct difference between two interpretations of 
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Islam, according to the group. First, there is the conservative interpretation of Islam and 
then the revolutionary interpretation.   
If revolutionary Islam is able to devise a clear program to achieve workers’ 
demands, it can assume state power and will eventually be able to achieve 
national and democratic goals. To reach this goal, there must be a united front 
built that is made up of workers and revolutionary Muslims.229
 
There is no talk of revolutionary Marxists here. Apparently, workers are to be lead by 
revolutionary Muslims. Or it may imply that as long as workers are present, one can 
assume Marxist ideology is also present. 
 
Ehsan Tabari and Islam 
 Even more interesting was a book written by another Tudeh party member, Ehsan Tabari, 
a sociologist educated in East Germany, who was one of the most intelligent members in 
this group. Like Kianuri, he comes from a religious family. His father was a well-known 
cleric (Sheikh Hussein Tabari) in the city of Saree, in the Caspian province of 
Mazandaran.230 He wrote extensively, and his ideas often gave direction to not only 
supporters and members of the group, but also to its central committee. The title of his 
book, Kazhrahe (Diversion) was intended to imply what he believed had happened to his 
party over the years. Compared to books and memoirs written by other party figures, it is 
rather short. Kianuri, for example, published his memoirs of over 700 pages. Tabari 
covers major issues related to the party during its almost 70-year lifespan. The most 
interesting part, related to the subject of this paper, is what he feels—or better yet, what 
he believes—about Islam. His main point in this book is how Marxists were, and still are, 
making grave mistakes by not recognizing Islam as the ideology of liberation. Marxists 
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have become isolated as a result, and this reality has become apparent to some zealous 
Marxists (namely himself) who “dared to compete with Islam with their shameful 
thoughts of failure.”231 For Tabari, Marxism has now become an outsider’s point of view. 
It comes from the West, and Iranians who have Islam as a liberation ideology, should not 
waste their time looking to the West or the East for help. In a section of his book 
subtitled, “Why Marxism Failed in Iran,” he gives the following analysis: 
The acceptance of their ideology can be divided into two branches of 
Westoxication and Eastoxication. The meaning of Eastoxication is the process by 
which one is intoxicated by Eastern European ideology. This has been dominated 
by Eastern European countries. It is obvious that Western European liberalism 
and Marxism, both Western ideologies, are different in content. However, the 
ideological difference between the two is not much when compared to Islamic 
culture and principles. It is obvious in comparing lifestyles of people in capitalist 
and socialist countries.232
 
According to Tabari, Marxism practiced by Iranians has left its advocates isolated 
in their own worlds. This loneliness is not, at the same time, a symptom of Iranian 
Marxists only. He feels that Marxists in all Islamic countries are suffering from this 
outcome: 
Isolation and alienation of Marxists in Iran is a familiar setting for all Marxists in 
Islamic countries. …While writing this memoir, with a free and open view about 
my close and not so close relations, things look very different today. Under the 
light of the Islamic Revolution, individuals and events that were once grand and 
significant have lost meaning and have diminished into mere shadows.233
 
For him as a Marxist, there is something in Islam that is illuminating and liberating. He is 
among those who do not believe Marxism has any convincing answers for social ills. The 
failure of Marxism in Iran does not only reflect the problems within Marxism. It is a 
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more profound phenomenon that has roots in not understanding Islam. The “alienation 
from people and their own nation was one of the reasons for the isolation of [Marxists].” 
There is another reason that led to the boycotting of Marxists in Iran. “It was the lack of 
belief in religion and especially the religion of Islam and their incessant disregard toward 
the bountiful teachings of Islam.”234 For Tabari, Islam is equivalent to a prophetic gift of 
life to Iranians. His usage of words like temptation, worship, and abandoning God, 
sounds convincingly Islamic. Islamic revolution, he believes, is 
…the strong foundation of a profound cultural uprising which entirely changes 
the facade of the individual and society. …The web of life of these characteristics 
has been knitted during the time when God was forgotten, and temptation and 
selfishness prevailed. All that was built by colonialism and its lackeys was 
destroyed by this revolution. Thus was built the human spirit by the material of 
worshipping God, work, sacrifice, and humanity. Such reconstruction and 
profound leap in spirits is not the work of Marxism.235  
 
His views, in the book, are usually contrary to what the Tudeh party had said to that 
point. He further questions the sincerity of the party, even when they cooperated with the 
Islamic Republic, and calls it pretentious. Here, Tabari questions all types of Marxism 
and ends by stating that Islam is liberating and free of all rigid structure and dogma 
because it has God on its side. 
The Tudeh party was pretending to be supportive of the Islamic Republic and the 
Revolution. They even agreed with the Line of Imam and condoned its social and 
political principles. They even briefly explained and justified, in Mardom (the 
official organ of the party), the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy of “neither east, 
nor west”236 and announced their concession to such policy. …This so-called 
school of Marxism-Leninism, despite its many forms: Stalinism, Trotskyism, 
Maoism, Titoism, and Brezhnev’s neo-Stalinism, decisions in today’s Soviets, are 
all the same in content but with different interpretations. When we refute 
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Marxism-Leninism, we will not have to pay attention to such interpretations since 
we reject both the political product of a state, which is socialism, and further 
oppressive politics of the Soviets. Approving Islam means total rejection of 
Marxism…237
 
Finally he rejects his party as hardheaded and uncompromising. The irony is that the 
Tudeh party, especially after the 1953 coup in Iran that brought back the Shah, has been 
labeled as the most compromising of all parties and groups. But Tabari is probably not 
referring to the Tudeh party compromising with the Islamic Republic. He is stating that 
one must have deep beliefs in Islam. Toward the end of his book he says: 
Islam, contrary to Marxism, is free of such dogma and rigid structure. A war 
against monarchs, and defending the poor, is understood by Islam with the 
profound understanding of historical and popular particularities because its 
teachings rise from the prosperous process of God’s word.238
 
For a few years, the convergence of Islam and Marxism in Iran seemed for some 
as natural as any ideological collaboration. It turned out, however, that it was not an 
enduring relationship. The collaboration did not last long. As soon as the Islamic regime 
became stable enough by repressing the opposition it was time to end the three-year 
accord. Both Tudeh Party and Majority were declared illegal. By early 1983, the Islamic 
Republic banned all material published by any Marxist organization or group including 
the Tudeh Party, Majority (Fadaeean), and all those that genuinely or not merged with 
Islamic ideology. This forced both groups to go underground and a majority of the 
leaders of both groups went into exile. 
 The subject of the next chapter is hybrid and Muslim organizations, and individuals. It is 
the story of how many groups and individuals converged in unity to build a solid front. 
Primarily, the Gilan Socialist Republic is looked at as a historical precedent to 
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convergence of Marxists and Muslims. Later, the two nationalist fronts, National Front 
and Liberation Movement made up of both Marxists and Muslims is examined. In 
addition, there is a brief history of a very prominent individual who combined Islam and 
Marxism to explain the Iranian political trajectory. Dr. Ali Shariati, a Muslim who 
borrowed from Marxism theorizing on social conflict and social inequality had great 
influence on both Muslims and Marxists. And lastly, there is an examination of Muslim 
groups that played a significant role in the Iranian political opposition. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HYBRIDS AND MUSLIMS 
Islamic Ideology was a set of religiously charged, Islamically informed, and ideologically 
alert political notions articulating the specific ways throughwhich the status quo had to 
be altered.  As articulated by its chief ideologues, “the Islamic Ideology” was an attmpt 
to assimilate contemporary (secular) political objectives into “Islamic” ideas. 
        Hamid Dabashi 
Within the Iranian resistance movement in the past several decades, we can see 
several instances of hybrid groups, individuals, and events. Following are some of the 
major ones, but by no means all. They were selected based on the significant roles they 
played in opposition to both the Shah and his father, Reza Shah. Here they are discussed 
in the order in which they entered the Iranian political stage. We begin with the Socialist 
Republic of Gilan, a historical event that introduced Marxists to the Muslims. Also 
included in this chapter are the two prominent nationalist organizations, the National 
Front and the Liberation Movement and the Organization of Iranian Peoples Mojahedin, 
as well as Dr. Ali Shariati, one of the most significant Muslim theorists in Iran’s political 
history. 
 
Socialist Republic of Gilan  
 
The Gilan Republic was the first instance of ideological and organizational 
convergence in Iranian history. It lasted close to two years before most of its leaders, both 
Marxist and Muslim, were killed or imprisoned. The leadership consisted of a coalition of 
Muslims belonging to a movement called the “Jangal Movement”239 and Marxists who 
established the Communist Party of Iran. This collaboration was in response to an abrupt 
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change implemented in Iran through England and France. During the 1920s and 1930s, 
modernization by western thought had set the political discourse for Iranians and Iranian 
political activists. The Muslims were led by Mirza Kuchak-Khan, a prominent figure 
involved in fighting Tehran’s central government since the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906. Marxists, originally from a group called “Fergheye Democratic” (Democratic 
Faction), were led by Haydar Khan (Haydar Amoughlu) and Soltanzadeh. This was the 
first cooperation between Marxists and Muslims as an organized political-military force. 
By the end of the 1920s, this movement, known as the “Socialist Republic of Gilan,” with 
the support of the Red Army with its 1500 guerillas, was prepared to proclaim its 
independence and eventually take on Tehran’s central government. Both movements had 
been active before the Russian revolution of 1917.  
Although the objectives of the Marxists and Muslim factions were quite 
dissimilar, the means of a military takeover of the central government was commonly 
shared. The unprecedented alliance lasted nearly two years. The defeat of this republic 
was probably due more to internal conflict and a political agreement signed between the 
nascent Soviet Union and the new government of Iran than a military defeat, according to 
Katouzian.240 This view perceived Muslims as being responsible due to their cooperation 
with the central government. However, according to Moises Persits, a Russian researcher, 
it was the Soviet support of the wrong communists that resulted in a war between 
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Muslims and Marxists. Defeat of the republic could have been avoided had the Soviets 
supported Amoughlu rather than Soltanzadeh.241
Before examining the reasons behind their conflict, however, we will inspect their 
points of commonality and events that led to their cooperation. It is especially important 
to delve into this joint activity since it was historically the first social movement that 
made a Marxist-Muslim convergence possible. A major contributing factor to such a 
close relationship was the presence of a foreign power, either the United States or Britain, 
and a local government supporting the foreign invaders.  
 The occupation of Northern provinces by Russia and southern provinces by 
Britain was a major factor contributing to mass protests.242 Some authors believe that the 
conflict had deeper roots and may have started independent of a nationalist movement 
rejecting foreign invasions. They claim it had more to do with the defeat of the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906.243 The discontent with Mohammad Ali Shah’s (of 
Ghajar dynasty) central government, and its incapability, led to invasion by Britain and 
Russia. This invasion intensified mass protests, especially in the northern region of Gilan 
by the Caspian Sea. In clashes between the people and Russian soldiers in the Gilan 
region, hundreds of people were killed and injured. Russian forces found themselves in a 
great military quagmire with the Jangal Movement guerillas (jangalis), which consisted 
of small landowners in Gilan. Mirza Kuchak-Khan, a landowner himself, led this 
movement.  
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 After the Russian revolution of 1917, more volunteers joined the Jangal 
Movement, hoping to force a Russian military retreat. With the temporary withdrawal of 
Russian forces, Britain became the main military presence in the northern regions. By 
this period, other non-Muslim groups and individuals had joined the fight. Marxists, 
encouraged by the revolution in Russia, became more involved and even better 
organized. Their discontent against Britain and the Iranian central government was a 
major contributing factor for collaborating with the Jangal Movement. Most of the 
leaders from a Marxist movement, who later formed the Communist Party, were 
influenced directly by Bolsheviks. Their main leaders were Soltanzadeh, Ghaffarzadeh, 
Javadzadeh, and Haydar Khan.244 With Armenian origins, Soltanzadeh had spent most of 
his political life in a Bolshevik underground organization in Russian Azerbaijan.  
Ghaffarzadeh, an old revolutionary, was the contact person for the Russian 
Communist Party’s organ, Iskra, responsible for its delivery from Europe to Iran. 
Javadzadeh (Pishevari), who was born in Iranian Azerbaijan, was a teacher in Baku, 
capital of Russian Azerbaijan. While in Baku, he came in direct contact with the 
Bolsheviks, and became the chief editor of a leftist newspaper called Hurryat (freedom). 
Ultimately there was Haydar Khan. He was a Marxist who went underground because he 
did not recognize the legitimacy of the last Ghajar monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah, after 
the Constitutional Revolution. With Marxist tendencies quite different from the other 
three leaders, he continued his opposition against the government. These four later 
organized the Communist Party of Iran with hopes of taking over the weak central 
government.  
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By the end of 1920, the Socialist Republic of Gilan had become a threatening 
force for the central government. Their coalition was able to fight against both the British 
forces and the Iranian central government. According to John Foran:  
The Communist Party of Iran, led by Haydar Khan Amoughlu, and the Jungle Movement, 
led by Mirza Kuchak Khan, had formed an alliance to build a soviet socialist republic. In 
addition, they sent a letter to Lenin asking for assistance in ‘freeing us and all of the 
oppressed from the chain of Iranian and British oppressors.’ They also sent a letter to 
Tehran proclaiming the monarch government illegitimate.245
 
For a while it seemed as though the nascent Socialist Republic of Gilan was 
gathering enough popular and political support to serve as a model province for the rest 
of the country. It was especially important because two ideologically opposite 
perspectives joined forces and emphasized a strategic view of democracy. But despite 
desires of the population of Gilan, including Marxist and Muslim leaders, the dream 
quickly ended.  
 What the two factions had in common was a combination of political and 
economic objectives, but what divided them were cultural issues. The veiling of women 
and Islamic ethics and principles were divisive issues, while land reform and discontent 
toward the central government contributed to the unification.246  
But Mirza Kuchak-Khan’s Islamic cultural beliefs did not interfere with his 
politics of joining forces with Iranian Marxists and the Soviets. For him it was more 
important to defeat or weaken the British, who were an unwelcome occupying force. He 
explained why he had cooperated with the Soviets: 
After overthrowing the Czarist government in Russia and establishing the Soviet 
Republic, Iranian revolutionaries relied deeply on the fraternal solidarity of the Russian 
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socialists … and we were dreaming about getting rid of our worst enemy (after Czarist 
Russia) meaning England. … Even before the Bolsheviks entered into Iranian 
Azerbaijan, in order to ensure victory, I wanted to contact them. So I sent some of my 
people to contact the Bolsheviks.247
 
On May 19, 1920, Abookov, a high-ranking Soviet military member, said to the 
people of Anzali, a popular port where the Soviet battle ships had docked: “One of the 
reasons for the Soviet military to enter [Anzali] is an invitation by the Iranian 
revolutionary Mirza Kuchak-Khan.”248
By June of 1920, Kuchak-Khan had gathered up to 8,000 troops, among them 
5,000 Soviet soldiers.249 Britain put up minimal resistance at the port and later retreated 
into the city. After relaying the defeat of the British to Lenin in Moscow, the Bolsheviks 
emphasized that Soviet military must show no political interest in the matter and keep a 
low profile. According to Persits, it was a direct order by Trotsky addressed to the Soviet 
military that, “you must announce the news on the radio that Anzali was conquered by 
Kuchak-Khan and his troops and that he has requested our stay in the city and he has 
allowed it.”250 In order to secure the amicable stay of the Soviets, Trotsky requested the 
following: 
First, that no military encounter takes place by Soviet troops with Soviet flags. 
[You must] insist on our absolute non-intervention [in Iranian domestic matters]. 
Second, Kuchak-Khan should be assisted in all matters by our volunteers, experts, 
and monetarily, and allow his troops to take over territories we have occupied. 
Third, if our battleships are needed for Kuchak-Khan’s future fights, they must 
raise the flags of Azerbaijan Republic and assisting Kuchak-Khan should be 
generally done through this Republic.251
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This position facilitated Kuchak-Kahn and his Jangal Movement in working with 
the Soviets. With the help of the Soviets, he was able to publicly announce his program, 
through which he first declared the establishment of a Committee of Revolutionary War. 
He then announced the ousting of the British and promised the distribution of land among 
the peasants after they pushed further and took over Tehran. Further, he said that once the 
takeover of Tehran was complete, they would call the country the Iranian Socialist 
Republic. According to Persits, even though Iranians were following the Soviet model, 
there was not even one communist among their ranks at the time. The program of the 
Republic, besides armed struggle against the King and Britain, demanded the “support for 
private property [land] and Islam, for [the entire] human race, and for nullifying all 
agreements forced upon Iran by foreign forces.”252 In this manner, forty square 
kilometers of the northern province of Gilan was pronounced as the Gilan Democratic 
Republic. 
By July 1921, the Soviets decided to take their troops out of Iran; it took until 
December of that year for them to completely pull out. According to Persits, the Republic 
of Gilan suffered a defeat mainly because it refused to become another Soviet 
Republic.253 The Soviets pulling out of Iran on the one hand, and the distrust Kuchak-
Khan had developed toward Iranian communists on the other, fomented the beginning 
stages of the collapse of the Republic of Gilan. For many reasons, as Persits states, 
Kuchak-Khan feared that “communists were trying to take over the leadership.”254 As a 
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result, he decided to get rid of Amoughlu, who had become one of the most prominent 
leaders. 
Kuchak-Kahn’s troops attacked the headquarters of the Communist Party and 
arrested Amoughlu. Kuchak-Khan and his Jangal Movement, afraid of Marxist 
repercussions, decided to act before they were destroyed. Haydar Khan, despite his non-
conciliatory policies toward the Soviets, was killed by Kuchak-Khan’s troops. 
 Clashes continued until October 23, 1921, when Kuchak-Khan was no longer 
able to resist the army with a small group of supporters. While escaping from government 
forces, he froze to death in the mountains of Gilan province. When his frozen body was 
found, his head was taken to Tehran as proof of an end to the Republic of Gilan.255 The 
death of major leaders of both groups led to disbandment of the coalition and an abrupt 
end to the first socialist-Muslim movement in Iran. Such convergence of ideas between 
the two distinctly different schools of thought did not occur again until the 1979 
revolution.  
On February 26, 1921, according to two Soviet experts on Iran, M. Pavlovich and 
Teria S. Iranski, the Soviets signed an agreement with the Iranian government to ensure 
their pulling out of Iran.256 There was controversy on whether the Soviets were actually 
there to aid the Iranians or more specifically, to help the Jangal Movement and the 
Communist Party of Iran establish a people’s republic. Pavlovich and Iranski briefly 
mentioned the Soviet incentive to both occupy and leave Iran. According to the 1921 
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pact, the Soviets would withdraw their troops only if the British would stop intervening 
in Iran and withdraw from the country.  
The experience of Marxist-Muslim cooperation in the Republic of Gilan left its 
mark for a long time. Among those greatly influenced by this hybrid view was a secular 
Muslim in the city of Rasht. Mohammad Nakhshab, who began his political career in his 
late teenage years, founded a Muslim group with socialist inclinations under the name of 
the Theist-Socialist Movement (nehzat-e khodaparastan-e socialist). This group was 
among the six organizations that originally formed the National Front. Nakhshab was 
also among the four leaders of Liberation Movement abroad along with Ebrahim Yazdi, 
Mostafa Chamran, and Abbas Amir-entezam.257
Nakhshab, a Muslim who also believed in a secular government with socialist 
beliefs, was among the oldest in this group. In 1944, while still a high school student, he 
had become involved in politics by joining the Party of Iran258 (hezb-e Iran), a nationalist 
opposition group. Not long after its establishment, many members of the Party of Iran 
proposed to join the Tudeh Party. In a protest to the Party of Iran’s joining the Tudeh 
Party, Nakhshab left to organize his own group. He first organized the Theist-Socialist 
Movement (jonbesh-e khoda parastan-e socialist) and later The Party of People of Iran 
(hezb-e mardom-e Iran). According to Abrahamian, neither of the groups could gather 
enough force to contend in the realm of politics.259 However, Nakhshab was the first 
individual Iranian who made an effort to bring Shi’a Islam together with European 
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socialism. It is interesting to note that Ali Shariati’s father was a sympathizer of the 
Theist-Socialists. Consistent with his father’s tendencies and influenced by Nakhshab’s 
views, Shariati advocated similar views of secular Islam. In fact, by his own admission, 
Shariati was merely perfecting the same principles that commenced with Bazargan,260 
Taleghani,261 and Nakhshab.262 [See later section in this chapter on Dr. Ali Shariati.] This 
was a secular religious belief that did not offend traditional merchants of the Bazaar or 
masses of Iranians who believed in Islam. Meanwhile it attracted new-leftist intellectuals 
under the banner of nationalism and secularism. It resulted in the creation of an upcoming 
nationalist movement, which despite the Islamic tendencies of its leaders, practiced a 
secular agenda. Among such nationalist groups were the National Front (jebhe-ye melli) 
and the Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi). 
 
The National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli) 
 
A major organization that made its mark in the protection of national interest was 
the National Front, originally founded in the fall of 1949 in Tehran by Doctor 
Mohammad Mosaddegh and his colleagues.263  This group was one of the most enduring, 
and at times, most popular political organizations advocating reform. From its founding 
until 1979, it went through three phases of development. As a political organization it had 
significant impact upon the process of social change in Iran. However, the National Front 
is mentioned here not for its political pertinence but rather for its members’ contributions 
                                                 
260 One of the founders of the Liberation Movement in 1962. He was the first Prime Minister after the 1979 
revolution. 
 
261 He was one of the most popular, important, and radical clerics before and during the revolution. He was 
not only active with Muslim clerics but also with nationalists and some Marxists. 
 
262 Ibid, 575. 
 
263 Mohsen Modir-shanechi. 1996. Ahzab-e Siasi-e Iran, (Iranian Political Parties), Tehran: Resa. 
 139
to the formation of other Marxist groups. It was a midwife that helped give birth to many 
Marxist revolutionaries, many of whom later became founders of some of the major 
organizations, such as the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas.  
In its first meeting, Mosaddegh264 was elected chairman.  In its first political flyer, 
the organization made three distinct demands: 
1. Just elections 
2. An end to martial law 
3. Freedom of the press265
By November 1, 1949, the National Front had openly declared itself as a political 
front consisting of many organizations and parties. At the time, the National Front was 
able to get eight of its members elected to the sixteenth congress of Majles.266 In March 
1950, according to Katouzian, they put forth their program asking for reforms within the 
parliament and opposing an oil agreement between Iran and Britain. Their fight mainly 
revolved around legal issues, and not much attention was paid to other social and 
economic problems, such as social justice and the question of democracy and democratic 
rights.267
 Two major factors had contributed to the creation of the National Front. First, 
Tudeh, as a major political group, was unable to draw Muslims to its socialist programs 
and Marxist ideology. Second, the presence of foreigners and their interest in Iranian oil 
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instigated deep nationalist feelings among Iranian masses. Other than the Tudeh Party, 
there had been no widespread movements for about twenty years. Nor had there been a 
political organization after the defeat of the Gilan Republic. Nonetheless, by the early 
1940s, as an aftermath of the occupation of Iran by Allied forces, political activity was 
rehabilitated. In a short period of time, a large number of parties, committees, groups, and 
unions of groups were organized. Among them were nationalist groups that basically 
formed to protect national sovereign rights and Iranian oil. According to some authors, a 
nationalist organization may have been a more feasible solution to socio-political 
problems than the ways of a Marxist organization like the Tudeh Party.268   
But the nationalists were not the only members of the National Front. Leftist and 
radical members had more in mind than parliamentarianism. Their fight was not merely a 
legal fight. They consisted of the Party of Iran, the Organization to Oversee Elections 
(sazman-e nezarat bar entekhabat), the Party of Iranian People, the Movement of Theist 
Socialists, the Population of Islamic Fadaeean (jami’at-e fadaeean-e eslam), and the 
Committee of Muslim Mojahedin (hey’at-e mojahedin-e mosalman).269 All organizations 
making up the main body of the National Front agreed on one principal issue, that Iranian 
oil belongs to Iranians. With this guideline, they were able to attract masses of people to 
their political arena, allowing them to build a strong front that went beyond its 
intellectuals’ desires. They were successful in nationalizing the oil industry by 1951 and 
in making Mosaddegh the Prime Minister. His prime ministerial position lasted until 
August 19, 1953, when his cabinet was toppled by a coup with the help of the CIA and 
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British MI-6. The Shah, who had previously fled the country fearing mass protests, was 
put back in power.270 As a result, many National Front leaders and members were 
arrested and imprisoned. This marked the official collapse of the first National Front. 
The covert and repressed political inclinations within the National Front finally 
erupted in a major split. Gradually, the National Front was revived by 1965 and early 
from its re-inception it was divided into two factions. The more secular and modern 
leaders established what they called the second National Front, which was primarily 
formed by the Party of Iran. An alliance of four other organizations271 established the 
third National Front.  
The second National Front and third National Front were founded after the 
original National Front had ceased to exist as a result of political repression and internal 
conflict among its members. The second National Front, due to its many initial internal 
political differences, was not an enduring movement. A major factor contributing to its 
collapse was a cleric-led uprising on June 6, 1963. The government’s severe suppression 
forced many in the National Front to change their political position. Some members who 
previously advocated legal-constitutional resistance against the regime were now 
convinced that possibilities for open political alternatives had been exhausted. In the face 
of the Shah’s authoritarian regime, how effective was open resistance?  
The third National Front declared its existence by the summer of 1965. This was a 
more radical and more skeptical group. It conducted its activities openly, but at the same 
time, very cautiously. The Third National Front was made up of four major opposition 
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groups. It included the Liberation Movement, the Society of Socialists (jame’e-ye 
socialist-ha), the Party of Iranian People, and the Party of Iran. The more religious-
leaning leaders, however, established the new Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi), 
which was, in reality, the outcome of the third National Front. In a matter of three short 
weeks, most of the leaders were arrested and imprisoned. This put an abrupt end to the 
third National Front.  
 A fourth National Front was created after about 12 years of non-activity. Guided 
by a new way of thinking, they decided to take advantage of the Shah’s ‘open political 
space.’ They were more optimistic about an open political movement. In the face of a 
growing urban guerilla movement, an organization advocating nonviolence with no 
armed intentions, such as the new National Front, was good news for the Shah. On 
October 7, 1977, they declared themselves to be back on the political scene again.272 
According to the flyer, the new National Front consisted of the Socialist Society of the 
Iranian National Movement, the Party of Iran, and the Party of Iranian People. This was 
the period in which most groups announced their political activism one way or another, 
including the Tudeh Party, most Muslim and Marxist guerilla organizations, and the 
Liberation Movement. Several days later, the newly organized National Front established 
two important positions in a flyer. Responding to an article about “Iran and Black and 
Red Oppression,”273 the National Front took sides with Ayatollah Khomeini and declared 
that all clerics have clearly taken the side of Khomeini. They claimed that people’s 
demand for Islam had nothing to do with the left and that the clerics’ objective was not in 
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conflict with freedom and independence for Iran.274 Two of its leaders met with 
Khomeini in Paris to strengthen their solidarity with him specifically, and Muslims in 
general. Some of the more prominent leaders of the National Front played significant 
roles during and after the revolution.  
 Nationalism drove the four stages of the National Front’s activity and political 
ideology. They were able to send a message of a) political involvement as a necessary 
condition for social rights, and b) organization as another necessity to achieve any socio-
political objective. From the rank and file of the National Front rose many significant 
individuals and groups. After understanding how important it was for opposition to take a 
stance, they thought of expanding their political organization to mobilize and include 
masses of people. All major leaders and theorists in both Marxist organizations, such as 
the Fadaeean, and Muslim groups such as the Mojahedin, were in one way or another 
involved with the National Front. This was especially important since there were both 
Marxists, e.g. Tudeh, and Muslims, e.g. Clerics, outside and independent of the National 
Front.  
 
The Liberation Movement   (Nehzat-e Azadi) 
 
The Liberation Movement, which had split from the third National Front, played a 
major role as an opposition force, especially during the few years just after the revolution. 
Many members of this group later broke away to form the Mojahedin, and many of the 
leaders made noteworthy imprints during the revolution.  
This group, which endured its internal conflicts and the Shah’s repressions, 
played a major role during the 1979 revolution. By May 17, 1962, the Liberation 
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Movement had declared itself an official group within the opposition. Three major 
leaders, all former members of the National Front, founded this new organization, which 
had stronger Islamic tendencies. The three included Mehdi Bazargan, Ezatollah Sahabi, 
and Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmood Taleghani. Bazargan and Sahabi were old, experienced 
activists with strong Islamic inclinations. Taleghani, a cleric who later became an 
Ayatollah, was another activist cleric heavily involved in the fight against the Shah. The 
Mojahedin, for instance, speak of Taleghani as one of their major ideological figures. The 
Liberation Movement’s main declaration about its members and supporters was “Muslim, 
Iranian, and Mosaddegh-i.”275 They believed in Islam as an ideology. Being Iranian 
implied nationalist Iranian in opposition to foreign forces, including Britain, the Soviet 
Union, and the United States. Furthermore, a member had to be a supporter of 
Mosaddegh’s belief in an independent national economy. Their main difference with the 
National Front, consistent with inclinations of the three founders, was greater emphasis 
on an Islamic ideology.276  
After the defeat of the nationalist movement, there were no traces of the clergy. 
Their non-presence took the political struggle back to the universities. Some of the 
younger intellectual clerics, who could not find opportunities for political activity due to 
the Shah’s despotism, began cultural activities such as publishing a magazine on the 
school of Shi’ism.277 They insisted upon a coalition of the nationalist movement and a 
movement based on Islamic ideology, including Tudeh and other Marxists. They felt that 
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within the opposition to the Shah, there were only two groups that actively practiced their 
political ideology:  
[They are] either revolutionary Muslims who fight, they attack the enemy and are 
attacked in turn, or they are non-Muslim Marxist revolutionaries. Therefore…the 
establishment [of Liberation Movement] reflected a historical necessity of the 
development of a new Islamic movement and their [Marxist] coalition into a union. 
And it is precisely this two-dimensional nature that enabled the Iranian Liberation 
Movement to accomplish its historical responsibility at the right moment.278  
 
After the suppression of the clerics in the 1963 uprising, the Liberation Movement 
advocated a more radical position against the regime in support of the clerics. 
Furthermore, it was this event that fomented a greater separation between the National 
Front and Liberation Movement. More pressure was put on the National Front by the 
Liberation Movement to condemn the regime for its murderous actions in Qom.279 The 
National Front, wanting to remain a legal and open political group, refused to take such a 
position. This forced the Liberation Movement to distance itself from the National Front. 
Now more radical Muslims, with nationalist ideas, were sympathetic to the Liberation 
Movement. Faced with an influx of imported western culture, they found more support 
for defending Islam and Iran in the Liberation Movement.  
The main leadership of the Liberation Movement was deliberately avoiding an 
antagonistic struggle against the Shah, but younger members and supporters had other 
ideas. This created a duality about the nature of the Liberation Movement. In some of 
their documents, they referred to the concept of Mojahedin, a Muslim who thought a 
Jihad fights against the forces of oppression: 
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After the 1963 uprising [cleric uprising in Qom] the Liberation Movement, on its path to 
development and growth, was able to become such Mojahedin-breeder which produced 
so many proud Mojaheds for the people of our country.280
 
This is referring to those who split from the Liberation Movement to found the 
Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin. Therefore, it can be said that the Liberation 
Movement gave rise to a more radical group of Muslims, who later advocated an all-out 
armed struggle against the Shah. Many intellectuals, young political activists, and 
students, especially those with Islamic tendencies, supported the Liberation Movement. 
According to Nejati, the Liberation Movement was the first party with an Islamic 
ideology that coordinated all activities of nationalists with the clerics and the Islamic 
movement.281  
 The Mojahedin, who had split from the Liberation Movement, had organized its 
own group by 1966. Radicalized by the Shah’s suppression, frustrated by the Liberation 
Movement’s reluctance, and deeply impressed by Marxist guerillas, they started their 
own urban armed struggle against the Shah. According to Abrahamian, “Even though the 
Mojahedin were Muslims, with a revolutionary interpretation of Islam, they put forth an 
ideology which was not much different from the Marxist Fadaeean.”282
 
Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin (sazman-e mojahedin-e khalgh-e Iran) 
 
This organization was founded by three former members of the Liberation 
Movement in the summer of 1965. Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad, Ali Asghar Badizadegan, 
and Saeed Mohsen had split from the religious wing of the Liberation Movement to 
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found the Mojahedin. They were able to organize themselves amid other turmoil within 
the Liberation Movement. This occurred precisely when most of the leadership from the 
Liberation Movement was arrested under subversive charges, tried by a military court, 
and sentenced to years in prison.283
 Hanif-Nezhad was born in 1938 in Tabriz, Azerbaijan, into a family of traditional 
merchants. He first joined National Front, then the Islamic Society, and finally the 
Liberation Movement. In 1962, he was arrested and sentenced to prison for seven 
months. In 1963, he graduated from Tehran University with a degree in agricultural 
machinery. He started his military service and became an officer before leaving the 
service. Disenchanted with the economy and alternative political parties, he thought of 
starting an underground group. The second founder of the Mojahedin was Saeed Mohsen. 
He was born in 1939 into a religious family in Zanjan. Active among student committees 
of the Liberation Movement, he was arrested and briefly imprisoned several times in 
1961. He graduated from Tehran University in Industrial Engineering during the same 
year. After finishing military service he, like Hanif-nezhad and Badizadegan, helped 
found the Mojahedin. He was active in all realms of the struggle for the Mojahedin for 
ten years before he was arrested the last time. 
Asghar Badizadegan, the third major figure and among the founders of the 
Mojahedin, was born in 1938 in Isfahan. He too began his political life with the 
Liberation Movement. He graduated with a degree in chemistry and served in the military 
henceforth. He served his time in an arms manufacturing factory and was later hired by 
the same factory. His familiarity with arms made him a good candidate for arms training, 
and in1970 he was sent to Palestine to the Fattah military camps for training. After 
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several months of training he returned to Iran. His training was not in vain however. 
Before Badizadegan was sent to Palestine, the main founders of the organization had 
decided on commencing an armed struggle against the Shah’s regime. They also studied 
an amalgam of Marxist books including Economy, Money for All, Worker’s Wage, 
Contradiction by Mao; State and Revolution, and What Is to Be Done? by Lenin, How to 
be Guerilla, and How to Be a Good Communist, by Leo Chaochi, Guerilla Warfare, by 
Che Guevara, Wretched of the Earth, by Fanon, Strategies of an Urban Guerilla, by 
Abraham Gilan, Revolution in Revolution, by Regis Debray, and many others.284 Their 
studies of Islamic work were much more limited: the Koran, Ali’s Nahjolbalagheh, The 
Path Traveled, Infinite Particle, and Love and Worship. Such books may have 
contributed to a general understanding of Islam and morality rather than a specific 
political strategy.  
Their ‘ideology team’ suggested to other members several books to read. Among 
them were Imam Ali’s Nahjolbalagheh. They later published a book called, Imam 
Hussein. This work included an analysis on Islam after the life of Mohammad and 
Hussein’s struggle against the Ummaye dynasty. An important event that shaped the idea 
of martyrdom among Muslims, especially Shi’as, was Hussein’s willingness to fight 
despite being disproportionately outnumbered. Islamic ideology was prevalent in this 
organization until the early 1970s. Members also read some Marxist works in order to 
enhance their understanding of other revolutions. For them, however, Islam was 
sufficient to explain class conflict and revolutionary activity.  
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Ali Shariati 
Ali Shariati was born in 1933 in Mashad, in the northeastern province of 
Khorasan. After graduating from high school and training as a teacher, Shariati started 
teaching in a village there. Several years later he started his university education and 
graduated with a degree in Persian Literature in 1953. With a scholarship to continue his 
education, he traveled to France. He finished his graduate studies and received a Ph.D. in 
Comparative Linguistics in 1964. His five years in France may be what instilled in him 
his political identity.285 The 1960s, the period of political turmoil in France, also educated 
Shariati as a political activist. He experienced one of the most radical leftist political 
movements in all of Europe at the time. It was through these movements that he realized 
the major differences between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. In many 
ways Dr. Shariati’s ideas of using Marxism to aid the oppressed, while keeping his 
Islamic ideas intact, was similar to the Liberation Theology of Latin American countries. 
The use of these ideas in his writing reflects his understanding and personal experiences 
with both.  He met and had long discussions with intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon286 
and Jean Paul Sartre.287 While participating in political demonstrations defending the 
Algerian government, Shariati was injured, and this injury played an important role in his 
becoming even more involved in the world of political resistance. Consistent with his 
Islamic beliefs, he joined the Liberation Movement’s chapter abroad. Two years later, he 
was appointed chief editor of Free Iran (Iran-e Azad), the National Front publication. 
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After receiving his Ph.D. in 1964, he went back to Iran. His activities in Paris, 
known to the government in Iran, caused his immediate imprisonment. After six months 
in prison, he was released, and despite his doctoral degree, he was allowed to teach only 
in a high school in his hometown of Mashad. Later, because of his relatively good 
behavior, he was permitted to teach in the university in the same city, but his tenure 
lasted just several months. As he was constantly under surveillance by the secret police, 
his ideas grew even more radical. He accepted the invitation of some politically active 
Muslims to speak in what became a famous mosque (Hosseinieh ershad) in Tehran. His 
lectures consisted mainly of Islamic theology, sociology, and the history of Islam, 
especially resistant Islam. He was warmly received by the youth, who promoted his tapes 
and books nationwide. For almost seven years, from 1966 to 1973, he was able to speak 
in the same mosque and at other gatherings.  
Shariati’s father had purposely chosen life in a small town and did not much care 
for big city glitter. He taught Islamic history in different small towns and villages in the 
same province. Choosing Khorasan to teach Islamic history was probably not a 
coincidence. It was where he was born and raised. Moreover, there was a population that 
did not appreciate the city and its secular living—the non-Islamic, nontraditional 
behaviorisms. Ali Shariati, following in his father’s footsteps, was also interested in 
politics. They both participated in political meetings and joined a group called the 
Movement of Theist Socialists.288 These meetings probably played a big role in giving 
Shariati his first taste of Iranian socialist and Marxist thought.  
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 In the early 1950s, when he was teaching in Mashad’s high schools, he 
translated a book, originally written in Arabic by Abdolmajid Jodat-al-Sahar, which was 
highly controversial for the times, not only for questioning state authority but also for 
giving new ideas to the Muslim population. The title of the book was Abuzar: The 
Socialist Theist. It was about the life of Abuzar, one of the first people to join 
Mohammad in Islam. Abuzar defended the poor and oppressed, and fought against the 
rich and powerful. It seems as though Shariati, like other Middle Eastern radicals, thought 
of Abuzar as the first Muslim socialist.289 In his speeches given at the popular mosque in 
Tehran, he persistently used Islamic metaphors and analogies to critique the Shah’s 
government. He never addressed the regime directly and never joined any specific group. 
This was why he was not perceived as a threat by the regime. The Shah’s secret police 
SAVAK was concentrating most of its forces on the nascent guerilla movement, so 
speeches made in opposition of the regime seemed harmless at the time. For more than 
two years, Shariati was able to make his popular speeches with no consequences. 
According to Zibakalam, the SAVAK thought that: 
Those in opposition to Shariati, namely the conservative clergy, would eventually 
attack the mosque of Husseinieh Ershad and close it down. This would resolve 
the Shariati problem for SAVAK. Eliminating Shariati by closing down the 
mosque where he spoke, clerics would reduce tension between the SAVAK and 
the people. 290
 
He was able to get away with the speeches only for so long. Because he spoke in a 
particular vernacular, using words with irony and dual meanings, he had gone undetected 
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for several years. But by 1971, he was being scrutinized closely by the SAVAK, and was 
finally arrested and imprisoned for eight months.  
During his speeches, he distinguished two types of Islam, Alawi Shi’ism291 and 
Safavi Shi’ism,292 He considered those two schools of thought to be the major conflict 
between all Muslims in the world. He spoke about Hussein’s martyrdom in Karbala as 
the quintessential Islamic struggle against injustice. He emphasized an unending fight 
against injustice, and said that the “most essential tradition of Islam is martyrdom and 
human activity that has been combined with the history of struggle against oppression 
and establishing justice and supporting human rights.”293 Marxist and Muslim guerillas 
also believed in the ideas of martyrdom and human activity to hasten the achievement of 
a just system.  
Doctor Ali Shariati was a significant force of opposition against the Shah’s 
regime. He had strong convictions in Islamic beliefs, especially Islam as an ideology of 
resistance. He would not only qualify as a hybrid within the general Marxist-Muslim 
resistance movement but also a hybrid among Muslims themselves. He advocated Islamic 
morality but was not a cleric. And while he was a leftist intellectual, he was not a Marxist 
or secular intellectual.  
 
He was one of the Muslims who applied principles of Marxism to his Islamic 
beliefs. He was outspoken against the Shah and his regime, especially during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. During this period people attended his lectures by the thousands. 
Even women, who rarely attended such lectures in the mosque, were present when he 
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spoke in Husseinieh-ye ershad. He was relentless in explaining the world as a conflicting 
dichotomy, a world of the oppressed and a world of the oppressor. For him the same 
division existed within Islam, an Islam that is utilized by the oppressors and an Islam that 
comes to the aid of the oppressed and justifies resistance against the oppressor.294 He 
believed that a real Islam can only be brought about and implemented by progressive 
intellectuals and not the clerics. He wrote: 
There are two Islams. An Islam as ideology to progress in life, [to] socially 
advance and develop, and the other [Islam] a collection of knowledge, values, and 
information like the written word, principles of theology by Islamic icons. Islam 
as an ideology creates Abuzar,295 and Islam as a culture creates Ibn-Cinna [Avi-
cenna].296 Islam creates believers as a culture. Islam creates intellectuals as an 
ideology…an uneducated individual may have understood Islam and thinks more 
Islamic than a cleric, a philosopher, and a master (Aref).297   
  
He often disagreed with high clerics and criticized their involvement in 
oppressive governments. He insisted that clerics like all Shi’a Muslims must take a 
political stance. No longer was defending Islam as merely a religion sufficient for a true 
Muslim. In one of his more famous books, Islam-ology (studying Islam), he wrote: 
Today, it is no longer enough to say that I disagree with religion or I believe in 
religion; this makes no sense. One must take a position on which religion does 
one believe in. The religion of Abuzar and Marvan Hokm are both Islamic. Fine, 
you believe in Islam, but which one, an Islam that pillages the people or one that 
is isolated in exile? If you claim that religion is an instrument to justify poverty, 
you could be right. Uthman298 used to say the same thing. But we can see that not 
only does Islam not justify poverty but advocates justice, equality, and struggle 
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against poverty. In mere defense of this concept, many of the greatest in Islam 
have been sacrificed.299   
 
Shariati’s political positions and relentless critique of conformist clerics made him 
even more popular. His criticism against the Shah’s government attracted a larger 
audience. The Shah’s secret police grew concerned with his popularity and finally 
intervened and banned him from speaking in Husseineh ershad. By 1973, they shut down 
the mosque, arrested Shariati, and banned his writings.300 After his arrest, he spent two 
years in prison. He was finally released through political mediation and negotiation by 
the Algerian government. Despite government restrictions not to leave the country, he 
fled to London where he resided for the next three years. He died there in late spring of 
1978. Although investigators diagnosed his cause of death to have been a massive heart 
attack, many still believe that the SAVAK was responsible for Shariati’s death. 
 Shariati insisted on maintaining an independent mindset on political and social 
issues. He adhered fully to no extant ideology. He was particularly leery of any “isms” in 
political thought. Nonetheless, he thought of Marxism as one of the most comprehensive 
social thoughts.301 Based on his writings and terminology, he was able to articulate a 
revolutionary Islam through Marxism. He felt, for example, that all Shi’a Muslims should 
use the day of commemoration of Hussein’s killing by Mu’aviah as a day to protest 
oppression, or even rise for a revolution. This indeed took place starting some months 
before the 1979 revolution. He said inequality and poverty in Iran was a consequence of 
world imperialism, international Zionism, cartels, multi-national corporations, racism, 
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cultural imperialism, and finally ‘westoxication.’302 His usage of Marxist terminology 
and concepts had many people intrigued. This duality of thought created enemies and 
friends on both sides: Marxists and Muslims. According to Abrahamian: 
[Shariati’s relationship with Marxism] was a love hate relationship. On the one 
hand he accepted that without Marxism one cannot comprehend society and 
modern history. Therefore, [he] accepted the division in society as an economic 
foundation, a class-based infrastructure, and a political ideological superstructure. 
He even confessed that almost all religions must be considered as part of the 
superstructure, because all rulers deceive people by the promise of heavenly 
rewards. He also accepted that history of people is a history of class struggle. But 
he adds that the main fight is over political power and not material goods. He 
claims that since Kane and Abel, humanity has been divided between two sides 
consisting of the oppressed (people) and the oppressor (rulers).303
 
 Most of his political writings and speeches referred to a dichotomy of wrong 
Marxists and wrong Muslims. On the one hand were the wrong Marxists of the Tudeh 
Party, the ‘Stalinist kind’ as he would call them, and on the other, the conservative 
Muslims, who were apolitical and who held wrong interpretations of Islam. So Marxists 
and Muslims would think of him as either a Muslim-Marxist or an anti-Marxist Muslim. 
He claimed to be neither. He thought of himself as a radical thinker who got his ideas 
from Shi’a Islam and used the methodology of Western social science, especially 
Marxism, for political analysis. He defended the true Marxist from attacks by clerics who 
claimed Marxists to be godless, immoral, corrupt, and sinful. In a pragmatic way, he said 
that it is what Marxists practice—fighting against oppression and for truth—that the 
Koran expects. According to the Koran, its definition of kofror kafir304 refers to one’s 
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practice and not what is in one’s mind as thought.305 He stated that Marxists must pay 
attention to the deep Islamic beliefs of Iranians. He scorned the Tudeh Party for not 
understanding the struggle of Muslims. It is due to this fact, he said, that not many people 
were attracted to this party in Iran. In his book, The Return, (bazgasht) he wrote: 
Look at their [Tudeh Party] books through which they are trying to introduce 
themselves to our Muslim population and to the spirits of our religious people: 
‘Dialectical Materialism,’ ‘Spiritualism and Material Principles,’ ‘Spirits Are 
Material Too,’ ‘School of Ancient Greek Philosophy,’ ‘Marxism in Linguistics’ 
(edited by Stalin), ‘Dialectics of History,’ etc… As a consequence, this is what 
our people think of the group’s thoughts and actions. ‘These are religion-less 
people, enemies of God, people, religion, ethics, and all that is sacred, all honors, 
all traditions. They are the destroyers of all rules, beliefs, and protestors of God, 
integrity, and everything. Their sole objective is to take away our religion and 
import non-religious beliefs from abroad, and that is all.306
 
In the same writing, however, he showed an awareness of what some clerics 
would do to discredit Marxism, and defended Marxist thought by catching some clerics’ 
deception. He said that clerics deceive people by exploiting people’s ignorance, for 
example when a cleric lies to people and claims that komo [in Persian] means God, and 
neest [in Persian] means ‘is not.’ So komoneest [the Persian way of saying communist] 
really means there is no God. It is funny, Shariati claims, but it is a popular 
understanding. Furthermore, Shariati wrote: 
Is it not true that we are addressing the population, a population with 90 percent 
peasants from villages as opposed to 90 percent proletariat like Germany? A 
population that belongs to feudalism and religion and not of industrial capitalism, 
a population that resulted from two centuries of renaissance and one century after 
the French revolution. This is how much effort was put into forgetting religion but 
not much opportunity to kick big landowners out of the village. Peasants and 
workers’ consciousness was crammed with the Koran, prayer, and Ali.307 But they 
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never became conscious of the truth about exploitation, the meaning of 
oppression, the philosophy of poverty, and alienation. Our translators and writers 
wrote and translated books about materialism and dialectics, linguistics, the 
engine of history, the refutation of Berkley’s philosophies, superstitious of 
idealism, the nonexistence of God and spirit, and principles of ethics. But among 
the thousands of books they published for the people, there was no translation of 
das Kapital.308
 
 There are strong Fanonist influences in Shariati’s writings. Shariati, like Frantz 
Fanon, the radical Algerian Marxist, felt that nationalism for Third World countries was 
the only path to liberation. He claimed that people in the Third World could only defeat 
imperialism through the return to their original cultural roots. Their national and cultural 
traditions would help them prevail over social alienation and reach a stage of 
independence. In his speeches, he referred to African and Latin American intellectuals on 
their way to ‘returning to the self.’ Shariati was successful with the youth and Muslim 
intellectuals. Most young Islamic intellectuals also felt that Shi’a Islam could be used for 
a revolutionary movement and that traditional clerics were too conformist. They rejected 
non-political traditions of Islam having to do with prayers, absolution, scholastic 
teachings, and superstition of healing through religion. Like Shariati, the Muslim youth 
wanted to use Islam as an ideology to protest the Shah’s dictatorship and foreign 
imperialism.  
 Even though he did not live to see the revolution take place, and more 
interestingly its consequences, he contributed immensely to ideas that mobilized the 
masses. Among his students were many leaders of the Mojahedin and other revolutionary 
Islamic groups. His desire to change Iranian society may have come true if only 
temporarily. In a letter to his son, he wrote: 
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We are speaking of a society with half its population asleep and under a spell and 
its other half who is awake are fleeing the country. We want to wake up the 
spellbound and force them to ‘stand up’ and make those who fled return and 
stay.309
 
According to John Foran, Shariati bridged the gap between Khomeini, his 
followers, intellectuals, and students. Even though Shariati did not approve of a 
government ruled by clerics, in two ways his analysis was quite close to the clerics. First, 
he thought of Islam as a completely just system, and second, good Muslims should give 
power to their leading clerics.310 Discourse on whether Shariati would approve of an 
Islamic Republic in Iran still continues. However, as far as Shariati was concerned, it was 
imperative, as he said in the letter to his son, that we wake people up. And to that he 
certainly contributed tremendously.  
Not since the Gilan Democratic Republic were Marxists and Muslims working so 
closely. This time the collaboration was against a common enemy using a particular 
method of struggle to achieve victory. Although independent organizationally, and 
distinct ideologically, the Marxist borrowing of ideas from Muslims was noticeable. The 
idea of martyrdom, as proof of an authentic revolutionary, determined popularity of the 
group. Serious revolutionaries not only engaged in armed struggle they also gave their 
lives for it. This made an impact on other smaller groups in the opposition. They were 
involved in the resistance movement. But the impact was mainly made by those who used 
martyrdom to demonstrate a genuine revolutionary. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ORIGINS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THREE MAJOR MARXIST 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The Iranian revolution was an Islamic revolution, but in Iran 
 there was, as elsewhere, an intellectual culture of Marxism. 
 The adherents of this culture lost many savage battles, but they 
 helped make the revolution possible and shaped postrevolutionary Iran. 
        Forrest Colburn 
 
 
Three major organizations permeated the Marxist political movement in Iran: the 
Tudeh Party, The Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas, and Paykar. 
Multitudes of other leftist and Marxist groups were active before the revolution, but these 
three groups were able to organize Iranian leftists and intellectuals more effectively than 
others. Part of their success was their persistence and seriousness in the struggle to topple 
the Shah’s regime. This chapter presents a brief history of the three organizations. Their 
history is particularly important because in one way or another, their leaders had a 
relation with Islam and/or Islamic movements. 
 
Tudeh Party 
 
Tudeh is the oldest Marxist organization that has been able to revive itself in one 
form or another. It has survived the imprisonment and execution of its leaders, members 
and supporters, many splits, controversies among its leadership, and most importantly, a 
growing disappointment and disenchantment among the Iranian people. Founded in 1920, 
the Communist Party of Iran became the country’s first Marxist group.311 There is a 
connection, however, between the Communist Party and the Tudeh Party that goes 
beyond their relationship with the Russian revolution and the Communist Party of the 
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Soviet Union. It started with the participation of Iranian workers who had traveled to 
Russian Azerbaijan for work. In the Russian revolution of 1905, they had a chance to 
participate in a political-social struggle for the first time. Wanting to use their experience 
in an organization, they established the Party of Justice (Hezb-e Edalat), and the 
Endeavor Society (Jamiat-e Hemmat).312 The Party of Justice, also known as the Social 
Democratic Group, changed its name to the Communist Party of Iran in 1920.313 They 
demanded: the end of imperialist domination in Iran; confiscation of foreign 
corporations; confiscation of land belonging to big landowners and its distribution among 
peasants and soldiers in the revolutionary army; finally, they demanded an alliance with 
the Soviets and the Workers International Movement.314
 To popularize their politics, they joined the Jangal Movement,315 which was led 
by Mirza Kuchak Khan.316 Ideologically, two individuals from the Communist Party 
played significant roles: Jafar Javadzadeh (Pishevari), who published the party’s organ 
The Communist, and Haydar Khan, also known as Haydar Amoughlu, who led the central 
committee of the party. This was the first instance of a Marxist-Muslim convergence in 
Iranian history. Through efforts of the leaderships from both sides, by Mirza Kuchak 
Khan, Amoughlu, and Javadzadeh, the first Democratic Society was established.317
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By 1920, the Communist Party denounced Reza Khan, the new monarch and a dictator, 
for being an obstacle to progress. They asked workers, peasants, and the petty 
bourgeoisie to unite against him.318  
By 1926, the Communist Party had regrouped and reiterated its view on Reza 
Shah as an obstacle to progress. They claimed that the only way to fight against his 
government was to organize workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie.319 At the same 
time, Reza Shah made all communist activity and literature illegal in 1931 by passing an 
amendment through the parliament. This move forced the Communist Party to turn 
inward and concentrate its activities among intellectuals. One of these, who later joined 
the party, was Taghi Arani, a chemist educated at the University of Berlin in Germany. 
He came to know Marxism while in Berlin, which motivated him to write several critical 
articles about Iranian culture. Upon his return to Iran, he began publishing an intellectual 
newspaper by the name of Donya (World).320 By 1931, Reza Shah had gathered enough 
support to denounce the Communist Party, and he proclaimed as illegal all activities by 
communists or communist groups. This act forced the Communist Party to go 
underground and conduct most of its activities among intellectuals. Taghi Arani was 
among them.  
So complicated were Arani’s articles that the government initially perceived the 
material as non-threatening.321 Articles under titles like “Historical Materialism,” 
“Science and Elements of Material,” “Meaning of Human Materialism,” “Women and 
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Materialism,” and “Material Basis of Life and Thought” may have been too dense for 
even university students. His problems came not with his theoretical writing but rather 
with a flyer he wrote in 1937, on May 1st, International Workers Day, and distributed on 
university campuses.322 This led to his arrest and a ten-year prison sentence. During his 
trials he compared Iranian police with the Nazis and accused them of torture. He stated 
that anti-socialist and anti-communist laws were against the constitution. He said, 
according to Abrahamian, “If you want to imitate Western clothing, methods, facades, 
technology, and style of living, you must also put to work Western political 
philosophy.”323 Arani died after only ten months in prison. Controversy surrounds his 
death since the cause was never established.  
The Tudeh Party was founded by 27 of the 53 individuals who were arrested 
along with Arani but were able to find each other later. Officially the Tudeh Party was 
established in 1941, and despite efforts by different governments to eliminate this group, 
it has persisted to this day. Since its inception, it has split into many more radical or more 
conservative groups, which exist now under different names. Some authors have argued 
that the Tudeh Party was originally created not as a communist party but as a united front 
for anti-fascist activities and constitutional rule, and this is precisely why the name 
“Tudeh” was chosen as opposed to the Communist Party or the Workers Party.324 There 
were three reasons that contributed to that decision: 
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1. Since communist activity had become illegal in 1931, any name making a 
communist distinction did not seem wise, especially since this was not perceived 
by members as an underground subversive organization. 
2. Any name referring to Marxism or communism would undoubtedly repel and 
fend off clerics and religious individuals, as well as many politically radical 
Muslims. 
3. Tudeh, meaning “mass of people,” would also attract and appeal to all sects and 
divisions of society, not only the working class. 
 
According to Morshedizadeh, the name Tudeh was chosen in an attempt to 
conceal the real communist nature of the party since Iranians thought of Marxism as 
hostile to religion and Islam.325 Tudeh leaders looking to organize intellectuals, students, 
and workers openly could not possibly have chosen a name affiliating them with 
communism, Marxism, or the Soviets.  Moreover, according to Abrahamian, a non-
communist name would draw distinctions between the old Communist Party of Iran and 
the new, more youthful Tudeh Party.326 In a pragmatic sense, the anti-communist law 
passed in 1931 might be the reason.  
The party chose a Ghajar prince, Soleiman Mirza Eskandari, as their leader 
because he had been an important figure during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.327 
By 1942, the new party had published its preliminary program and started its political 
activities in Tehran. Their first conference was held in the fall of that year. Thirty-nine 
members from the provinces and 87 members from Tehran attended the conference. 
Their initial program was based on four objectives according to Abrahamian: 
1. Freeing the remaining members of 53 
2. Making the Tudeh Party an official party 
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3. Publishing a newspaper 
4. Creating a program that, contrary to previous anti-religion programs, would not 
exclude clerics and would attract young Marxists and non-Marxist radicals.  
 
It took six months for Tudeh to accomplish these plans. They started gathering in 
Tehran and had organized their first conference by September 1942, which was attended 
by 126 members (87 from Tehran and 39 from other cities). During the conference, the 
following membership conditions were delineated. Members must: 
1. Be Iranian citizens 
2. Be at least 20 years of age 
3. Accept the party’s ideology and structure 
4. Go through a three-month training period in one of the party’s branches328 
 
The two types of Marxists who made up the main body of the Tudeh Party were 
quite different. This was apparent in both their class and educational background:  
Founders of the Tudeh Party were mostly young Persian-speaking men from 
Tehran, whereas members of the former Communist Party were middle-aged, 
from Azerbaijan, and spoke Azari. While founders of the Tudeh Party were 
university-educated intellectuals who had come across Marxism through leftist 
movements in Western Europe, founders of the Communist Party were self-taught 
intellectual activists who had reached the same conclusion through Leninism of 
the Russian Bolshevik Party. While the founders of the Tudeh Party, these 
European-educated Marxists, saw politics only from the class perspective, the 
leadership of the Communist Party—having witnessed ethnic massacres of 
Ghafghaz and local uprisings of Khiabani and Mirza Kuchak Khan—saw society 
not only from a class perspective, but an ethnic view. These differences were not 
apparent from 1941-1943, but surfaced later.329
 
In time, these differences became a major source of conflict. Given Iranian 
society’s lack of a working class proletariat, copying Soviet-style communism had 
become a problem. Conflict rose among party members from the First Congress of the 
party. One of the more important issues was the communist nature of the party. The issue 
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was whether communism was appropriate for Iran’s particular social makeup.330 They 
were facing a political dead-end. Some members felt that the party was not serious 
enough about class struggle and armed struggle in achieving socialism, and that the party 
had replaced workers with intellectuals. Others argued that there was not enough open 
and democratic discussion within the central committee, which harbored too much 
control. Yet there were others who underscored reasons outside the party, such as 
political suppression and British imperialism conspiring in Iran.331 Despite such political 
differences, they were able to publish their views concretely without seeming 
contradictory.  
This time, however, there appeared a new line of class struggle in their program, 
demonstrating a new socialist/worker inclination vis-à-vis an old nationalist/ethnic line. 
After the first congress in 1944, the formulated principles of the party were put forth in a 
paper as the following: 
The Main objective of the Tudeh Party is to mobilize workers, peasants, 
progressive intellectuals, merchants, and artisans of Iran. In our society today, 
there are two main classes: those who own principle means of production, and 
those who do not own much. The second group includes workers, peasants, 
progressive intellectuals, merchants, and artisans. Those who work are not 
rewarded for their work, and are oppressed by a small group. If the social 
structure is completely turned upside-down and the principle means of production 
is shared by the people, this class, for losing a little, will gain a whole lot in 
return. … When we say our intention is to fight against despotism and 
dictatorship, we are not addressing particular individuals but a class structure that 
creates such dictators and despots. In August of 1941, many people thought that 
with the overthrow of Reza Shah, dictatorship would also disappear overnight. 
But now we are aware of the mistake we made. We can see with our own eyes 
that the structure that created Reza Shah still remains. Such class structures, 
furthermore, will create mini Reza Shahs through oligarchies in the form of 
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landowners and oppressive capitalists, who will control society by owning the 
means of production.332  
 
Ideological conflicts on what takes precedent—ethnic and nationalist struggle or worker 
struggle—continued to persist within the Tudeh Party.333  
An interesting development within Tudeh was its Women’s Organization. The 
Women’s Organization of the Tudeh Party, which was created in 1943, was supported by 
another group of women called the Society of Women. By 1949, both groups had joined 
to form the Society of Democratic Women. Interestingly, the members were mostly 
related to male members of the Tudeh Party.334 The subject of women’s rights and the 
political activities of women was a point of contention for clerics, one that may have 
played a major role in creating a rift between clerics and Tudeh. The women’s branch of 
Tudeh managed to organize women to fight for literacy, voting rights, political and social 
rights, equal wages, and the building of more schools for girls. This is while clerics were 
trying to close all institutions open to women.335  
Among the most radical branches of Tudeh was its military chapter. It was 
announced an official chapter of the party in 1951, and by 1954 it had hundreds of 
members. During the same year, 500 of its members were arrested and 21 were 
executed.336 Tudeh was especially active in recruiting members from the working class. 
In their first conference, they proclaimed a neutral position toward worker’s religious 
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affiliations, language, and political views. They organized many strikes demanding 
higher wages and improved work conditions for workers. According to Foran: 
By 1941, only three strikes, involving 50 workers, had taken place, but by 1944, 
the number of strikes had reached 57. It reached a peak by 1946, with 183 strikes 
in total. By May 1, 1944, International Workers Day, four workers’ 
confederations joined forces to form the Central Council of the United Trade 
Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers (shora-ye mottahed-e markazi-ye 
kargaran va zahmatkeshan-e Iran). This council was led mainly by old activists 
of the workers movement and members of the “fifty-three.” The council grew 
rapidly until 1946, when it claimed to have organized 335,000 members including 
industrial workers, artisans, merchants, non-skilled wage laborers, and service 
sector employees.337
 
In 1948, as a consequence of an assassination plot against the Shah, martial law 
was declared and all Tudeh Party members were arrested. Two weeks later, the prime 
minister announced the Tudeh Party responsible for the attempt by presenting some 
documents. He linked the alleged assassin to an Islamic Newspaper, the Flag of Islam 
(parcham-e eslam), Tudeh, and United Committee of the United Trade Unions of Iranian 
Workers and Toilers.338 Furthermore, citing the 1931 ban against communism and 
communist groups and literature, the Tudeh Party was proclaimed illegal and it was 
indicted with charges, which, according to Abrahamian, included destabilizing the 
constitutional monarchy, organizing hunger strikes and plotting riots in the southern 
region of Abadan, arming workers in the northern province of Mazandaran, and 
encouraging the secession of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.339 Leaders were arrested, the 
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party line along with its members went into disarray, and internal conflict arose.340 
According to Katouzian, there were some members of Tudeh Party who could have spied 
for the government.341  Two hundred members were arrested and some executed. With 
the advent of the 16th Congress, some political activity was permitted. This allowed the 
Tudeh Party to start publishing a political organ and begin organizing protests and strikes. 
Despite several years of inactivity, they were able to rebuild and organize once again.  
 By 1953, they had gathered more support and resurfaced. Their serious political 
activities enabled these Marxists to gain the trust of the population as an opposition 
group. All throughout the 1940s and until 1953, when the Tudeh Party failed to organize 
the masses to protest the coup against Dr. Mosaddegh, they had set the political discourse 
for Iranian opposition. On May 1, 1953, International Workers Day, they organized 
protests in almost all major cities. On other occasions, they were able to mobilize up to 
100,000 people to participate in political protests.342 But according to some of their 
leaders, they failed for not supporting Mosaddegh.  Eskandari writes: 
During the nationalist movement, we did not support Mosaddegh, who 
undoubtedly represented the national bourgeoisie. We believed that Mosaddegh is 
fighting for nationalizing Iranian oil, but American imperialist support of this 
movement means they are also behind it. Therefore, we mistakenly concluded that 
communists must not support the movement of the nationalization of oil.343  
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Eskandari neglected to mention the role of the Soviet Union in this decision. 
According to some authors, the party’s decisions were made with the interests of the 
Soviet Union in mind.344 The Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States had plans for 
the Iranian oil industry. In a speech in Majles, Mosaddegh put forth his “negative 
equilibrium” policy, suggesting that new concessions on Iranian oil should not be made 
until Iran could plan for nationalization of Southern oil under the control of Britain. To 
give the Soviets Northern oil concessions, and have the British already in the South, was 
“negative equilibrium.” Tudeh published articles blaming Mosaddegh for being one-sided 
and claimed that all governments had spheres of influence in Iran, including the 
Soviets.345After the 1953 coup, The Tudeh Party was seriously damaged. In a period of 
five years, 1953-1958, up to 3,000 members were arrested. From 1960-1963, several key 
members of the party fled Iran to Europe.  
 From the perspective of many writers, political activists, and intellectuals, the 
Tudeh Party contributed significantly to the defeat of Mosaddegh by withdrawing their 
support precisely at the moment when he needed it most.346 Their political positions and 
actions that had been based on a Soviet connection literally pushed the Tudeh Party out 
of the political picture. Leadership’s mistake caused the arrest and incarceration of 
hundreds of supporters and members.347 Hundreds received life-sentences and dozens 
were executed. Many splits occurred within the party. Meanwhile, the government began 
a widespread campaign of labeling the Tudeh Party as a Soviet puppet and agent. Many 
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who were not arrested fled to Europe, mostly to East Germany, with the help of the 
Soviets.   
In 1962, four former members returned to Iran to start a new organization 
consisting of what remained of old members and supporters. By 1963, they managed to 
create a new publication called the Appendix to Mardom (zamime-ye mardom) through 
which many lost members were able to reestablish their connections with the party. For 
the first time, Tudeh voiced its sympathy for clerics and the movement led by the clergy. 
They called the uprising, led by Khomeini in 1963, an “uprising of anger and revenge 
against the Shah.” They praised all clerics involved and reiterated the necessity for all 
opposition groups to unite. By 1966, many members were arrested. This resulted in a 
dissipation of members and supporters, and again led to a period of inactivity. It was not 
until early 1970s that the Tudeh regrouped once again and published four different organs 
under the names Navid, Mardom, Donya, and Sho’le, meaning “good news,” “people,” 
“world” and “flame” respectively. By the summer of 1975, several years short of the 
1979 revolution, they announced their ideology of Marxism-Leninism.348 During these 
years, heady discussions between Tudeh and Fadaee guerillas and the Mojahedin took 
place. Until 1978, the Tudeh Party remained an underground organization; two days after 
the revolution, it surfaced and announced its reemergence. The party mostly advised 
groups to stay away from armed struggle because it would only contribute to their 
martyrdom in vain. Two months before the February revolution, they wrote: 
Our primary and most important responsibility of the party is to work 
comprehensively with popular forces and mostly with forces led by Ayatollah 
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Khomeini. It is our duty to warn people about potential threats while we defend 
the progressive government of Bazargan and his national[ist] government.349
 
Anti-national bourgeoisie and anti-Islam in the 1950s, the Tudeh Party had turned 
completely around in support of both during the 1979 revolution. As discussed in the 
following sections, the Tudeh Party, of all the Marxist organizations, came closest to 
converging Marxism with an Islamic ideology. 
 
Tudeh and the Soviet Union 
Historically, ever since its inception, there had been a peculiar, yet robust and 
persistent, relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union. This relationship 
has always been a “major point of controversy in the history of the Iranian communist 
movement.”350 Different political entities have generated various views on the Tudeh 
Party. The Shah’s regime, and also the government of the Islamic Republic, both believed 
the party to consist of spies working directly for the Soviets. Groups within the 
opposition, both Marxist and non-Marxist, were less conspiracy-driven and analyzed the 
Tudeh Party more politically. They believed that the Tudeh Party was so ideologically 
dependent on the Soviets that they were copying Soviet policies and interests despite the 
necessities of the Iranian working class and the oppressed. Although the close 
connections between the Tudeh Party and the Soviets had been clearly shown, the extent 
and nature of the relationship was never clear. That is, who was influencing whom? As 
quoted by Behrooz from one of the Tudeh Party’s original leaders, Avanessian, the 
Comintern outlined the Tudeh Party’s policy, which was to “fight against fascism 
through propaganda and other means; to fight for the establishment of democracy; and to 
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make the Iranian people understand that the Soviet government only wanted their well-
being and freedom.”351
 Extant factions within the party also had different views on the Soviet influence. 
The two prominent leaders, Kianuri and Tabari, felt that the party was an extension of the 
CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Eskandari, however, thought of Tudeh as 
more independent. According to Eskandari, “The Soviets had different departments in 
their government that sometimes pursued contradictory policies.”352 He claimed that “as 
long as Tudeh was operating inside Iran and had a mass following, the Soviet influence 
was less, but that after exile between 1960 and 1979, [when party leadership fled to] first 
the Soviet Union then the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the influence 
increased.”353 Connections between the 1953 coup and the Soviets can only be speculated 
upon since there are minimal sources of information. Joseph Stalin’s death five months  
prior to the coup to overthrow Mosddegh’s government may have affected both entities. 
His death caused political instability in the CPSU. Different factions of the CPSU had 
started their own internal struggle to fill the vacuum left by Stalin. At the same time, the 
Tudeh Party was affected in their directives from CPSU. This may “explain the paralysis 
of the party [Tudeh] leadership in confronting 1953 coup.”354 According to Kinzer, the 
Tudeh Party’s lack of participation in defending Mosaddegh during the coup was also 
directly related the Soviet’s non-participation, but this time, like most of the world’s 
Communist Parties, Tudeh was controlled by the Soviet Union, and in times of crisis it 
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followed orders from Moscow. On this day, however, no orders came. Stalin had died 
several months earlier and the Kremlin remained in turmoil. Soviet intelligence officers 
who would normally have been concentrating on Iran were preoccupied with the more 
urgent challenge of staying alive.355
Political turmoil in the Soviet Union and a CIA coup in Iran contributed to the 
demise of not only the Tudeh Party but generally the Marxist left in Iran. As Kinzer puts 
it: 
Undoubtedly, there would have been no coup in August 1953 if not for the CIA. 
The CIA devised Operation Ajax, paid a large sum to carry it out—estimates of 
the final cost range from $1 million to $20 million, depending on which 
experiences are counted—and assigned one of its most imaginative agents to 
direct it.356
  
There are also some accounts of an infiltration of the CIA in the Tudeh Party. The 
CIA “had infiltrated the Tudeh at a very high level during the coup period, and the 
Lankarani brothers [Tudeh members] were in fact MI-6 [British equivalent of the CIA] 
agents.”357 As far as party politics toward Mosaddegh were concerned, “leaders of the 
Tudeh Party took their orders from the Soviet Union, and the Feudal reactionaries were in 
connection with the Brits and the Americans, and both these groups acted against the 
interests of the country [Iran].”358  
 After the 1979 revolution, the Tudeh Party admitted to mistakes they had made 
during and after the 1953 coup. They held their leadership responsible, yet never 
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mentioned the Soviet role or lack thereof in the coup. Nejati quotes from one of the 
documents published by the Tudeh Party after the 1979 revolution: 
Not knowing the national bourgeoisie in Iran, not realizing its nature, and not 
recognizing the anti-imperialist characteristics of the National Front caused our 
party to make great mistakes. …The party leadership, instead of defending 
nationalization of the oil industry throughout the country, which was supported by 
masses of people and a common ground among all anti-imperialist forces, came 
up with the slogan to nationalize the Southern oil fields and nullify the pact [made 
with Britain] vis-à-vis the National Front’s demands.359
 
What the above quotation neglects to mention is the Northern oil fields that were 
contracted out to the Soviets. So when it came to nationalization of oil in Iran, the Tudeh 
Party was still partial toward the Soviets. As more books were written by former and 
current members of the Tudeh Party after the 1979 revolution, the role of the Soviets and 
their influence in the party became clearer. As discussed below, the Soviets may have 
perceived the Tudeh Party as their agents in Iran in a geopolitical context. Knowing full 
well that the Iranian government had in mind the interests of Britain and the United 
States, the Soviets did not entirely give up on the Shah. They maintained a close 
relationship with his government while they influenced the Tudeh Party to act on their 
behalf. This paradoxical relationship between the Soviets, the Shah’s government, and 
the Tudeh Party was seriously questioned by emerging Marxists. The Sino-Soviet conflict 
and China’s alternative to Soviet peaceful coexistence, in addition to important victories 
in liberation movements worldwide, deeply affected new and youthful Marxists. They 
were thinking of new means—other than legal and constitutional struggles, to overthrow 
the confident dictator. The new Marxists moved away from a Tudeh-like organization 
only able to function under legal and semi-legal conditions, and dependent on foreign 
powers, to one independent of outside influences and conditioned to operate under the 
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extreme repression of a police state. A reverence for the Bolshevik revolution, a hallmark 
of the previous generation, was diluted by the experience of Chinese, Cuban, Algerian, 
and Vietnamese revolutions.360  
Several questions may be raised on the relationship between the Tudeh Party and 
the soviets. Who consulted whom on the matters of Iranian politics? Did the Tudeh Party 
play a more significant role in determining Soviet attitudes toward Iran or were they mere 
agents of the Soviets? 
This intriguing relationship is crystallized through the following events. A reform 
group that split from the Tudeh Party in 1948 released a communiqué in which they 
stated that Tudeh’s program should be appropriate for Iran’s socioeconomic conditions 
and not simply another copy of the socialist countries. The fate of the reform group was 
sealed, according to Behrooz, when “the Soviets condemned it…Many who joined the 
group started to desert once the Soviet position became clear. The group virtually ceased 
to exist after the Soviet condemnation.”361 Similar unpopularity of the Soviets surfaced 
when they abandoned the Iranian Gilan Republic and supported the Iranian government. 
Such sentiment was enhanced several decades later when the Soviets refused to support 
the nationalist movement led by Mosaddegh. However, diligent members did not cease to 
protect Soviet foreign policy. Tabari, a prominent and fleeing member of the Tudeh Party 
at the time, published an article in the party journal suggesting that all governments had a 
sphere of influence in Iran, including the Soviets. He claimed that “If the American 
government, as we mentioned, is after spheres of influence, and is interested in being 
strongly engaged in the post-war politics and wants its companies to explore the 
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Baluchestan oilfields, then it is quite natural that our northern neighbor, in its 
international interest, do the same.”362
Many believed the 1953 coup that brought the Shah back into power could have 
failed had the Tudeh Party resisted. Behrooz quoting Jazani on the 1953 coup stated: 
The August 19th onslaught could have become a turning point for intensifying the 
struggle and for the passing of the movement from a political phase to a military 
one. Had the head the Tudeh Party, with its inadequate forces, chosen to resist 
between August 17th and 22nd, [they] might have been able to defeat the coup. 
This resistance could have become the beginning of a revolutionary movement for 
mobilizing and arming masses for a people’s war against the enemy.363  
 
While the Soviets were condemning those who split from the Tudeh party, other 
conflicts were broiling. The Tudeh Party’s support for the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute and other disagreements caused yet another split. The Revolutionary 
Organization of the Tudeh Party of Iran split from the Tudeh Party and defended China’s 
position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This group was against Khrushchev’s de-
Stalinization and the Soviet Communist Party’s peaceful co-existence thesis. 
A contributing factor in a popular criticism of the Soviets, and thus Marxism and 
communism, was the relationship between the Soviets and the Shah’s regime. This led to 
the proposal for an armed struggle, which increased in the 1970s. Jazani comments on 
this relationship: 
In this new situation, the Soviets gave their support to the land reform program. 
Soon after, the economic relations between the two countries [the Soviet Union 
and Iran] expanded greatly…meaning that right at a time when the regime was 
repressing the people and strengthening the dictatorship, a honeymoon between 
Iran and the Soviets was starting. This development proved, once more, that the 
Iranian revolutionary movement must take an independent path, vis-à-vis Soviet 
politics or any other foreign powers, and rely on the power of the people. [This is 
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so] since the Soviets and other powers and world movements have ignored the 
interests of our movement and have coordinated their relations with Iran 
according to their own interests.364
  
While the Tudeh Party reported to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it was the 
Soviets that made the final decisions. And it was the Tudeh Party that took directives 
from the Soviets during most of its activities in Iran. For the Iranian masses, the Soviet 
Union and the Tudeh Party represented Marxism and communism.  
 The Tudeh Party was one of the major organizations that converted to political 
Islam and accepted an Islamic Republic as a legitimate political alternative. They 
defended Islam and the Islamic government until they became the victims of political 
persecutions and widespread suppression. In the eyes of Iranians, however, the 
relationship between the Tudeh Party and the Islamic Republic regime was imbued with 
skepticism, and the Tudeh Party’s defense of political Islam was constantly criticized by 
many other Marxist groups.   
 
The Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (OIPFG) 
Among the new Marxist theoreticians was Masoud Ahmadzadeh. In his book, 
Armed Struggle: Both Strategy and Tactic, he wrote: 
To defeat reactionaries, we need to mobilize peasants into the struggle. The only 
way to defeat reaction is to defeat the reactionary army and to build the people’s 
army in a protracted guerilla war. And guerilla war is not only necessary as a 
military strategy in order to defeat the conventional army but also as a political 
strategy in order to mobilize the masses. …This is the lesson we learned not only 
from Cuban but Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary wars. Can anyone claim 
that Chinese masses were conscious before [their revolutionary war] that they had 
realized the necessity of armed struggle?365
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  This new generation of Marxists seemed to be more confident, more daring, and 
ready to become martyrs at any given point. Many members of the Mojahedin and 
Fadaeean carried cyanide under their tongues, ready to be broken in case they were 
captured. They were independent, not expecting help from any foreign powers. They 
strongly criticized the Tudeh Party and ridiculed its conciliatory policies toward the Shah. 
Nothing short of an armed struggle was acceptable in the face of the Shah’s despotism. 
As Ahmadzadeh reminded the young revolutionaries in his book:  
How can we set the foundations of a movement, the path through which the 
masses will realize their own interests, realize their invincibility and enormous 
power, and be drawn into the struggle? How can we penetrate the large dam 
[barrier] of suppression that has made progressive leadership useless, [that has 
reinforced] the regime’s propaganda against intellectuals and people, that has 
caused a rift between the necessity of a struggle and struggle itself, and [how do 
we] guarantee the release of the vast flood of the masses? The only way is armed 
action.366
 
 Further, it was not only the new generation Marxists who questioned the old 
Tudeh Party and its conciliatory policies toward the Shah. Muslim revolutionary forces as 
well no longer found mere words of clerics or the National Front to be effective in the 
face of the Shah’s repressive military and secret police. Bazargan predicted the proximity 
of the coming radical movement: “We are the last to politically struggle in accordance 
with the constitution [the law]. We expect the head of this court to convey this point to 
his superiors.”367
Muslim organizations, specifically the Mojahedin, proved Bazargan right. Their 
armed struggle, which began in the early 1970s following the Marxist organizations, was 
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much more radical and by no means constitutional or legal compared to those in the past. 
One could say that both new generation Marxists and Muslims had moved away from 
their traditional movements. New Marxists criticized and distanced themselves from the 
Soviets and their local branch, Tudeh, while new Muslims criticized and separated 
themselves from the clerics and other Muslim groups.  
The Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e chereekha-ye 
fadaee-e khalgh-e Iran) was founded in 1971 by the joining of two groups whose 
activities went back to the 1960s. The first group was established in the summer of 1966 
at Tehran University with the help of six students;368 it was later called Jazani Group.369 
Its members studied techniques of armed struggle for a year. In 1967, due to the 
penetration of an informer, a former Tudeh party member who was working for the 
SAVAK, most members except two were arrested. Farahani and Ashtiani were able to 
flee to Lebanon, where they received some training at PLO camps. Farahani returned to 
Iran in 1969 and was able to locate three other members. After finding revolutionary 
conditions ripe in Iran, he returned there in 1970 with the necessary arms. The newly 
formed group took on two important tasks at this time. First they started a long study of 
rural areas in the Northern provinces; second they established contact with another 
Marxist group that was also working toward an armed action against the regime.  
 This second group had also started reading Marxist works from different parts of the 
world. They were especially interested in the Algerian, Cuban, and Chinese revolutions, 
plus the Vietnam War and the Vietcong armed struggle. Masoud Ahmadzadeh and Amir 
Parviz Pouyan were the group’s main organizers and theorists. They had written books on 
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how an armed struggle could bring about a strategic and long-term revolution to the 
country. They were both born and raised in the Muslim holy city of Mashad. 
Ahmadzadeh’s father, a well-known religious man, was among the intellectuals of 
Mashad who organized meetings and protests against the Shah. He ardently defended 
Mosaddegh and his nationalist ideas, and became even more active in political 
movements after the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh’s government. When the Shah was 
put back in power through the CIA’s covert actions,370 Ahmadzadeh’s family announced 
their solidarity with both the Liberation Movement (Nehzat-e-Azadi) and the Resistance 
Movement (nehzat-e-moghavemat), both of which were inclined towards Islam. 
 When Masoud Ahmadzadeh was in high school in Mashad, he organized the Society of 
Islamic Students, which announced its solidarity with the National Front. At eighteen, he 
started his university education in Tehran. During his second year in university in 1967, 
he, along with several other students, initiated a new underground organization with 
Marxist inclinations. They began their study sessions on revolutionary writings of Latin 
America, studying Regis Debray, a French leftist who wrote on the Cuban revolution,371 
and Carlos Marighella, who wrote, Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla.372 They also 
studied Che Guevara, the Argentine revolutionary. In 1970 Ahmadzadeh, as the main 
theorist of the Fadaeean, wrote his book on the necessities of an armed struggle, Armed 
Struggle, both Strategy and Tactic. 
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 Amir Parviz Pouyan, who was Ahmadzadeh’s close friend, also joined his group in 
Tehran while he was attending another university. He too was originally active in Islamic 
societies. He later developed Marxist tendencies and joined Ahmadzadeh’s group. He 
defended the Cuban revolution and Latin American revolutionaries. He developed a 
belief in armed struggle and felt that a revolutionary’s first duty is to fight selflessly 
without the fear of losing his life. In his book, The Necessity of Armed Struggle and 
Refutation of Theory of Survival, he reiterated this idea. In it, he fundamentally dispensed 
with the notion of preserving the lives of leading figures in a revolutionary 
organization.373 He therefore laid out the idea of martyrdom as a guarantee to the survival 
of a revolutionary line. Although other Marxists believed and practiced martyrdom 
during their revolutionary lives before, Pouyan, was the first to put the phenomenon in 
theoretical-ideological perspective. It was not merely giving one’s life for the cause; 
rather, doing so would: 
a) Demonstrate vulnerability of the Shah’s regime 
b) Impact the population who believed in the “two absolutes”374 with entirely 
different effects compared to merely legal and political activity  
c) Prove an irrevocable path of struggle of the Marxist guerillas 
d) Encourage the masses to participate in a struggle that essentially belongs 
to them  
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374 The “two absolutes” were, according to Pouyan, 1) The Masses’ belief in the absolute and undefeatable 
power of the Shah’s military, and 2) Their own absolute powerlessness in defeating the Shah and his 
military. 
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The Marxist formulation of martyrdom put a more rational and political cloak on 
the phenomenon. The concept of sacrificing one’s life for the cause, nonetheless, 
remained consistent as the theological concept of martyrdom in Islam. Consequences of 
martyrdom and what it would achieve were different, but the necessity of giving life for 
the cause remained the same.  
Consisting mostly of university students, the two groups established contact and 
set the foundation for one of Iran’s largest Marxist organizations. This group, with its 
strict belief in armed struggle, began its practice of revolutionary theory in 1970. In the 
fall of that year, one of the groups affiliated with Ahmadzadeh and his friends robbed a 
bank in a populated area of Tehran (Vanak) and got away with 1,600,000 rials (close to 
$23,000). The money allowed the two groups, Ahmadzadeh and Jazani, to support a 
coalition formed to conduct the first armed attack on the Shah’s regime.  
 A third group, led by Farahani, began an exploration of the Iran’s Northern provinces 
(Gilan and Mazandaran). After a six-month study of the region, including both forests 
and mountains, they announced a tentative date to begin their attack. A total of 33 
guerillas were to form both rural and urban forces. According to their theory, the rural 
team could survive only if supported by the urban team. They split up accordingly and 
began their work. Their original plan was to attack a police precinct in an area called 
Siahkal, confiscate their arms and ammunition, and swiftly flee the area. They labeled the 
action “armed propaganda.” It was to break what Pouyan had referred to as the two 
absolutes. Theoretically, people observing such brave sacrifices by the guerillas would 
consciously rid themselves of both absolutes. 
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 While the attack was perceived as successful by the group, since they confiscated arms 
from the precinct, some complications arose.  They were surrounded by the police force 
in this mountainous region. With minimal food and ammunition, they were able to fight 
off the military up to 29 days. Delaying their arrest for so long helped the group achieve 
one of its goals. The entire population of the region learned of their political agenda. 
However, contrary to their belief, that did not necessarily translate into popular sympathy 
for the group. Due to lack of cooperation on the part of the rural population, many of the 
guerillas were held captive until military backup arrived. Ultimately, 17 out of 33 were 
arrested and later executed. 
 
Marxist Mojahedin (Paykar) sazman-e paykar dar rah-e azadi-e tabaghe-ye kargar 
The Organization of Combat for Emancipation of the Working Class 
 
Islamic movements, not only in Iran, but elsewhere in the Middle East, have been 
able to put forth guidelines for struggle, and have led people’s struggles using an Islamic 
ideology. In the case of Marxist Mojahedin, later called Paykar, Islam had apparently 
fallen short of becoming a revolutionary praxis. Several factors contributed to this, 
although these were never thoroughly explained by either side. 
By 1974, most members of the Mojahedin were studying revolutions led 
predominantly by Marxists; these included Cuba, China, Algeria, and the Vietnamese 
Communist Party fighting against the U.S. military. By mid-1974, there were talks about 
converging Marxist ideology with Islamic ethics. In an abrupt move, in the fall of 1975, a 
published paper announced a change in the organization’s ideology. It claimed the 
following:  
After four years of armed struggle and two years of political and ideological 
discussion, we have reached a decision that Marxism is the only true 
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revolutionary philosophy. …We first thought of combining Marxism with Islam 
and accepting historical determinism without dialectical materialism, but now we 
know that this is impossible. …We chose Marxism because it is the true path to 
liberate an oppressed working class…because Islam, due to its belief in God, 
Prophecy, and Armageddon, cannot be a dynamic social force and [cannot] bring 
victory and emancipate toilers and the oppressed (workers and peasants) from 
oppressive structures of society, constructing a new society without oppression 
and exploitation where classes do not exist. Therefore, a classless society and 
refutation of all exploitation and oppression is not objectively achievable through 
Islam.375
 
The arrest and execution of original members of the Mojahedin probably 
contributed immensely to the conflict between Marxists and Muslims within the group. 
Muslims, who were forced to organize themselves in a new group, were from then on 
called the Muslim Mojahedin, and Marxists continued—since they were the majority—
with the same name, the Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin. Later, just before 
the 1979 revolution, they were referred to as the Marxist-Leninist faction of 
Mojahedin.376 During the revolution they combined forces with other Maoist 
organizations and picked an entirely different name for the group. In February 1979, the 
group officially changed its name to the Organization of Paykar (Combat) for the 
Liberation of the Working Class, or simply Paykar, a word meaning combat or fight. 
Marxist Mojahedin, not yet known as Paykar, declared its conversion to Marxism in 
September 1975. In their first publication they stated: 
In the beginning we thought it possible to combine Marxism and Islam and 
accepted the philosophy of historical determinism without dialectical materialism. 
Now we realize that this thought is impossible…we chose Marxism because it is 
the correct and realistic path for the liberation of the exploited working class.377
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In a paper distributed just after the revolution, Muslim Mojahedin accused the 
Marxist faction of treason, opportunism, and fratricide. They accused them of being anti-
Islam and anti-revolution: 
There is no doubt that an opportunist betraying faction, with a leftist facade, has 
dominated the Organization of the Mojahedin through an anti-revolutionary coup. 
[They] have taken a position against the people’s liberation movement in favor of 
Imperialism. …Its opportunistic nature, through a sick and psychopathic way 
devoid of all principle and ethics, was exposed to all by their traitor leaders.378
 
In another paper, the Muslim Mojahedin compares the Marxist faction of holding 
the same position as Shah’s regime. They mention Islam’s revolutionary nature and put 
their ideas into an Islamic context. 
Is it not the case that Red Shi’ism, which is the real face of Islam, has consistently 
in its pure belief [of classless society] been the guideline of all of the oppressed 
on earth (verse 5, Ghassass [of the Koran]), and has it not inspired them [the 
oppressed] to ‘wait’ for this period? Now if we truly and steadfastly believe in our 
cause, we should have no fear of labels such as ‘confused’ or an Aryamehri 
[referring to the Shah’s phrase] label such as ‘Islamic Marxism.’379
 
The existence of a Marxist faction within the Mojahedin, and its sudden 
secession, was not a complete surprise. Since1973, ample political discussions had been 
taking place within the group.380 According to Nejati, since no conclusions were reached, 
most members decided to treat this faction with a consensual silence.381 Ironically, many 
of those who joined the Marxist faction were quite religious and had pious family 
backgrounds. Therefore, the split between the Marxists and Muslims within the 
Mojahedin also caused splits within families. Husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, 
and fathers and sons took sides against each other for either Marxism or Islam.  
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 Paykar, which had its own peculiar strand of Marxism, continuously vacillated between 
Marxism and Islam. Its main ideological mentor was Enver Hoxha, leader of the 
Communist Party of Albania. This group rejected both the Soviet type and the Chinese 
variety of Marxism. According to Behrooz: 
Post-Mao reforms in China [were] extremely hostile to both Soviet Union and 
China. Although they considered the United States the main enemy of the 
revolutionary movement in Iran, they called the Soviet Union a socialist-
imperialist power, the Tudeh a Soviet fifth column, and considered the Soviet 
threat imminent.382
 
Paykar, despite its many leftist positions, in fact became more conciliatory toward the 
new government of the Islamic Republic. It participated in elections for the council of 
experts (males-e khobregan), which designed the Islamic constitution. By 1982, however, 
the organization had dismantled. Many of its leaders were arrested and later executed by 
the Islamic Republic. The most severe setback occurred when two of its leaders, Rohani 
and Sepasi, were arrested. While Sepasi died under arrest, Rohani cooperated with the 
Islamic Republic until his execution in the mid-1980s.383
In hindsight, several reasons may account for this duality and the subsequent split 
within the Mojahedin. First was the death of many of the original leaders. Four of the 
important founding members of the Mojahedin had been killed by 1972. Badizadegan, 
probably the most prolific writer in the group, was killed by the SAVAK in 1971. This 
was a great blow to the articulation and creation of ideology for the group. In the same 
year, 69 members were arrested, leaving the organization devoid of leadership.384 With 
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the exception of Rezaee, all central committee members, a total of 11, were arrested, 
removing the group’s elite. They were the ones who had generated ideas and theories for 
the organization and who were the politically active members. This left the group 
vulnerable to attacks from outside and inside and prepared a fertile ground for Marxist 
leaders and their takeover. Secondly, the original leaders had wanted to achieve a Marxist 
program, giving Marxists within the Mojahedin a reason to exist. After the attack by 
Marxist guerillas in Siahkal in the winter of 1971, entirely new conditions prevailed 
within Iran’s left for any group serious in its opposition. Influenced by Siahkal, the 
Mojahedin, denouncing the Shah, felt compelled to take action that was equally, if not 
more, impressive. Parallel with their actions, Marxist ideas were also implemented to 
create an acceptable revolutionary program. Precedents for acceptability of this program 
had already been set by the actions of Siahkal. Anything short of that would seem 
insufficiently revolutionary. Siahkal forced the Mojahedin to hasten their armed 
activities.385 According to Mojahedin’s publication, Siahkal had mobilized the 
organization so that Fadaeean would not think they are the only vanguard of 
revolution.386
Another important factor was the opposition led by Marxists in the Middle 
Eastern countries, and more generally in the Third World. Revolutions in Cuba, Vietnam, 
China, and revolutionary movements in Latin America, especially those of urban guerilla 
movements such as the Tupa Maru in Uruguay, were mostly Marxist and rarely religious 
at the time. Consequently, prevalent ideas of resistance moved forward mostly through 
Marxist theories of revolution. This also contributed to huge volumes of available 
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literature generated by the world’s Marxists. Even Shariati, who was educated in France, 
was influenced by thoughts of Sartre and Fanon. In this period, Islamic revolutionary 
literature, particularly literature of armed struggle, was rare – almost nonexistent. If 
revolutionary Islamic theory was to be taken seriously, it had to be originally produced 
by these groups themselves. This may explain why the Muslim sector of the Mojahedin 
was not as well equipped to conduct coherent discourse with the Marxist faction. Classics 
of Islam, such as the Koran, Hadith, and even Shariati’s work were not sufficient to 
delineate strategies for revolution or tactics of armed struggle. 
 As shown in this chapter, three major Marxist groups in Iran were in some way 
affiliated with Islam and the Islamic movement. Islam could be found in their family 
backgrounds with fathers and grandfathers as clergy, such as Kianuri and Tabari. Or they 
came from a specific Islamic organization, as in the case of the Fadaee Guerillas. With 
Paykar, they were Muslims who turned Marxist, having split from the Mojahedin, a 
major Muslim organization. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Most decisively in the confrontation between the Marxists and the Islamist leadership of 
the revolution, the Marxists were utterly out-maneuvered by the Islamists on two issues, 
radicalism and anti-imperialism 
 Maziar Behrooz 
                                                                                                
 Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, political movements in the Middle East 
were organized against the western oppressors. Nationalism was the leading just cause 
connecting all those who opposed the local despots and their western supporters. 
Nationalist movements in the Middle East utilized secularism, Marxism, and socialism in 
their political struggles. Among these individuals and groups were Muslims; nonetheless, 
their nationalist zeal was organized through secular, socialist, and Marxist thought. The 
National Front in Iran, the Ba’athist Party in Iraq and Syria, Kamal Abdul Nassser in 
Egypt, several groups within the PLO in Palestine, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan 
in both Iran and Iraq exemplified the influence of Marxist thought in the Middle East. In 
Iran for much of this period, Muslims, e.g., Mojahedin, Dr. Shariati, the National Front, 
and the Liberation Movement, borrowed from Marxist ideas to propagate their political 
agenda. It was quite different for Iranian Marxists however. On the surface they did not 
borrow from Islam, but deep within their version of Iranian Marxism strong Islamic 
values were found. 
Iranian Marxists looked toward the overthrow of the Shah’s regime and 
establishment of an independent social democratic state – a state that was at the same 
time anti-imperialist. Muslims too thought of the Shah as an American lackey and were 
looking for an independent, anti-imperialist state. The Shah’s disdain toward the people 
would explain the reason that Muslims and Marxists found common grounds for 
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solidarity based on short-term political goals. Through this solidarity they were able to 
achieve their political goal and overthrow the Shah’s regime. The outcome, however, 
demonstrated the dominance of Islam and Islamic thought among Iranians.    
The Shah’s modernization unlike the modernized European model which resulted 
in the building of a strong infrastructure was more of an empty shell. His regime’s 
modernization process was forced on Iranians from the top down and contained no real 
infrastructure. Productive forces were precarious, sporadic and irregular; they were 
almost absent in terms of creating any meaningful social force. Infrastructure was not 
built, and not even a solid capitalist class was formed. There were no modern private 
capitalist and petite bourgeois social structures. The social relations that had been 
implanted from above proved not to be viable. The Shah’s White Revolution, which 
supposedly gave land to the peasants, forced a significant number of them off their land 
and into the cities looking for work. Unlike in some Latin American countries, the state 
did not act to build a viable infrastructure. The peasant migrants were not able to find 
jobs in the cities and therefore became marginalized. These marginalized people were 
disconnected from their class and were not able to forge new social bonds. Their way of 
life was uncertain, to say the least. 
The first-generation urban migrants became the main opposition force who gave 
their fundamental and unconditional support to an Islamic authority. They transferred 
their long-established belief system of Islam, with its patriarchal and traditional values, 
into the cities, creating the basis for one of the strongest Islamic mass movements in the 
Middle East. This created a fertile ground and the seeds of a revolution. In a peculiar 
way, the Shah helped build the same social force that would years later produce his 
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overthrow. For most Iranians, salvation came with Islam. Mosques became the only place 
where it was possible to criticize the Shah’s regime. Although Marxists fought hard, they 
were not able to create the social bonds in their organizational efforts or even in their 
vernacular to make the necessary connection to the masses. The Shah’s simulated 
modernization (development) did not get rid of religion; rather it strengthened Islamic 
ideas and values. The significance and prestige of Islam in the process of feigned 
modernization was increased, not diminished.  
Marxists in Iran did not criticize the religiosity of the masses and religious leaders 
because they held the same values. This revolution was not a criticism of the past; it was 
to welcome the past. It left almost no room for criticism of the traditions and the illusions 
created by religion. To be sure, Marxists were thinking of ways to interact with the 
masses through more religion, not less.  
The resentment toward the United States, Britain, and the local despot created a 
common denominator to organize a resistance movement that eventually led to the 1979 
revolution. Even though non-Islamic groups – Marxists and seculars – actively 
participated, the revolution was dubbed an ‘Islamic Revolution.’ Islamic beliefs and 
understandings prevailed in most realms of politics and in the culture of the opposition. 
As Esposito puts it: 
Shi’a Islam proved that it is a most deep-rooted and everlasting tool to mobilize 
an effective mass movement and that it is able to create the meaning for identity 
and history, common values and beliefs for a strong political-religious leadership. 
Shi’a Islam offered an ideological framework through which it gave meaning and 
legitimization to the movement of repressed and the oppressed against any 
reactionary force, such that many diverse groups were able to join in and become 
active. Clerics like Khomeini, Mottahari, Taleghani, and Beheshti, in collusion 
 192
with non-cleric ideologies like Bazargan and Shariati, were able to establish 
revolutionary and reformist ideologies.387
 
Esposito does not mention Marxist groups in the above quotation. Was it because they 
blended in so well, or because they did not significantly contribute to the revolution?  
Iranian Marxists were organized into several groups and were influential in 
shaping the Iranian political discourse, especially in the 1970s; they became one of the 
most serious forces within the opposition. There were more Marxists killed in armed 
conflict, torture and execution than any other group.388 In the opposition against the Shah, 
they played a major role in all aspects of creating an ideology, organization, and 
mobilization of the masses. Although they were not monolithic by any means, they held 
many beliefs in common with each other and also with Muslim opposition groups. 
Despite all of their contributions to the movement, however, Marxists were never 
thoroughly accepted by the Iranian masses as a force that could fulfill the ethics and 
belief systems of the Iranian culture. Marxists found themselves accepting the Islamic 
ethics and beliefs as an unchangeable social fact. They had major theoretical differences 
with the Muslims, yet unknowingly held many common beliefs. They converged with the 
Muslims contrary to their Marxist beliefs, actually becoming Muslims. This research has 
shown that in many ways, Iranian Marxists never abandoned their Islamic beliefs, but 
accepted Marxism merely on theoretical grounds. Marxists’ use of Islamic beliefs and 
values was two-fold: contextual and ideological. Contextual Islam includes the way 
social relationships are concretized through socialization processes e.g., education, 
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family, mosque, religious rituals, etc. Ideological Islam includes accepting Islamic ideas, 
and social and political analysis, as ideal. 
 
An Examination of Contextual Islam through Sociology of Knowledge 
Contextual Islam, for the Iranian masses, for Marxists, and even the ruling class 
including the Shah is intersubjective, internalized so deeply it becomes the way of life. It 
is what Iranians have internalized to be subjective tool to analyze the world around them. 
The sociology of knowledge as a methodology can be used to dissect and demonstrate the 
ubiquity and intensity of Islamic belief. It reveals the origins of Marxism and its 
immersion in Islam from the conception of this school of thought. Marxism in Iran has 
been influenced by Islam dating back to 1920. Once the trajectory of the Marxist 
movement is examined, its modes of thought are understood as a part of the history of 
Iranian opposition. The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge in examining 
contextual Islam is that there are modes of thought that cannot be sufficiently understood 
as long as their social origins are not clear. It was indeed true that Marxist organizations 
were theorizing on the sociopolitical conditions in Iran without realizing that they were 
living amidst those sociopolitical conditions. There was no such metaphysical entity as a 
social mind, which thought over and above the heads of these organizations, or whose 
ideas the group merely reproduced. According to Mannheim, sociology of knowledge 
seeks to comprehend thought in the concrete setting of a historical-social situation. Not 
many original ideas emerge outside of this history. Thus, it was not Marxist groups in 
general or even isolated individuals within these groups who did the thinking; rather it 
was certain Islamic values that developed a particular style of thought in an endless series 
of responses to typical situations characterizing their common position. Historically, 
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responses to these typical situations were set forth by Muslims and were outside the 
Marxist discourse. However, it is incorrect to say that Iranian Marxists were not a product 
of their historical social conditioning. Rather, it is more correct to insist that they 
participated in thinking beyond what others had thought before them. Every group, 
whether Marxist or Muslim, was therefore in a dual sense predetermined by the fact of 
growing within a particular society. On the one hand, they existed in ready-made 
situations and on the other, they realized that in those situations there were patterns of 
thought and conduct. These patterns of Islamic conduct were so strongly rooted that not 
even Marxists were consciously aware of their existence.  
Social conditioning through Islam involved an internalization of the Islamic ethos 
even in the political realm. This also relates to Mannheim’s particular and total ideology. 
It made sense for Marxists to agree on particular ideological points with Muslims, 
tactically uniting to defeat the enemy. However, given the wide separation between the 
two schools of thought in constructing ideal societies and the states that run them, it was 
counter intuitive when they collaborated in total ideology. 
Peter L. Berger’s sacred canopy further illuminates the Islamic belief and ethos in 
a country such as Iran. The sacred canopy of Islam, according to Berger’s concept, was 
contextual for not just the clerics and the population, but also for Marxist intellectuals. 
That is, certain beliefs, in this case Islamic, became so prevalent and taken for granted 
that all activities were filtered, recognized, and managed through them. In the case of 
Iran, the argument is that Islamic behavior was not only reinforced by Muslims, who 
were influenced through Islam directly, but by Marxists as well. For instance, while 
Marxists had formed their political positions using general guidelines of secular political 
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Marxism, they were not able to shed the Islamic belief in martyrdom. Islamic belief in 
martyrdom became the canopy that hovered over all thought and all activity. Voluntarily 
sacrificing one’s life for an ultimate cause was a precondition of achieving a better 
society in both Muslim and Marxist thinking. For most Marxists, as depicted in their 
literature, martyrdom was a unit through which the authenticity of a revolutionary was 
measured. It guaranteed the movement’s future success.  
Generally, and consistent with Berger’s notion of a sacred canopy, Islam created 
meaning. It was what told people how to behave and presented a world view that had 
answers for all human problems.389 Islam became an organizing linchpin with a network 
of clergy. Through Islam they were able to resist and oppose inside and outside 
oppressors, to mobilize people, and to start revolutions. 
 
Ideological Islam 
In addition to the contextual Islamic belief, which was a part of life and political 
struggle for Marxists, there was also an ideological aspect to Marxists becoming 
Muslims. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the Tudeh Party and Majority Fadaeean were 
among those who deliberately used ideological Islam to achieve two objectives: the first 
was to get close to the masses, who mostly understood politics through Islamic 
terminology and ethics; the second was to get close to the newly established Islamic 
government. Alliance with the Islamic Republic guaranteed safety from persecution in 
addition to affiliation with political power.  
Marxists borrowed Islamic ideology to theorize the nature of the economy and 
politics of the enemy. Islamic beliefs were borrowed to organize the masses of people 
                                                 
389 Henry Munson. 1989. Islam and Revolution in the Middle East. Boston: Yale University Press. 
 196
and certainly to mobilize members and supporters. Without this ideological borrowing, 
Marxists would not have been able to create a discourse for their particular movement. 
There are quite a few contrary views on this matter. Given the extant Islamic culture and 
political activity of the Muslims, Skocpol claims that modern revolutionary parties, 
including the Mojahedin and Fadaeean, had nothing to do with revolution making. She 
believes that revolution was made through Islamic culture.390 Skocpol’s statements are 
true in relation to the days of the revolution, but not quite precise on the years leading up 
to the revolution. According to Nejati, the Mojahedin and Fadaeean fought against a 
regime that had suppressed all means of struggle. They “turned repressed conditions and 
hopelessness into hopefulness. They created a new political atmosphere and selflessly 
gave their lives where it was required. They created new values and new meaning, and 
cleared the path for revolution.”391  
As the revolution was occurring, Muslims were able to create avenues for the 
Iranian people to participate and join the revolutionary groups. However, since the early 
1970s, it was the Fadaee and Mojahedin guerillas that did most of the damage to the 
Shah’s regime. There is quite a difference between what Skocpol and Nejati claim about 
the revolution. It is explicable however, if we understand Nejati’s observation as relating 
to the seven years before the revolution and what led up to it, and Skocpol’s as the actual 
revolution itself.  
Agreeing with Skocpol, John Foran’s analysis also included culture more than 
secular political groups. He found the culture of resistance and its movement to be shared 
among, and result from the efforts of many diverse groups. It became clear that Muslims 
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and those who attached themselves to Islam created an ideology and a culture that 
corresponded to the experience of everyday life.392  
Forrest Colburn believes that revolutions have a political mind of their own, that 
they are not the consequences of particular economic conditions. Revolutions occur 
despite the economic background. Therefore there is a separation between economic 
development and political actors, especially those who lead revolutions. He claims that: 
“there is a tense mutuality between revolutionaries and the societies that created them; 
neither one can be deduced from the other. Economic history does not determine political 
history.”393 Colburn’s statement about the role of the intellectuals also holds true. He 
claims that the values, expectations, phraseology, iconography, and implicit rules 
expressed and shaped collective intentions and behavior in the Iranian revolution. Like 
other authors, he believes that Islam as a belief system, and Muslims as organizers, were 
better prepared to lead the masses: 
Several factors explain the success of Islam as a revolutionary force where 
Marxism-Leninism had failed. The clerics in Iran had a wider and more effective 
organizational base than the Marxists from which to mobilize popular opposition 
to the Shah. And Islam had a resonance and legitimacy with the entire population 
that Marxism-Leninism could only aspire to have. Finally, the moral authority of 
Islam protected the clerics from the kind of brutal suppression encountered earlier 
by secular organizations.394  
 
 Skocpol, Foran and Colburn have touched upon some social facts that are usually 
overlooked by researchers and social scientists who wrote about the Iranian revolution. 
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Although they neglect the role of Marxism and Marxists before the revolution, they 
concisely analyze the power of Islam and Muslims.  
 
Developing Common Terminology 
This research found concrete and historically sound common denominators and 
forces that converted Marxists into Islam. Although at many points of the Iranian 
opposition movement it may appear a mere convergence of ideas and that each converged 
as much as the other, it was Islam that prevailed. The contextual Islamic belief system 
disavowed the serious penetration of Marxian thought in Iran, yet they agreed on many 
points. Four factors facilitated Marxists convergence with Islam: 
1. An anti-despotism ideology (movement) against the Shah 
2. Anti-Imperialism, beginning with Britain and later against the United States 
3. A race to demonstrate the abilities of an authentic revolutionary 
4. The sacred canopy of Islamic ethics, especially that of martyrdom; the concept of 
Fadaee perceived as an inevitable method of struggle   
 
Due to these factors, common organizing tactics and political terminology 
emerged. Nationalists, Muslim clerics, and Marxists used the same language. Beginning 
in the 1960s, Khomeini, as one of the main opponents of the Shah’s White Revolution, 
linked a few political issues to add to the significance of resistance. He was able to 
concentrate an amalgam of issues into one overarching problem induced by the Shah’s 
regime. It included women’s right to vote (he argued that they should not have the right), 
land reform, and the Shah’s close and unholy alliance with the United States, Israel, and 
international corporations. He posed this concoction as a grave threat against Islam and 
the lives of Muslims in an independent Iran. He mentioned the U.S. as the main enemy of 
Islam in all his speeches. The real nature of the U.S., according to Khomeini, was 
noticeable in America’s foreign policy in the Middle East – supporting Israel and 
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exerting influence in Iran.  In a speech against both the Shah and the United States, he 
stated: 
The government of Iran has sold our independence, put us among the colonized 
countries and labeled Muslims inferior to animals. …If clerics had anything to do 
with it, they would not allow Iranians to be enslaved by England and the United 
States. If it were up to the clerics, they would not allow Israel to control Iran’s 
economy so that Israeli goods would be sold without tariffs. …Should we be 
under American boots because we are a weak people, because we do not have 
dollars? The United States is worse than England, England is worse than the 
United States, and the Soviet Union is worse than both…Today we have to deal 
with the United States.395
 
Such antagonism in terminology was not only used by the clerics. Many left-
leaning nationalists also had the same criticism of the West. Jalal Ale-Ahmad, a Marxist 
and former member of the Tudeh Party, warned Iranians of Westoxication (infected, 
poisoned, and intoxicated by the west): 
Westoxication, I say, is like being infected by cholera, or at least like putrefaction. 
Have you seen how it rots wheat? It is from the inside; the peel is still there but 
nothing remains inside. Just like the shell that’s left by the butterfly on the 
tree…and now under this banner, we remain an alienated tribe, [we are] alienated 
in our own clothes, our own homes, our own food, our literature, our journalism 
and most dangerously in our culture. We are developing Western-like [farangee-
moab] and Western-like we look for solutions to our problems.396
 
There were also Muslim intellectuals who mentioned the U.S. and the west in 
general as the real cause behind all social and economic ills in Iran. Doctor Ali Shariati 
attacked the west and used the same word, ‘Westoxication,’ in his writings: “Let us, 
comrades, dispose of Europe, let us end the nauseating imitation of Europe, and let us 
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betray Europe which speaks of humanity everywhere by suppressing human beings 
wherever it goes.”397
For all those in the opposition, the idea of western culture meant a corruption of 
Iranian and Muslim culture. Anti-west language and terminology was found in literature 
written by Marxists, Muslims and nationalists. The notion of the west lurking to invade 
Iran and Iranian culture created a common cause, which required collective ideas to 
foment action. It forced members of the opposition, as far apart as they may have seemed 
ideologically, to look for common grounds to oppose and overthrow the Shah. The 
following is an example of such amalgamation of forces. It involves Islamic clerics, a 
Marxist-Muslim group, and Marxist groups. Hojjat-ol eslam Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani,398 recalled how he originally met the Mojahedin in prison. It was the 
Mojahedin who told Rafsanjani about the Marxists and Marxism.  
They [Mojahedin] told me we have a common goal [with the Marxists]. We must 
be united and share all [capabilities organizing for the revolution]…but we 
[clerics] did not accept. One of their theorists gave a short analysis of the 
revolution that, we [Mojahedin] learned the science of struggle from the Marxists 
and without them victory is not possible. On the other hand in the Iranian society 
one cannot fight without emphasizing Islam. Therefore, we need to construct a 
bridge between Marxism and Islam, so we can have both the science of struggle 
and its foundation which is religion. [they came up with an] analysis of religion 
which found no contradiction with Marxism, and they kept repeating the same 
methodology that there must be a fusion between Marxism and Islam.399
 
Although Rafsanjani himself was never fond of Marxism, Marxists, or any left- 
leaning political ideology, he recalled the proximity of Marxists and Muslims insisted 
upon by the Mojahedin. Furthermore, it is important to note that he was willing to meet 
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with the Mojahedin to discuss solidarity with the Marxists. The Mojahedin saw Marxists 
as their close allies not so much because of their philosophy, but rather due to the 
common goal for which they were both striving. Iranian national independence was what 
drew the two schools of thought together.  
 
Theoretical Implications of this Dissertation 
 
An interesting concept to explore as the aftermath of the Iranian revolution is the 
state-centered theory of revolution put forth by Jeff Goodwin.400 Goodwin argues that 
states largely construct the revolutionary movements that challenge and sometimes 
overthrow them. The success of the revolution will depend on how much resistance the 
state puts up against the opposition and how suppressive state institutions are used to put 
out the flames of mass uprisings. In other words, there could be no modern revolution 
before there were states; nor could there be revolutions if and when the international state 
system is replaced by some other mode of governance.401 Part of what made the 
revolution in Iran a success, at least in the sense of overthrowing the old regime, was the 
Shah’s resistance to giving some democratic rights to the political opposition. He realized 
he should have been more lenient with the use of his oppressive police force a few 
months too late. Using Goodwin’s theory, one could conclude that giving some 
democratic rights to the population and practicing some leniency could have prevented 
the Iranian revolution from taking place, or at least reduced its magnitude.  
Goodwin’s state-centered theory also works in explaining why the Islamic 
Republic of Iran still remains in power. It is true that the post-revolutionary state has been 
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far more oppressive against its opposition than the Shah. For the past 28 years, Iranians 
have endured worse economic conditions and certainly more political repression than 
during the entire time the Pahlavi dynasty remained in power. Yet the Islamic 
government remains in power despite its opposition. What the Islamic regime has done 
successfully, in contrast to the Shah, is consider reform at the right moment. In the face 
of mass opposition, the Islamic Republic has stepped back and succumbed to some 
demands of the opposition. The process of presidential elections is an example of such 
conciliation. Were the Islamic government to suppress current social movements for 
reform, as the Shah had done, it would have surely fomented another social revolution in 
Iran. The post-revolutionary state has learned that suppressing movements at the wrong 
moment will bring about mass uprisings. In the past decade, the idea of Iranians voting 
for the president through so-called free elections is one example of such conciliation with 
mass political movements, albeit unorganized. Surely it seems a political paradox for a 
despotic regime to claim free elections of any kind.  
 
The Subordination of Class Struggle 
There is an irony in Marxists becoming Muslims. Marxists who accepted Islam 
ideologically did not foresee their shaky position in the new Islamic government. They 
anticipated secure positions of power within the state apparatus. However, they were 
disconnected from the Islamic government within two years after the revolution. Once 
the Islamic Republic of Iran was established, it proceeded to de-legitimize any type of 
opposition. All aspects of struggle were labeled as anti-Islam and anti-revolution when 
waged against the interests of the new state leadership. The clerics promoted an 
ideological polarization in the state system. Pitting Islam and revolution against all other 
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ideas as anti-revolution they justified nation-wide repression. At this point, any signs of 
class struggle would bring about severe punitive consequences.  
According to Giovanni Arrighi, et al, once national independence is attained, the 
use of this ideological separation means a further narrowing of the legitimacy of the class 
struggle in the new national government.402  
This tendency has two quite distinct roots. On the one hand we have regimes that 
have attempted to consolidate their power through an alliance with the political 
and economic elites of core zones. In this case, the class struggle was de-
legitimized as part of the political exchange between core and peripheral elites, 
whereby the former respect/protect the formal sovereignty of the latter in 
exchange for the latter’s creation within their national boundaries of an 
environment favorable to core capital. On the other hand, we have regimes that 
have the opposite route of struggle against core elites.403
 
In Iran, once revolution had reached its objectives of ousting the Shah and 
America, class struggle was no longer permitted. The Islamic regime branded all those 
who continued to struggle for nationalist, gender, class, or political rights, ‘anti-
revolution,’ and ‘anti-Islamic.’ Consequently, the class struggle within the country was 
de-legitimized as an obstacle to the former struggle of anti-imperialism, which was itself 
defined as class struggle at a higher level. 
Before the revolution, a moral authority of Islam protected the clerics from the 
kind of brutal suppression encountered earlier by secular organizations.404 The ubiquitous 
presence of Islamic belief within the population notwithstanding, there were a few events 
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that also worked to the advantage of the Islamic Republic. The hostage taking and the 
war against Iraq helped stabilize an unstable nascent government. 
According to Colburn, “The invasion of Iran by Iraq in September 1980 further 
strengthened the clerics and undermined the radicals [opposition]. Iranians were asked to 
join the revolutionary guards and the army to defend the ‘Islamic homeland.’”405 Had the 
Marxists been better prepared by forming their own coalition among working classes 
would the Islamic Republic of Iran still have remained immune from scrutiny?  
 A comparison of the information available on the social background of the Iranian 
Marxist groups shows a disconnection between these groups and the working masses. 
Such disconnection has been a historical problem persisting for decades; it was true 
before and certainly after the revolution. They were most successful when they were able 
to organize non-working masses such as intellectuals and professionals. Iranian Marxists, 
those who supported armed struggle and those who did not, never managed to establish a 
firm base among the masses – petite bourgeois, working class or the peasantry. The 
appeal of Marxism seems to have been limited to the educated, the new middle class, and 
especially students. While Muslims were able to connect and recruit their members and 
supporters from the Iranian masses and the poor, Iranian Marxists failed to link up with 
the main classes of people who could understand their ideology and bring about social 
change.406  
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Discussion 
It was not the collapse of the Soviets that made social movements look for an 
alternative ideology because that collapse did not occur until the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The Iranian revolution, and consequentially the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic government, played a major role in using Islam as a viable revolutionary 
alternative in the Middle East. For 28 years the Iranian revolution has been called the 
Islamic revolution. Under this title, it has used Islam to defy the west and western culture, 
making the Islamic alternative viable. Under the current political conditions in the Middle 
East, many believe in Islamic revolutions as inevitable.  
However, from what was evident during the 1979 revolution in Iran, one can also 
question that inevitability by analyzing the specific role of Marxist organizations such as 
the Tudeh Party and the Majority Fadaeean. Events would have unfolded differently had 
these major Marxist groups not made Muslims their immediate allies. As Behrooz has 
argued, this alliance was partially based on the Tudeh Party as an instrument of the Soviet 
Union.407 While this is true, it could only qualify as an external reason behind Tudeh 
Party’s conciliatory line. There were also internal reasons that the Party collaborated with 
the Islamic Republic government rather than other Marxist and non-Marxist 
organizations in the opposition. The Tudeh Party has had a history of conciliation and 
appeasement to power when it comes to a serious struggle. That is precisely why there 
have been so many splits within the party since its inception. To this day there are some 
sectors of the Tudeh Party that appease the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, the 
Tudeh Party decided to work with the Islamic regime because it was the best way to get 
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to power without bloodshed. The Tudeh Party refused to fight against the Islamic 
Republic government despite its suppression during the first few years of the revolution.   
The outcomes of the Iranian revolution certainly would have been different had 
the majority of the Marxists not coalesced with the Islamic Republic. Yet by summer of 
1981, most of the Marxist groups plus the Mojahedin were uprooted by the Islamic 
Republic regime. Those who joined the Islamic Republic stayed safe, at least for another 
year or so, but those who opposed the regime were suppressed. According to Behrooz: 
The June 1981 crisis was essentially one which other Marxist elements had 
brought about, these being on one hand the Islamic Liberals, with the Muslim 
Mojahedin, and on the other the Maktabis, the IRP and state apparatus, backed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini. In this battle Marxist groups which supported the Maktabis, 
such as the Tudeh, joined the battle consciously. Those who opposed the 
Maktabis, the majority of whom also opposed the Islamic Liberals, were simply 
drawn into battle without preparation. 408
 
 By the mid-1980s, the organized activity of most Marxists was reduced to 
Kurdistan, and by the late 1980s, what little activity was conducted by Marxist groups 
was suppressed by the Islamic government’s military in the region. Some of the members 
were able to flee Kurdistan and the region altogether and seek refuge in European 
countries. Currently their activities are limited to publications, meetings, and 
demonstrations against the Islamic Republic in numerous European cities.  
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to study some of the literature and 
print material put forth by Marxist organizations in Iran in order to extract the 
traditionally overlooked Islamic terminology and ideas. A secondary purpose was to 
examine and unveil the latent contextual-cultural and the ideological-political 
convergence of political Marxist organizations in Iran. This convergence reveals that as 
rigid as they may seem, ideologies can be transformed to look completely different. For 
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example, a trajectory of ideological convergence in Iran can be shown. Originally, 
convergence began with the historical event of the Socialist Republic of Gilan. From this 
period (1920), ideology was borrowed, however precariously and momentarily. The 
trajectory of the Iranian opposition movement vacillated between Muslims borrowing 
from Marxism and Marxists borrowing from Islam. The use of Islamic ideology, 
terminology, and resistance, however, became prevalent for Marxists especially during 
the months leading up to the 1979 revolution. During the revolution, a majority of 
Marxists, consciously and purposefully, and with clear objectives, converged with 
Islamic ideology. They viewed Islam as being in the vanguard of ideas and the most 
comprehensive of revolutionary concepts. This ultimately marked the unprecedented 
mixing of two highly contradictory schools of thought. What Iranian Marxists did not and 
have not taken into consideration is the power and challenges of the “tripartite Islamic 
complex” mentioned by Mesbahi. It was formidable, and went beyond the early 
revolutionary period:  
 The power of this tripartite complex and the challenge facing the  Marxist in the 
immediate post revolutionary period could only be appreciated if one consider its 
remarkable longevity way beyond its initial impact, and the fact that it has continued its 
relevance three decades after the revolution, as most radical and secular forces still have 
to deal with its cultural, ideological and political challenges ”409                                                                 
 
It may be several years or even decades for seculars and Marxists to realize the 
power behind Islamic culture and ideology. Iranian Marxists were both culturally and 
ideologically predisposed to support the Islamic revolution. They made important 
contributions to the Iranian revolutionary process. They consciously and unconsciously 
modified their Marxist perspective to accommodate fundamental Islamic ideals and 
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values. This gave their movement a more popular appeal making their political efforts 
against the Shah’s regime more effective. 
The joining of forces between the two very different belief systems of Marxism 
and Islam has shown that in the face of foreign invasion of the country, in this case 
foreign presence and control of the economy, historically non-allied forces would join 
against the common enemy. The history of collaboration between Marxists and Muslims 
in Iran points to one direction. It started as defiance against England and France, the 
foreign forces who, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, had invaded Iran. The 1979 
revolution similarly involved the collaboration of Marxists and Muslims for the same 
sociopolitical reason, but this time against America. This lesson is pertinent and useful in 
analyzing what is currently happening in Iraq. 
Although 28 years have passed since the Iranian revolution, awareness about what 
went wrong or right has not been completely discussed. It is of utmost importance that 
analysts of revolution and Iranian intellectuals and groups pay particular attention and 
analyze the past correctly—without ideological boundaries and limitations. For close to 
three decades still the Islamic Republic controls political and economic power in the 
country. The accommodation of Marxists to the Islamic movement is no longer an issue 
and nor is it contributing in keeping the regime in power. Does this indicate a demise or a 
decline in Iranian Marxism? And will Marxists and seculars be able to play a role in the 
future of Iran? These are questions and issues open to future research and investigation. 
 The issue of Islamic belief not allowing laicization/secularization to make 
significant inroads within the Iranian political movement since the revolution is important 
because after 28 years the issue of the separation of religion and state is still discussed 
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among Marxist and Muslim intellectuals. Such discussions are gradually beginning to 
make headway within the Iranian politics. Until recently, such separation had not been 
present in the Iranian political or sociological discourse. Although Islamic belief has 
prevailed for decades in Iran the gradual evolution of Iranian politics connotes a new 
more secular dynamic of support and opposition at work. 
The 1979 revolution created an excellent opportunity for all intellectuals, Marxist 
or non-Marxist, to begin a process of discussion on this historically necessary issue. I 
hope that this dissertation may contribute to creating a source for those who are interested 
in the Iranian revolution and its outcome, and the relation between ideology and power. It 
also demonstrates the significance of Islamic belief in Iran and, more generally, in the 
Middle East. 
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INDEX OF NAMES 
 
 
Ahmadzadeh, Masoud 
One of the original founders of the Oraganization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guirillas. 
Initially started a Marxist organization with co-founder Amir Parviz Pouyan. He was 
executed by the Shah’s SAVAK in 1972 after undergoing torture and a brief trial along 
with 11 others. His book, Armed Struggle: Both Strategy and Tactic was used as a major 
source of political discourse among believers of armed struggle in the Iranian left 
movement. 
 
Alam, Assadollah 
Appointed as Prime Minister by the Shah in the summer of 1962. He replaced Ali Amini.       
Many members of his cabinet were involved in the coup against Mosaddegh in 1953 
aiding the CIA and MI6.  
          
Ale-Ahmad, Jalal 
A secular intellectual who wrote in the 1960s. He popularized the term gharbzadegi 
(westoxication), those who get stung by the West and become enchantingly sycophant 
forgetting their own culture. 
 
Allamehzadeh, Mohammad Reza  
Among the group of 12 people who were arrested in 1974 for plotting to kidnap the 
Empress and Shah’s oldest son. Allamehzadeh and four others including Daneshian, 
Golsorkhi, Teifoor Bataee, and Abbas Samakar did not confess or repent. He was 
originally given the death sentence but later life in prison. 
 
Amouzegar, Jamshid 
Appointed as Prime Minister by the Shah in 1976 as a measure of reform. He replaced 
Amir Abbas Hoveida. 
 
Amoughlu, Heydar Khan 
Originally from the Azarbaijan region, he was among the first founders of the Communist 
Party of Iran in 1920. He led the first Marxist-Muslim collusion to establish the Gilan 
Socialist Republic.  
 
Arani, Taghi 
Among the group of 53, Arani was the founder of the Tudeh Party along with 23 other 
members. He led the Tudeh Party until his arrest. He was a chemist educated at the 
University of Berlin in Germany. He came to know Marxism while in Berlin, which 
motivated him to write a few critical articles about Iranian culture. Upon his return to 
Iran, he began publishing an intellectual newspaper by the name of Donya (World) which 
later became the official name of the Tudeh Party’s political organ. 
 
 
 
 219
Ashraf, Hamid 
Born in 1946, he was the only Fadaee guerilla leader who survived the Shah’s purges in 
the early 1970s. He led the organization in the tumultuous years from 1974 until his death 
in 1976. He was famous for his organizational abilities, courage and expertise to handle 
the SAVAK. It is said that he had escaped the SAVAK’s traps up to 14 times. 
 
Azhari, Gholam Reza 
Shah’s appointed Prime Minister to replace the failing government of Sharif-emami. 
Azhari’s government only lasted from November 6, 1978 to January 16, 1979. 
  
Badizadegan, Ali Asghar 
A major figure and among the founders of the Mojahedin, he was born in 1938 in 
Isfahan. He too began his political life with the Freedom Movement. He graduated with a 
degree in chemistry and served in the military henceforth. He served his time in an arms 
manufacturing factory and was later hired by the same factory. His familiarity with arms 
made him a good candidate for arms training. By 1970, he was sent to Palestine to the 
Fatah military camps for training. His political life after his return lasted only one year. In 
1971, he was arrested and later executed in the spring of 1972. 
 
Bakhtiar, Shapur 
The last Prime Minister in Iran appointed by the Shah. His government lasted only a few 
days, from January 16, 1979 to February 9, 1979. 
 
Banisadr, Abolhassan 
He was among the figures welcoming Khomeini to Paris. He was the first Iranian 
President after the 1979 revolution. His government lasted from December 1979 to June 
1981. 
 
Bataee, Teifoor 
Arrested along with 11 others for conspiring to harm and kidnap members of the royal 
family in 1974. He received a death sentence after refusing to confess. Along with 
Golsorkhi and Deneshian, and nine others, their trial was the first televised trial of 
political activists in Iran. His sentence was later reduced to life in prison. 
 
Bazargan, Mehdi 
One of the founders of the Liberation Movement in 1962. He was the first Prime Minister 
after the 1979 revolution. He took on the position of Prime Minister just when Bakhtiar 
fled Iran. His government lasted 275 days before he resigned amidst accusations of 
conciliating with the United States. 
 
Beheshti, Mohammad Hossein (Ayatollah) 
Among the closest people to Khomeini, he helped establish the Islamic Republic Party. 
During the days of revolution he played a major role as the spokesperson for the Islamic 
Republic. On June 28, 1981, he was killed in a massive explosion inside the IRP 
headquarters along with much of the party’s top leadership.  
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Behrangi, Samad 
A revolutionary teacher whose teachings gave incentive to many of the Fadaee guerillas.  
He was from a modest background and worked among the rural Azari children and had 
come to identify with their suffering. His short stories in defense of a struggle against the 
powerful rang familiar tones in the ears of Iranian youth. He drowned in the Aras river in 
1969. 
 
Daneshian, Karamatollah 
A Marxist revolutionary who was arrested and tried along with 11 others on conspiracy 
charges against the Shah and his family. In court he defended his ideas of the necessity of 
a revolution. Despite knowing full well that he would be executed he did not ask to be 
pardoned by the Shah. He and another member of the group, Khosro Golsorkhi were the 
only ones who were executed in the winter of 1974. 
 
Dehghani, Ashraf 
She led the split from Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas in May 1979. 
Her brother, Behrooz Dehghani, was among the original members of the two groups that 
later established the Fadaee Guerillas. He was tortured to death by the SAVAK. In her 
interview published in the same month she declared the government of the Islamic 
Republic the enemy of the people and declared an armed struggle against the regime. 
This group which called itself the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas is also known as the  
Ashraf Dehghani Group.  
 
Golsorkhi, Khosro 
He was a revolutionary poet who was executed in the winter of 1974, along with 
Daneshian. He was arrested and put on military trial with 11 others on charges of 
conspiracy against the Shah’s family. Knowing that the trial was televised he made his 
famous speech of how Islam and Marxism go hand in hand in Iran and that it is a 
necessity to mix the two. He and Daneshian actually managed to put the Shah’s regime 
on trial in front of a nation-wide audience. 
 
Haghshenas, Torab 
Originally a member of the Mojahedin, he later joined the Marxist faction and became 
one of the main founders of the Paykar (Marxist Mojahedin) group. Before the split 
between the two Marxist and Muslim factions he and another member of the Mojahedin, 
Hossein Rohani, met with Khomeini for a political endorsement while in exile in Iraq.  
 
Hanif-Nezhad  
One of the three original founders of the Mojahedin. He was born in 1938 in Tabriz, 
Azarbaijan. His family was of traditional merchants. He first joined National Front, then 
the Islamic Society, and finally the Freedom Movement. In 1962, he was arrested and 
sentenced to prison for seven months. In 1963, he graduated from Tehran University with 
a degree in agricultural machinery. He was executed along with 11 other members of the 
Mojahedin in the spring of 1972. 
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Hormatipour, Mohammad 
In cooperation with Ashraf Dehghani, he was one of the main organizers of political 
activity abroad (Europe) representing the Fadaee guerillas just before the revolution. 
Later, in 1981, he led a group that split from the Fadaee Guerillas (Ashraf Dehghani 
Group) under the name of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (Liberation Army of the 
Iranian People). He was killed in the northern provinces by the Islamic Republic troops. 
 
Hoveida, Amir Abbas 
Longest lasting Prime Minister in Iran. He was Prime Minister for 13 years, 1963 to 
1976. He was executed by the Islamic Republic in 1979.  
 
Jazani, Bizhan 
Among the main founders and theorists of the Fadaee Guerillas. He was incarcerated in 
Shah’s prisons for five years before he was executed. He held a Ph.D. in sociology and 
wrote many important papers on the political sociology of Iran. His work remained 
among very important writings within the Iranian leftist movement. 
 
Khiabani, Moosa 
One of the most important figures of the Mojahedin after the 1979 revolution. He stayed 
in Iran after the main leadership of the organization fled Iran to France. He was killed by 
the Islamic Republic in 1981. 
 
Khomeini, Ruhollah (Ayatollah) 
Main leader of the cleric opposition before and after the 1979 revolution. In 1963 he led a 
cleric movement against the Shah and became a major figure in connecting many Muslim 
groups in opposition to the Shah. In 1964, he was sent into exile by the Shah and did not 
return to Iran until February 2, 1979. Upon his arrival to Tehran close to 3 million 
Iranians greeted him at the airport. He became the Shi’a spiritual leader of Iranians after 
the revolution and was declared marja-e taghlid (source of emulation). He also 
established the concept of velayat-e faghigh (rule of Islamic jurisprudence) ( He died in 
June,1989.  
 
Kianouri, Nour-al Din 
One of the executive committee members of the Tudeh Party. He fled Iran and resided 
mainly in East Germany until 1979. He was the main spokesperson for the Party during 
the years of the revolution. He became the main figure for the party to convince both 
Muslims and Marxists the Party line of becoming close affiliates of the Islamic Republic.  
He remained a key figure even after being incarcerated by the Islamic Republic. 
 
Meftahi, Abbas 
One of the three major figures to establish the Ahmadzadeh group that later joined Jazani 
and formed the Fadaee Guerillas. He was mainly responsible in organizing group’s 
sympathizers in the northern provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran. He played a key role 
with connecting the Jazani group to establish the Organization of Iranian People’sFadaee 
Guerillas. He was arrested and later executed by the Shah’s SAVAK in 1972. 
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Mohsen, Saeed 
He was born in 1939 into a religious family in Zanjan. Active among student committees 
of the Freedom Movement, he was arrested and briefly imprisoned several times in 1961. 
He graduated from Tehran University in Industrial Engineering during the same year. 
After finishing military service he, like Hanif-nezhad and Badizadegan, helped found the 
Mojahedin. He was executed along with 11 other members of the Mojahedin in the spring 
of 1972. 
 
Mosaddegh, Muhammad 
One of the main founders of the National Front in 1949, Mosaddegh was the Prime 
Minister of Iran from April 1951 to 19 August 1953. During his two years as Prime 
Minister he managed to nationalize the oil industry in Iran despite national and 
international controversy. He is looked upon as the symbol of nationalism in Iran. August 
19, 1953, his government was toppled through a coup organized by the CIA and MI-6 to 
restore the Shah’s government. 
 
Paknezhad, Shokrollah 
Along with two others, Naser Khaksar and Hossein Tajer-riahi, founded the Palestine 
Group. He was arrested during an operation against the Shah and given a long prison 
sentence. 
 
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 
The Shah (king) of Iran for 37 years (1941-1978). He was installed as the Shah of Iran by 
the Allies in August 25, 1941. His reign was interrupted by the nationalist government of 
Mosaddegh for a few years. He made a comeback with the help of the CIA and MI-6 in 
1953. He ruled Iran with an Iron fist for decades banning and destroying the opposition 
through his laws and notorious secret police the SAVAK. He was overthrown in January 
1979, and left the country on January 16, of the same year. He died in exile in 1980.  
He survived an assassination attempt in 1949 
 
Pahlavi, Reza Shah 
Originally an army commander, he became Prime Minister by the Ghajar Shah in 1923. 
Two years later the Majles officially deposed the Ghajars and installed Reza Khan as 
Shah. At this point he changed his name to Reza Shah Pahlavi. He tried to follow in the 
footsteps of Atta Turk, the nationalist Turkish leader. He wanted to emulate the west and 
bring about what he perceived to be modernity. In August 1941, after Russian and British 
forces invaded Iran, he was sent to exile which put an end to his rule. 
 
Pouyan, Amir Parviz 
One of the key figures in original Fadaee guerillas. He was one of the main organizers 
and theorists of Iranian armed struggle movement starting in 1970. He wrote Armed 
Struggle and the Refutation of Theory of Survival, to convince Iranian Marxists that there 
are no other ways about a serious struggle against the Shah than to declare a war against 
his government. He, and Peyro-naziri, a Fadaee guerilla, were killed during a shootout in 
1971.  
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Rajavi, Masood 
Among the original Mojahedin who survived the Shah’s death squads by serving a prison 
sentence. He led the Mojahedin during the revolution but fled Iran along with Bani-Sardr, 
the one time president of Iran in 1981. He remains Mojahedin’s main leader to this day. 
He became a prolific writer during his years of leadership on the matters of Islam and the 
philosophy of life and struggle. 
 
Rezaee, Mehdi 
A prominent activist of the Mojahedin who was arrested along with 68 others in 
September 1971. He was tortured by the SAVAK and later executed in the same year. 
During his defense he lashed out at the Shah’s government and called the armed struggle 
against his regime a just struggle by the Iranian masses. 
 
Rezaee, Reza 
He was among the leaders of the three main branches of the Mojahedin in the early 
1970s. A member of the Mojahedin’s ideological team, he was arrested along with 68 
other members but managed to escape. He was later killed in an armed clash against the 
Shah’s security forces in 1972. 
 
Rohani, Hossein 
A member of the Mojahedin’s ideological team, he was one of the more important 
figures. He later led a split from the Mojahedin to establish the Marxist branch of the 
Mojahedin in September 1975. He became one the key figures in the Paykar 
organization. He later went to work for the Islamic Republic abandoning Paykar. Despite 
his conciliations with the regime he was executed. 
 
Roozbeh, Khosro 
Head of the military network of the Tudeh Party who was arrested in 1956 following 
massive arrests of other members the year before. He was probably the most daring of the 
members. He helped establish the Military Organization of the Tudeh Party in 1944. This 
was a group of military officers in the Shah’s army who were sympathetic to the Tudeh 
Party. He had embraced Marxism and joned the Tudeh Party in 1943. By the time of his 
execution in 1958, he had 36 books and pamphlets to his name. Despite his opportunities 
to flee Iran he remained inside to fight. He was very critical of the Tudeh leadership who 
had chosen a life abroad. 
 
Sabouri, Abdolrahim 
A leader of the Fadaee Guerillas (Iranian People’s Liberation Army) that split from the 
Fadaee Guerillas (Ashraf Dehghani Group) in 1980. He led the new group for seven 
months of guerilla warfare in the forsts of Mazandaran and Gilan provinces. He was 
killed in an armed clash on March 4, 1982. 
 
Safaee-farahani, Ali Akbar  
The militant leader of the Jangal Group which later contacted Ahmadzadeh group to 
establish Fadaee Guerillas. In 1968, after the arrest of many members of a small group he 
was involved with, he left Iran for Lebanaon and joined the Palestinian movement for 
 224
training and arms. In 1970 Farahani and Ashtiani returned to Iran with arms and 
ammunition and made their first contact with Ahmadzadeh’s group in August of 1970. 
He led the attack against a police precinct in a region called Siahkal in Gilan province. 
He was arrested and later executed on March 17, 1971, along with 12 other members.    
 
Samakar, Abbas Ali  
He was arrested by the SAVAK for conspiring against the royal family in 1972 along 
with 11 other individuals. He originally received a death sentence for not repenting and 
asking for the Shah’s pardon. But his sentence was later reduced to life in prison. He 
recently wrote a book on the process of his arrest and the rest of the members who were 
prosecuted by the Shah’s regime. It was published under the name of “I Am a Rebel” 
(man yek shooreshiam) in Iran in 2004. 
 
Shahram, Taghi 
One of the main organizers of the Marxist Mojahedin in 1974. He led the split from the 
Mojahedin and later called the new organization Paykar. He managed to convince a few 
other members of the Mojahedin with Marxist tendencies to eliminate a leader of the 
Mojahedin, Sharif-vaghefi.  
  
Shariati, Ali 
A sociologist in his way of detailed analysis, Ali Shariati finished his doctoral work in 
Paris, France. After receiving a Ph.D. in 1964, he returned to Iran. He was born in 
Mashad, in the northeastern province of Khorasan, in 1933. His father had purposely 
chosen life in a small town and did not much care for big city glitter. He taught Islamic 
history in different small towns and villages in the same province. Choosing Khorasan to 
teach Islamic history was probably not a coincidence. It was where he was born and 
raised, but the other reason was a population which did not appreciate the city and its 
secular living—the non-Islamic, nontraditional behaviorisms. Ali Shariati, following in 
his father’s footsteps, was also interested in politics. They both participated in political 
meetings and joined a group called “The Movement of Theist Socialists.” These meetings 
probably played a big role in giving Shariati his first taste of socialist or Marxist 
thoughts.  
 
Sharif-emami, Ja’far 
Appointed as Prime Minister by the Shah to replace Jamshid Amouzegar. He submitted 
the members of his cabinet to the Shah on August 27, 1978. He assumed his position as 
Prime Minister as he claimed to rid the country of corruption and creating a safe 
atmosphere for the private sector to invest and produce in Iran without any perceived 
danger. His government only lasted until November 6, 1978. 
 
Shoa’ian, Mostafa 
An independent Marxist who never affiliated himself with any of the Marxist 
organizations in Iran. A few years older than most Marxists involved in armed struggle, 
he was continuously critical of their analysis. In an effort to join them the Fadaee 
guerillas initiated political discussions with him but to no avail. The discussions were 
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discontinued in 1974 and continued independently. He was killed in an armed clash with 
the security forces in 1975. 
  
Tabari, Ehsanollah 
He was the chief ideologue of the Tudeh Party and one of its most prolific writers until 
1983. He became a devout Muslim in his later years and published books on the 
superiority of Islam over Marxism. He wrote many books and pamphlets during his years 
with Tudeh. He studied in East Germany and received a Ph.D. in sociology. He was 
heavily involved with the party in the years of the revolution. After the Islamic Republic 
began its attacks against all Marxists he was imprisoned  
 
Taleghani, Seyyed Mahmud (Ayatollah) 
He was one of the most popular, important, and radical clerics before and during the 
revolution. He was not only active with Muslim clerics but also with nationalists and 
some Marxists. Taleghani was one of the founders of the Liberation Movement along 
with Sahabi and Bazargan. He was closely affiliated with the National Front and The 
Mojahedin for many years. At one point he called the Mojahedin the true Muslims. He 
was arrested by the Shah’s security forces before the uprising of 1963. He died in 1982. 
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INDEX OF EVENTS 
 
 
The following chronology is between 1920 and 1983, the period depicted in this  
dissertation. By 1983, most Marxist organizations in Iran were either destroyed by the 
 Islamic Republic or surviving members had fled to Europe or the United States. Sources  
used for the chronology of events are: 
 
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988). 
 
Maziar Behrooz, Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran. (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1999). 
 
Gholam Reza Nejati, Tarikh-e bist va panj sale-ye Iran (The Twenty Five Year History 
of Iran), 2 vols (Tehran: Rasa Cultural Institute, 1992). 
 
Kennth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New 
York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004). 
 
 
 
1916 
 The development of the Jangal Movement 
1920 
June: The first Communist Party of Iran was established. 
 
December: A movement known as the “Socialist Republic of Gilan,” had begun. 
 
26 February: After a military coup, a new government was established. The Soviets 
signed an agreement with the Iranian government to ensure their pulling out of 
Iran only if the British would do the same. 
 
6 May: The Communist Party of Iran continued in collusion with Kuchak-Khan. 
 
June: Mirza Kuchik-Khan had gathered up to 8,000 troops, among them 5,000 Soviet 
soldiers. 
 
July: The Soviets had decided to take their troops out of Iran. 
 
By 1926, the Communist Party regrouped and revised its view on Reza Shah to be an 
obstacle to progress. They claimed that the only way to fight against his 
government was to organize workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie 
In contact with 52 others, they were all arrested on charges of illegal communist activity 
in 1931. 
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Reza Shah, by passing an amendment through the parliament in 1931, made all 
communist activity and literature illegal. 
Articles under titles like “Historical Materialism,” “Science and Elements of Material,” 
“Meaning of Human Materialism,” “Women and Materialism,” and “Material 
Basis of Life and Thought” may have been too dense for even university students. 
His problems came not with his theoretical writing but rather with a flyer he wrote 
in 1937, on May 1st, International Workers Day, and distributed on university 
campuses. 
 
1941 
October: The Tudeh Party of Iran was established. 
 
1942 
An affiliate of the Tudeh Party, The Central Union of Worker’s Councils was established.  
 
1944 
Election of Tudeh members to the fourteenth Majles. 
The first congress of the Tudeh Party. 
Reza Shah died in exile. 
 
1945 
The Azarbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) was established. 
The ADP declared an autonomous government in Azarbaijan 
 
1946 
The Islamic Fadaeean was established by Navvab Safavi 
The Soviet Army withdrew from Iran 
 
1948 
The first major split in the Tudeh Party.  
 
1949 
An assassination attempt on the Shah’s life. 
Tudeh Party was declared illegal. 
Mosaddegh and his friends established the National Front. 
 
1951 
Razmara assassinated by Islamic Fadaeean. 
Oil nationalization day. 
Mossadegh became Prime Minister. 
Toilers Party of Iran was established. 
 
1952 
Mossadegh resigned as Prime Minister 
Under social pressure and mass protests a few days later, the Shah appoints Mossadegh 
as Prime Minister again. Mossadegh broke political relations with Britain. 
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1953 
First coup attempt against Mossadegh failed. 
Three days later (August 19) the second coup attempt organized by the CIA and MI-6 
was successful, and Mossadegh’s government was overthrown. 
12 November: First mass demonstrations against the coup (in November). 
7 December: University students demonstrated against Nixon’s trip to Iran. Three 
students, Ghandchi, Bozorgnia, and Shariat-razavi were shot and killed by the Shah’s 
military. This day is commemorated in Iran as Student’s Day. 
 
1954 
Tudeh Party’s printing facilities are confiscated. 
First group of Tudeh military officers were executed. 
 
1956 
February: Some Tudeh Party members participated in the CPSU’s twentieth congress. 
The party acceded with the introduction of de-Stalinization initiated by Khrushchev.  
November: Tudeh Party launches its new underground radio station from East Germany 
under the name of peyk-e Iran. 
 
1957 
The Shah’s notorious secret police the SAVAK was founded with the help of CIA and 
Israeli MOSAD. 
 
1958 
May: Khosrow Roozbeh, a prominent Tudeh Party member was executed. Tudeh Party 
stops political activity in Iran. 
 
1960 
July: The National Front, named the Second National Front was reorganized by some 
Mossadegh colleagues. 
 
1961 
The Iran Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi-e Iran) was established by Mehdi 
Bazargan, Ayatollah Taleghani and others. 
 
Ali Amini appointed Prime Minister 
 
1962 
Amini’s cabinet approved a land reform bill 
The Shah declares his ‘White Revolution’. 
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1963 
Mass uprising began against the land reform program. The city of Qom was attacked by 
the Shah’s army since the clergy were behind most of the organizing. 
 
1964 
Hasan Ali Mansur was appointed Prime Minister 
Majles approved the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Capitulation Agreement. 
Ayatollah Khomeini was sent to exile after attacking the capitulation rights of U.S. 
personnel in Iran.  
 
1965 
January: Prime Minister Mansur was assassinated and Amir Abbas Hoveyda took over 
the position. He remained Prime Minister for next 13 years. 
April: Failed attempt on the Shah’s life by an affiliate of the Revolutionary Organization, 
a split group from the Tudeh Party. 
September: Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin was established by three main 
leaders, Badizadegan, Saeed Mohsen, and Mohammad Hanifnezhad. 
 
1967 
An armed rebellion started in Iranian Kurdistan, led by Ghazi Mohammad. 
March: Mossadegh died in exile. 
December: Following the death of Gholamreza Takhti, a popular and internationally 
known wrestler, large mass protests were organized by Marxist university students 
against the Shah’s regime. It was believed that  
 
1968 
The Jazani-Zarifi group, one of the main bodies that later formed the Iranian People’s 
Fadaee Guerillas, was discovered by the SAVAK. 
Death of Samad Behrangi, a teacher who taught many of the revolutionaries that later 
joined Marxist organizations. 
 
1971 
February: Jangal group of the Ahmadzadeh-Farahani coalition began its guerilla activity  
against the Shah by attacking a police precinct in one the northern provinces in Siahkal.   
April: Establishment of the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas. 
The Shah’s infamous General Farsio, military prosecutor general, was assassinated by the    
Fadaee guerillas. 
May: Amir Parviz Pouyan, one of the founding members of the Fadaee Guerillas, along 
with another member, Peiro-naziri, was killed in a clash with the Shah’s troops. 
August: Iran recognizes the People’s Republic of China. 
September: 69 members of the Muslim Mojahedin were arrested. 
 
1972 
March: Masood Ahmadzadeh and Abbas Meftahi, both founders of the Fadaee Guerillas, 
and eight other members executed in Tehran. 
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May: Nixon and Kissinger arrived in Tehran to inform the Shah that the United States is 
prepared to sell Iran the conventional weapons systems it requested. 
 
 
1973 
The Muslim Mojahedin assassinated Louis Hawkins, an American colonel, in Tehran. 
 
1974 
The Fadaee Guerillas bombed the police precinct headquarters, assassinated one of the 
wealthiest Iranians, Mohammad Sadegh Fateh-Yazdi, and Major Alinaghi Niktab, a 
notorious SAVAK torturer.  
 
1975 
Fadaee Guerillas attack several police precincts across the country. 
The Shah declares the Rastakhiz party the only legal political party in Iran. 
Fadaee Guerillas assassinated Captain Yadollah Noruzi, head of university security 
forces and Abbas Ali Shahriari. 
Bizhan Jazani, one of the founders of the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas , executed by 
the SAVAK along with six other Fadaees and two of the Mojahedin. 
Shah and Saddam sign the Algiers peace accord ending conflict between Iran and Iraq. 
Conflict between Marxist and Muslim factions within the Mujahedin ends in 
assassination of Majid Sharif-vaghefi. He was one of the leaders of the Muslim faction 
who was killed by the Marxists. 
Marxist faction of the Mujahedin declares an independent organization called the 
Organization of Iranian People’s Mojahedin (Marxist-Leninist). 
Marxist Mojahedin assassinated two Ameican military advisors in Tehran. 
 
1976 
Navid, the only active part of Tudeh Party in Iran was created.  
Mostafa Shoa’ian, an independent Marxist who never joined any of the Marxist groups, 
was killed in a street battle with the Shah’s security forces. 
Hossein Nahidi, a SAVAK interrogator/torturer was assassinated by the Fadaee Guerillas 
in Mashhad. 
Bahram Aram and two other Marxist Mojahedin members were killed in a street battle in 
Tehran. 
 
1977 
May: Death of Dr. Ali Shariati 
Amir Abbas Hoveyda was replaced by Jamshid Amouzegar as Prime Minister. 
Shah and his Wife arrive in Washington D.C. and were met by a violent and organized 
protests by Iranian student opposition. 
Fadaee Guerillas bombed government buildings in Zanjan and southern Tehran. 
 
1978 
January: President Carter and his wife arrived in Tehran. Carter called Iran the “island of 
stability’. 
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Fadaee Guerillas bombed US-Iran cultural center. 
7 January: An article insulting to Ayatollah Khomeini appeared in a Ettella’at newspaper. 
It fomented many anti-regime events. 
9 January: Protests were held in the holy city of Qom against the article. Fadaee Guerillas 
bombed a police precinct and the building of Rastakhiz Party in Qom. 
More mass demonstrations begin all over the country. 
March: Red leftists and black Muslims are attacked by the Rastakhiz part as the ‘unholy 
alliance’ of the red and black. 
April: Political prisoners in Ghezel Hessar prison began a hunger strike.  
Student demonstrations started in Tehran and Science and Industry universities. 
May: Anti-regime rioting started in 34 cities. 
Mass demonstrations marked the 1963 uprising in Tehran and Qom. 
The Shah replaced Nassiri with Moghaddam, as head of SAVAK. 
Shah announced that the next elections will be completely free. 
August: For the month of Ramadan, mass protests started in several major cities. 
Demonstrations in Tehran targeted banks, movie theaters, and nightclubs.  
Amouzegar resigned to be replaced by Sharif-emami. 
Liberation Movement and National Front demanded Shah’s removal, disbanding of 
SAVAK, freedom of speech, and trial of powerful officials within the Shah’s regime. 
Fadaee Guerillas attack a police headquarter in Tehran. 
8 September: Martial law was declared in Tehran and eleven other major cities. Troops 
opened fire on demonstrations killing hundreds of people.  
Major strike started by oil industry workers. 
5 October: Khomeini left Iraq for Paris, France. 
Newspapers and major industries went on strike, hunger strike by political prisoners in 
Tabriz. 
Khomeini called for a nationwide strike in commemoration of those who were killed on 
September 8th   Black Friday.  
A number of political prisoners were freed. 
Oil workers and Iranian Airline employees went on strike.  
Riots continued in Tehran and British embassy was attacked. 
6 November: In a nationwide television address, the Shah admitted to past mistakes and 
told the nation he had heard their demands. 
Two-hundred and ten political prisoners were freed. 
Shah declared an end to martial law and free elections. 
In defiance of curfews demonstrators clashed with troops resulting in many deaths. 
Khomeini called on soldiers to leave the military. 
11 December: Millions of people demonstrated against the regime in Tehran. Several 
soldiers killed in takeover of military garrisons.  
30 December: Shapour Bakhtiar appointed Prime Minister by the Shah. 
 
1979 
January: Bakhtiar submitted the names of his new cabinet. 
Violent demonstrations began in the Azarbaijan provinces. 
Fadaee guerillas assassinate a police commander in Tabriz, Azarbaijan. 
16 January: The Shah and his family leave Iran. 
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President Carter expressed support for Bakhtiar, the new Prime Minister. 
Hundreds of political prisoners were released. 
 
February: 
1 February: Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran and asked for immediate resignation of 
Bakhtiar. 
Khomeini asked Bazargan to form a new cabinet. 
Fadaee guerillas held first open commemoration of Siahkal where hundreds of thousands 
of supporters show up in the streets of Tehran. 
Clashes between people and armed forces continued until the collapse of Bakhtiar’s 
government. 
13 February: Tudeh Party declares its reappearance in its sixteenth plenum under the 
leadership of Nour al-Din Kianouri. Tudeh Party announces official support for 
Khomeini. 
Fadaee guerillas issued a list of demands to the provisional government, asking for equal 
rights for women, nationalization of all industry, and the expulsion of foreign military 
advisors. 
Execution of top officials of the Shah’s regime began. 
18 February: Islamic Republic Party established. 
In mass rally organized by the Fadaee guerillas tens of thousands of people ask for the 
inclusion of the Fadaees in the new government. 
 
March: 
Khomeini ordered the creation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards.  
Thousands of women held demonstrations in Tehran denouncing the Islamic dress code 
and the Islamic government’s actions against women. 
Fadaee guerillas denounce forthcoming referendum for not allowing freedom of choice. 
Heavy fighting began between Kurds and government troops.  
Battle between Turkmans and government forces started. 
 
May:  
A group of Fadaee guerillas led by Ashraf Dehghani split from the Organization of 
Fadaee Guerillas, calling themselves the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerrillas.  
Ayandegan, an independent newspaper shut down its operations due to a dispute with 
Khomeini. 
Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators declare support for Ayandegan in mass rallies. 
 
June:  
National Democratic Front accused Khomeini of abandoning earlier pledges to keep 
clergy out of state affairs. 
Khomeini warned lawyers, writers, and intellectuals to act more cautiously or de 
destroyed by the ‘same fist that destroyed the Shah’.  
Demonstrations at Tehran University demanded a popular assembly to draft a new 
constitution.  
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July: Armed clashes between Kurdish pishmarge and government troops in Kurdinsh city 
of Marivan. 
 
August: Revolutionary Guards attacked the office of Ayandegan newspaper.  
Hezbollah attacked a demonstration led by National Democratic Front and injured 
hundreds of the protestors.  
Armed clashes began over the control of the Kurdish city of Paveh between government 
troops and Kurdish pishmarges. Four hundred people were killed. 
Khomeini ordered general mobilization of the military to suppress the Kurdish rebellion. 
Kurdish Democratic Party was declared banned while it captured one of the major cities, 
Sanandaj. 
Khomeini ordered the closing of 22 publications including National Democratic Front, 
Tudeh, Paykar, and Fadaeean.   
Government troops executed some of the opposition members and supporters in Paveh. 
As informal truce was declared by the government and Kurdish fighters Khomeini 
rejected truce and ordered troops to crush rebellion. 
 
October:  
Fadaee guerillas held their first post-revolution meeting to iron out political differences 
that later led to a major split between Minority and Majority Fadaee organizations.  
Women were attacked by Hezbollah as they were demonstrating for equal rights. 
 
November:  
Bazargan and his colleagues met Brzezinski in Algiers to discuss U.S.-Iran relationships. 
4 November: Bazargan criticized for meeting with the Americans 
Line of Imam students seized American embassy and took 62 American hostages. 
6 November: Bazargan’s government collapsed after 275 days and its duties were taken 
over by the Revolutionary Council. Prominent writers and Tudeh Party declare support 
for hostage taking.  
 
December: 
The new Islamic constitution was approved. 
Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators denounced the new constitution in Tabriz and 
declared support for Ayatollah Shariatmadari. 
Islamic Republic of Iran denounced Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
 
1980 
25 January: Abolhassan Banisadr was elected as the first president of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
February: Four Turkman council leaders and Fadaee supporters were killed. 
Clashes between Kurdish guerillas and the new government went into its second round. 
A major split in the Fadaee Guerillas occurred. Two groups calling themselves minority 
and majority emerged.  
29 July: The Shah died in exile. 
September: Saddam Hosseirn breaks peace accord and attacks Iranian borders on the 20th 
of September. 
 234
1981 
June: Massive clashes began between Muslim Mojahedin and the Islamic Republic. 
Many prominent Marxist and Muslims within the opposition were executed by the new 
government. 
A massive explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic kills more than 70 top 
officials. Blast in Prime Minister’s office killed Prime Minister Bahonar and President 
Rajai. 
 
1982 
26 January: Communist League (sarbedaran) took over the city of Amol, in the northern 
provinces by the Caspian sea. 
February: Mousa Khiabani a major figure within the Muslim Mojahedin and several other 
members were killed. 
March: Abdolrahim Saboori, among the leaders of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas, 
Liberation Army killed in a clash with the revolutionary guards.  
Number of Fadaee Minority central committee members and others were killed. 
Mohammad Reza Hormatijpour, leader of the IPFG, Liberation Army, killed. 
 
1983 
February-April: Tudeh Party and Fadaee Majority members arrested and executed by the 
Islamic Republic. Second wave of arrests and attacks on the Tudeh and Majority in 
Tehran and other major cities. 
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INDEX OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Marxist Organizations 
 
Communist Party of Iran (hezb-e comonist-e Iran) 
This was the first organization in Iran established by Marxists in 1920. Most of the 
leaders from a Marxist movement who later formed the Communist Party were 
influenced directly by the Bolsheviks. Their main leaders were Sultanzadeh, 
Ghaffarzadeh, Javadzadeh, and Heydarkhan Amoghlu. With Armenian origins, 
Sultanzadeh had spent most of his political life in a Bolshevik underground organization 
in Russian Azarbaijan. Ghaffarzadeh, an old revolutionary, was the contact person for 
Russian Communist Party’s organ, Iskra, responsible for its delivery from Europe to Iran. 
Javadzadeh, who was born in Iranian Azarbaijan, was a teacher in Baku, capital of 
Russian Azarbaijan. While in Baku, he came in direct contact with the Bolsheviks and 
became the chief editor of a leftist newspaper, called Hurryat (freedom).  
 
Tudeh Party of Iran (hezb-e tudeh-ye Iran) 
Main founder of this group, Taghi Arani was in contact with 52 others, known as the 53-
group. They were all arrested on charges of illegal communist activity in 1931. The 
majority of the intellectuals arrested along with Arani were members and supporters of 
the original Communist Party. Officially the Tudeh Party was established in 1941, and 
despite efforts by different governments to eliminate this group, it has persisted to this 
day. Since its inception, it has split into many more radical or more conservative groups 
Some are still politically active, mostly outside of Iran, under different names. 
 
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e cherikha-ye fadaee-e 
khalgh-e Iran) 
The Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e chereekha-ye fadaee-e 
khalgh-e Iran) was established in April of 1971 by the collusion of two groups whose 
activities went back to the 1960s. The first group, led by Jazani and Zarifi, was 
established in the summer of 1966 at Tehran University with the help of six students. The 
group was later called Jangal Group following the Siahkal incident. The second group 
was led by Ahmadzadeh and Pouyan. The two groups coming together declared 
themselves as the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas and the New Communist Movement 
of Iran (jonbesh-e novin-e comonisti-e Iran) after the Siahkal operation. The word, 
‘organization’ was later added to the name. The newly formed group took on two 
important tasks at this time. They first started a long study of rural areas in the Northern 
provinces and second established contact with another Marxist group that was also 
dwelling on an armed action against the regime.  
 
Organization of Combat (Paykar) for the Liberation of the Working Class 
(sazman-e paykar dar rah-e azadi-eh tabagheye kargar) 
In the case of Marxist Mojahedin, later called Paykar, Islam had apparently fallen short of 
becoming a revolutionary praxis. A few factors contributed to this, although these were 
never thoroughly explained by either side. By 1974, most members of the Mujahedin 
were studying revolutions led predominantly by Marxists. They included Cuba, China, 
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Algeria, and the Vietnamese Communist Party fighting against the U.S. military. By mid-
1974, there were talks about converging Marxist ideology with Islamic ethics. In an 
abrupt move, in the fall of 1975, a published paper announced a change in ideology of the 
organization. There they claimed their Marxist inclinations and found the class analysis 
of Marxism to be most fitting with sociopolitical conditions of Iran.  
 
Ideal of the Masses  (arman-e khalgh)         
This was among the smaller groups that independently reached the conclusion that armed 
struggle is the only way to topple the Shah’s regime. It was made up of young workers 
led by Homayoun Katiraee, Hushang Taregol, Naser Karimi. During their effort to join 
the Fadaee guerillas in 1979, they were arrested and later executed. 
 
Palestine Group (goruh-e felestin) 
This group of Marxists was led by Shokrollah Paknezhad, Naser Khaksar, and Hosein 
Tajer-riahi. It was mainly made up of and supported by university students. The group 
had Maoist tendencies, and had come to accept political struggle based on the Chinese 
model of starting armed struggle in the rural areas. Many of its members were arrested by 
the SAVAK in 1969 and given long prison sentences.  
 
Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas (cherikha-ye fadaee-e khalgh-e Iran) (Ashraf 
Dehghani group) 
This group split from the Main Fadaee organization in the Spring of 1979, just after the 
revolution in Iran. They were able to clarify their positions in an interview with Ashraf 
Dehghani. In this booklet they held the Islamic Republic to be and dependent and 
suppressive government that continues the same political-economic agenda as the Shah. 
 
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaee Guerillas (sazman-e cherikha-ye fadaee-e 
khalgh-e Iran-aghalliat) (Minority) 
 In June 1980, this group broke away from the main Fadaee Guerilla organization. They 
published their own political organ Kar (labor). They called the Majority opportunists. 
They believed that political differences over the nature and class base of the Islamic 
Republic government were irreconcilable.  
 
Organization of Iranian Peoples Fadaeean (sazman-e fadaeean-e khalgh-e Iran-
aksariat) (Majority) 
This group, which moved to join the Tudeh Party later was formed as a result of the 
Minority split in June of 1980. They accused Minority of left-wing sectarianism. They 
renounced armed struggle and consistently dropped the name guerilla as part of their 
name calling the new organization, the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadaeean 
(Majority). 
 
Organization of the Worker’s Path (sazman-e rah-e kargar) 
This group was manily made up of former Fadaee and Marxist Mojahedin (paykar) 
members or supporters who had changed their views on armed struggle while in prison. 
After the revolution they began their own publication under the name of Rah-e Kargar 
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(worker’s path). The considered the Islamic Republic government a religious petit 
bourgeois-national bourgeois which is led by the clergy.  
 
The Organization of Communist Unity (sazman-e vahdat-e comonisti) 
Sporadically active before the revolution, this group was mainly made up of a few 
intellectuals in contact with the Fadaee Guerillas prior to the revolution. Between 1979 
and 1981, it published Rahaee as its official publication. They opposed the Islamic 
government but kept their activity limited to writing and political discourse. 
 
Communist League of Iran (ettehadieh comonistha-ye Iran) 
Most of the members of this group, later called Sarbedaran, were active outside of Iran 
prior to the revolution. Consistent with their Maoist tendencies, they conducted a daring 
attack against the Islamic regime’s forces in the city of Amol in June of 1981. Most 
members were either killed in the incident or arrested. A few surviving members fled the 
country and still continue with their political activities abroad. They later joined the 
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, made up of many Marxist organizations world-
wide. Their publication under the name of Haghighat continues to this day. 
 
 
Muslim Organizations 
 
Jangal Movement (jonbesh-e jangal)  
This movement consisted of small landowners in Gilan. Mirza Kuchak Khan, a 
landowner himself, led this movement. So popular was the movement that even a Marxist 
student organization in Germany wrote articles in their newspaper, Kaveh, defending the 
Jangalis. The Gilan Republic was the first instance of ideological and organizational 
convergence in Iranian history. It lasted close to two years before most of its leadership, 
Marxist and Muslim, was killed or imprisoned. The leadership consisted of a coalition of 
Muslims belonging to a movement called the “Jangal Movement,” and Marxists, who 
were organized in the Communist Party of Iran. The Muslims were led by a prominent 
figure who had been fighting Tehran’s central government since the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906, Mirza Kuchak Khan. Marxists, originally from a group called 
“Fergheye Democratic” (Democratic Faction), were led by Heydar Khan (Heydar 
Amughlou) and Soltanzadeh. In fact, this was the first cooperation between Marxists and 
Muslims as an organized political-military force. By the end of 1920, the movement 
known as the “Socialist Republic of Gilan,” with the support of the Red Army, with its 
1500 guerillas, was prepared to proclaim its independence and eventually take on 
Tehran’s central government. 
 
Fadaeean of Islam (Fadaeean-e eslam) 
Among those who came to organize themselves, more than any other fundamentalist 
organization, was the Fadaeean of Islam (Fadaeean-e Eslam). This group was organized 
by a young cleric by the name of Navvab Safavi in 1945. They were against all that was 
non-Islamic. They were against alcohol, cigarettes, movies, opium, gambling, and 
western clothing. Their political goal was to establish a Shi’a Islamic Republic. They 
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began their political activities by assassination of some government officials and famous 
secular writers. 
 
Committees of Muslim Alliance (heyat-ha-ye mo’talefe-ye eslami) 
By the 1960s, many Muslim groups were on a different path of struggle. The first group 
was the Committees of Islamic Alliance. The activities of some of its politically 
experienced members could be traced back to Mosaddegh’s time, whereas some were 
relatively young and inexperienced. Socially, most members were small merchants. The 
armed struggle for this group, and many of the Islamic groups, did not seek the same 
goals as Marxists. While Marxists advocated armed struggle as both strategy and tactic, 
and a way of creating an armed uprising, Muslims had a different idea. Their aim was to 
physically destroy certain individuals—a more limited plan—within the Shah’s 
government. Although they had generated a list of those to be assassinated, they were not 
able to get past their first target. In February 1964, they assassinated Prime Minister 
Mansour. Within a few weeks, all 20 members of the group were arrested and four of 
their leaders were executed. The rest were given 15-year to life sentences.  
 
 
The Party of Islamic Nations (Hezb-e malal-e eslami) 
There was a second group that made an effort (since they never actually carried out any 
armed actions) to fight against dictatorship. This group, a more educated and younger 
bunch than Committee of Islamic Alliance, called itself The Party of Islamic Nations. In 
1965, the Shah’s secret police was able to arrest 80 of its members and affiliates, 25 of 
whom were released and the rest imprisoned. Among the arrested were some prominent 
clergy. 
 
Committee of Islamic Alliance (Shora-ye Ettehadi-ye Eslami) 
Another major Muslim group that made significant contributions to Iranian Islamic 
Opposition was the “Committees of Islamic Alliance.” The death of Boroujerdi opened 
the gates of cleric involvement in politics. Until 1961, the year Boroujerdi died, clerics 
were discouraged from getting involved in politics. After his death, they no longer faced 
opposition in this regard.  Ayatollah Khomeini was among those who started this move 
by making contentious statements against the Shah’s regime. Khomeini was able to make 
a more sophisticated argument in questioning the Shah. He went beyond the two main 
reasons for clerical conflict: opposing women’s rights and opposing land reform. He 
posed more popular demands that involved other sectors of society. The reason this group 
was named the Committee of Islamic Alliance has much to do with Khomeini’s role as a 
linchpin.  
 
Organization of Iranian Peoples Mujahedin (sazman-e mojahedin-e khalgh-e Iran) 
Three former members of the Liberation Movement founded The Organization of Iranian 
People’s Mojahedin in the summer of 1965. Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad, Ali Asghar 
Badizadegan, and Saeed Mohsen had split from the religious wing of Liberation 
Movement to found the Mojahedin. They were able to organize themselves amid other 
turmoil within the Liberation Movement. This occurred precisely when most of the 
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leadership from Liberation Movement was arrested under subversive charges. They were 
tried by a military court and sentenced to years in prison. 
 
 
Nationalist and Hybrid Organizations 
 
National Front (jebhe-ye melli) 
This group was one of the most enduring, and at times, most popular political 
organizations advocating reform. Up until 1979, it went through three phases of 
development. As a political organization it made some significant impacts upon the 
process of social change in Iran. However, the reason the National Front is mentioned 
here is not its political pertinence but how its members contributed to the formation of 
other Muslim and Marxist groups. It acted as a midwife, giving birth to many other 
Marxist groups and individuals. Many of these individuals later became founders of some 
of the major organizations, namely the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerillas. The National 
Front was originally founded in the fall of 1949 in Tehran. 
 
Liberation Movement (nehzat-e azadi)  
The covert and possibly repressed political inclinations within the National Front finally 
manifested through a major split. The more secular and modern leaders established what 
they called the second National Front. The more religious-leaning leaders, however, 
established the new Liberation Movement. This group, which endured its internal 
conflicts and the Shah’s repressions, played a major role during the 1979 revolution. By 
May 17, 1962, the Liberation Movement declared itself an official group within the 
opposition. Three major leaders, former members of the National Front, founded this new 
organization with stronger Islamic tendencies. The three included Bazargan, Sahabi, and 
Taleghani. 
 
Socialist Republic of Gilan (jomhuri-e socialist-e Gilan) 
The Gilan Republic was the first instance of ideological and organizational convergence 
in Iranian history. It lasted close to two years before most of its leadership, Marxist and 
Muslim, was killed or imprisoned. The leadership consisted of a coalition of Muslims 
belonging to a movement called the “Jangal Movement,” and Marxists, who were 
organized in the Communist Party of Iran. The Muslims were led by a prominent figure 
who had been fighting Tehran’s central government since the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1906, Mirza Kuchak Khan. Marxists, originally from a group called “Fergheye 
Democratic” (Democratic Faction), were led by Heydar Khan (Heydar Amughlou) and 
Soltanzadeh. In fact, this was the first cooperation between Marxists and Muslims as an 
organized political-military force. Contrary to some beliefs, both movements were active 
before the Russian revolution of 1917. Although the objectives between Marxists and 
Muslim factions were quite dissimilar, the means of a military takeover of the central 
government was commonly shared. The unprecedented alliance lasted nearly two years. 
 
 
 
 
 240
VITA 
 
ABDOLRAHIM (Abdy) JAVADZADEH 
 
  Born Tehran, Iran 
 
2007  Doctoral Candidate in Sociology, 
   Florida International University 
   
1998  M.A. in Sociology, 1998  
  Florida Atlantic University 
   
1995  B.A. in Sociology, 1995 
   Florida Atlantic University 
   
1988  A.A. in Architecture 
   Miami Dade College 
 
2004  Second Place Winner: 2003-2004 Teaching Assistant 
  Excellence in Teaching 
  Florida International University 
 
2007  Nominated for Adjunct Instructor of the Year by 
  Department of Sociology/Anthropology 
 
2007  Instructor, 
  Department of Sociology 
  Florida International University 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
 
Javadzadeh, Abdy (2006). The Culture of Suicide Bombers. A paper presented at the 
2006 MPSA Annual Meeting in Chicago. 
 
Javadzadeh, Abdy (2005). Marxists becoming Muslims and the Culture of Struggle in the 
Middle East. A paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American 
Sociological Association in Montreal.  
 
Javadzadeh, Abdy (2002). Iranian Marxism during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. A paper 
presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the  American Sociological Association in 
Chicago. 
 
Javadzadeh, Abdy (2001). Islamic Revolution and Its Effects on Urbanization. A paper 
presented at the 2001 Cultural Sociology in Manchester, England. 
 
 241
